America’s Foreign Policy Future: Public Opinion and the 2024 Election

The 2024 Chicago Council Survey finds there is often less division than imagined when it comes to long-standing pillars of US foreign policy.

Executive Summary

The 2024 presidential contest, like those in 2016 and 2020, features a clash of worldviews on US foreign policy.

For the Democrats, current Vice President Kamala Harris is the most recent Democratic candidate to act as standard-bearer of the ‘rules-based order.’ She has largely put forth a platform that advocates for the traditional American foreign policy of the past 70 years, centering the importance of allies and the US commitment to defending those allies if they come under attack. On the economic front, she has promised to protect American workers and plans to continue the industrial policies of the Biden administration that are pushing large investments into US manufacturing capacity as well as in high-tech sectors. While she has declared support for immigration reforms that would create more pathways to citizenship for undocumented migrants, she has also pledged to continue measures aimed at reducing the flow of asylum-seekers to the US-Mexico border.

For the third consecutive time in the past eight years, former President Donald Trump is the Republican nominee. As in his previous campaigns, Trump has advocated for a United States not necessarily less involved in world affairs, but less multilateralist and looking out for its own interests first and foremost. If he prevails, Washington may no longer stand by its commitments to defend allies in the case of attack. As a part of his proposed retrenchment, Trump has suggested withdrawing troops from key allied nations around the world or withdrawing from specific defense treaties altogether. His economic policies promise 20 percent tariffs across the board on imported products in an effort to correct trade imbalances—though many experts say this would effectively result in a tax on the American public. And on immigration, one of his signature issues, he has not only promised to stop migration from unwanted countries of origin but to deport immigrants already in the country through state-run deportation camps.

Which of these platforms most closely aligns with the preferences of the American public? Just as there have been foreign policy swings since 2016 between the Trump and Biden administrations, the American public’s foreign policy mood has also alternated over the past eight years.

When Trump was in office, Chicago Council Surveys captured how everyday Americans broke with the president’s more isolationist ideas. Surveys from 2018 to 2020 reported some of the highest levels of public support since the Council’s first poll in 1974 for an active US role in the world (Figure A). In addition, public support for defending allies (see Appendix Table 16) and endorsing international trade rose to new heights during Trump’s tenure (Figure B).

Since taking office in 2021, President Joe Biden has pursued a more active foreign policy agenda, reinvigorating relationships with other countries and uniting US allies to assist Ukraine economically and militarily against Russian forces. Additionally, after the October 7 Hamas attacks, Biden provided both US diplomatic and military aid to Israel in its war with Hamas. At the same time, as the rest of the world did, the United States dealt with a wave of inflation resulting largely from the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing challenges to supply chains, as well as disruptions to energy and food markets caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the face of higher consumer prices, some Americans now question whether US economic and military aid to other countries—even if they are allies—is warranted.

These combined factors have taken a toll on everyday Americans’ backing an active US role in world affairs (56% in Figure A, a near-record low) and their willingness to assist other countries. Many think US leaders should direct their resources to dealing with domestic challenges instead of international ones (Figure C and Appendix Table 2).

This does not mean that the American public is turning wholly isolationist. Majorities continue to recognize the importance of both alliances and superior military power to US national security and continue to favor international trade. While majorities support US assistance to both Ukraine and Israel, there are key differences between Republicans and Democrats on these conflicts (see Figures 9, 10, and 14).

But in an election year, most Americans are focused on issues closer to home such as inflation, the economy, and American democracy. Many think the United States is overextending itself at a time when there are significant domestic problems requiring attention that they consider more important in their voting decisions than the wars in Ukraine or the Middle East. And the very public costs of US assistance to Ukraine and Israel at a time of high consumer prices at home have likely contributed to these perceptions.

Still, Americans overall do not want a radical change to US foreign policy. Support remains strong for the core pillars of US foreign policy, and the past 50 years of Chicago Council polling suggests that is likely to continue no matter who wins the presidency.

Introduction

The 2024 presidential election will carry significant consequences for the future of the United States on both domestic and foreign policy, being the third consecutive election in the past decade that pits an internationalist against a nationalist view of the American role in the world. The American public has experienced both approaches in consecutive Trump and Biden presidencies and is once again presented with contrasting plans for the best way forward. While it is domestic policy that is often top of mind for voters in presidential elections, where do Americans stand on these competing outlooks for the role of the United States in the world? As Chicago Council Surveys show, the US public seems to be somewhere in the middle. Moreover, the past decade of research suggests that on key foreign policy issues, public opinion often appears to move counter to the policy platforms enacted by the sitting president.

In the first two years of Trump's presidency, the percentage of Americans who believed the United States should play an active part in world affairs soared to new highs—levels not seen since just after the September 11 attacks in 2002. Support for defending key allies such as Japan, Korea and the Baltic NATO countries also hit their highest points. These spikes came as then-President Trump was actively trying to pull the United States back from a more engaged role in the world, threatening to end traditional alliances, and launching a trade war with China.

Since taking office in 2021, President Biden has executed a more activist foreign policy agenda. His administration has united US allies to continue economic and military support of Ukraine against Russian forces and maintained US military aid to Israel in its war with Hamas. At the same time, Biden officials kept many of the same tariffs that Trump imposed on Beijing, and they have doubled down on industrial policies designed to boost the United States in its economic competition with China.

The 2024 Chicago Council Survey shows that while public support for alliances, NATO, and international trade remains solid, only 56 percent of Americans now think the United States should play an active role in world affairs—one of the lowest levels ever recorded since the survey question was first asked in 1974. Only a slight majority say the benefits of maintaining the US role in the world outweigh the costs. And half the US public believes that because the United States has limited resources, its leaders should focus on problems at home and reduce America's involvement in world affairs.

In a growing trend, partisanship is a core part of understanding differences in views on the US role in the world. There are deep divides between Republicans and Democrats on a range of issues—from Ukraine to immigration—and the two parties seem to be moving in opposite directions on core attitudes toward the US role in the world. But there is often less division than imagined when it comes to long-standing pillars of US foreign policy, such as US alliances and the importance of US military superiority.

I. Downward Shift in Public Support for US International Involvement

Over the past four years, the Biden administration has sought to manage multiple conflicts and competitions by taking an active approach to world affairs. For their part, a significant portion of the American public seems to think the United States might be at risk of overextending itself. Fewer than six in 10 Americans (56%) think the United States should play an active role in world affairs, the second-lowest percentage recorded since 1974 (the lowest was 54% in 1982). And more than four in 10 (43%) say the country should stay out of world affairs, the highest level ever recorded in the Chicago Council Survey’s 50-year history.

As has been the case over the past decade, Democrats are more positive about an active role for the United States. In 2024, more than two-thirds of Democrats (68%, 31% stay out of world affairs) think it is best for the United States to play an active role. While this reading is still solidly supportive, it is down from an all-time high of 78 percent among Democrats in 2020. That high-water mark could be interpreted as an expressed corrective to the more isolationist foreign policies put in place by the Trump administration, which included withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement, unilaterally terminating the Iran nuclear deal, and demanding increased payments from allies in exchange for having their security guaranteed by the United States.

Among Republicans, only a bare majority currently think it is best for the United States to play an active role in world affairs (54%, 44% stay out), though this has increased from 47 percent favoring an active role in 2023. Both 2023 and 2024 readings are a far cry from previous highs of 77 percent in 2002 and 2006, when Republicans were the greater champions for active engagement, and a signal of how far the Republican electorate has moved on foreign policy over the past decades.

Narrow Majority See More Advantages Than Disadvantages to US Global Role

The appropriate level of US international engagement appears to be closely tied to perceptions about the required commitments to undertake US involvement. Half the American public (50% combined) either says that the United States has enough resources to take care of its own problems at home as well as take a leading role in world affairs (33%) or that, because the United States is the world’s strongest and richest country, it has the responsibility to take a leading role in world affairs (17%). But the other half disagree, saying that the United States has limited resources and its own problems at home, so it needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs (49%).

Consistent with their higher level of support for an active US role in the world, two-thirds of Democrats (65%) say either the United States has the resources to handle a leading role while also taking care of problems at home (39%) or the United States has a responsibility to take a leading international role because it is the world’s strongest and wealthiest nation (26%). By contrast, majorities of Republicans (57%) and Independents (54%) say the United States needs to reduce its global involvement because of its limited resources and problems at home—though, as in previous questions, sizable minorities of both partisan groups take the other position. 

At the same time, a slight majority of the overall US public (54%) continues to say the benefits of maintaining the US role in the world outweigh the costs, a figure that is largely unchanged from previous surveys. Here too, two-thirds of Democrats (65%) are convinced that the benefits of maintaining the US role outweigh the costs, while Republicans and Independents are evenly divided (49% each). But the divided responses on this question overall underscore that Americans are concerned about the costs of US involvement on global issues.

II. Declining Support for US Economic and Military Assistance to Other Countries

Nearly each year of the Biden administration has been accompanied by an end to a major conflict or the beginning of a new one. In 2021, the United States completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, ending 20 years of US military deployment in that nation. In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, starting a war that continues to this day. And in 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale terror attack against Israel, sparking a massive Israeli response that now extends into both Gaza and neighboring Lebanon.

The Biden administration’s approach to both ongoing conflicts has been to provide aid to Ukraine and Israel, rather than involving US forces directly in the fighting. Although a majority of Americans continue to say foreign assistance is an effective method to achieve US foreign policy goals, that confidence has declined since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and Israel’s war with Hamas beginning in 2023. A smaller majority now than in 2022 say that economic assistance (62% vs. 73% in 2022) and military aid (67%, down from 75%) are somewhat or very effective foreign policy tools. Furthermore, an increasing percentage of Americans now say that federal spending on economic aid (51%, up from 41% in 2020) and military aid (50%, up from 42% in 2022) to other nations should be reduced. This suggests that the extended nature of both conflicts has demonstrated real limits to what US foreign assistance can achieve.

Support for US Assistance to Ukraine Weaker than at Start of War

As the war in Ukraine stretches into its third year, American assistance to Kyiv has become a contentious and increasingly partisan issue. Though a majority of the public overall continues to support aiding Ukraine with economic (58%) and military assistance (57%), support has fallen significantly from the initial highs of March 2022 when eight in 10 Americans favored US economic (78%) and military (79%) aid.

Support for aid to Ukraine has declined among all partisan groups over the past two years, but the decline has been especially sharp among Republicans. Between March 2022 and February 2024, Republican support for sending economic aid dropped by 34 percentage points, and support for sending military aid fell by 35 percentage points. Today, majorities of Democrats and Independents continue to support assistance to Kyiv compared to just 45 percent of Republicans.

In addition to reacting to opposition from some congressional GOP leaders, the drops in public support for sending economic and military aid to Ukraine may be partially due to the declining salience of the conflict and perception of threat that it poses to Americans. In March 2022—just after the war broke out—two-thirds of Americans (67%) cited Russia’s territorial ambitions as a critical threat to US interests. Now, just five in 10 Americans (50%) say the same.

Support for US Role in Middle East, but Also for Conditioning US Military Aid to Israel

Since its beginning in October 2023, the Israel-Gaza war has also divided the American public along partisan lines. And in a time where foreign assistance is already being called into question, the US role in the Israel-Gaza war—and its high cost to American taxpayers—may be another factor depressing public support for an active part in world affairs.

Across the board, Americans believe the United States is playing a positive role in resolving key challenges facing the Middle East (61%), and a plurality of Americans (42%) believe the United States is either striking the right balance (22%) in its support for Israel or not supporting it enough (20%). However, nearly a third (30%) say the United States is supporting Israel too much, a view more commonly held by Democrats (40%) and Independents (34%). By contrast, Republicans are more likely to say the United States is not supporting Israel enough (40%).

A plurality of Americans (43%) also say the United States has provided Israel with either the right amount (26%) or not enough (17%) military aid, while a third (34%) say it has provided too much military assistance. Partisans are again divided: pluralities of Democrats (42%) and Independents (39%) say the United States has provided Israel with too much military aid, while Republicans are more likely to say the United States has not given Israel enough military assistance (34%).

While 60 percent of Americans say that the United States should support Israel until the remaining hostages are returned, a slight majority (53%) also favor restricting US military aid to Israel so that it cannot be used in military operations against Palestinians. Nearly seven in 10 (68%) Democrats favor such restrictions. Independents are more divided in their views, but more than half (54%) support restricting US military aid to Israel. By contrast, the majority of Republicans (59%) oppose such restrictions.

Finally, Americans are hesitant to aid reconstruction efforts in Gaza following the conflict. Nearly six in 10 Americans (57%) oppose the United States playing a leading role in the reconstruction of the enclave, something experts say would cost more than $80 billion to complete. Just over half of Democrats (51%) support this policy, while majorities of Republicans (71%) and Independents (58%) oppose US leadership in this area.

Council-Ipsos polling shows that Democrats have grown more critical of Israel’s role in the Gaza conflict as well as in the broader Middle East. Their greater concern, relative to Republicans, for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the plight of Palestinian civilians is driving their more critical views of US support for Israeli military actions.

III: Enduring Support for US Alliance System

While support for an active American role in world affairs has declined, the 2024 survey also demonstrates durable support for some of the fundamental components of traditional US foreign policy. Americans view the US alliance system as beneficial to the United States, favor maintaining US military bases in allied nations around the world, want to maintain America’s superior military power, and are willing—in some cases—to use that military power to defend allies.

Majorities Support Maintaining US Alliances and Superior Military Power

Trump has consistently questioned the value of US alliances, which have long been considered an essential element of US global strength. While Trump has repeatedly stated that alliances do not benefit the United States, Biden and other Democrats have put allies at the forefront of their foreign policy strategy. For its part, the American public takes a positive view of US security alliances: nearly two-thirds (64%) think they benefit both the United States and its allies (51%) or mostly benefit the United States (13%).

Democrats are most emphatic about the positives of alliances, in part because they prefer a multilateral approach to international concerns.1 In total, 74 percent of Democrats say alliances benefit either the United States and allies (58%) or the United States alone (16%). One-quarter (24%) say alliances mostly benefit allies (19%) or benefit neither (5%).

Perhaps reflecting the messaging from Trump and his surrogates, Republicans are more divided. While 55 percent say alliances benefit either the United States (10%) or the United States and allies (45%), a sizable minority of Republicans (39%) say they mostly benefit US allies (and 4% say they benefit neither). Independents are in-between: six in 10 (62%) consider alliances to mostly benefit either the United States or the United States and its allies (49% both, 13% US alone), but nearly four in 10 think otherwise (26% allies alone, 11% neither).

Views in support of alliances are also likely tied to the fact that maintaining those alliances are viewed as one of the most highly effective tools in the US foreign policy arsenal (46% very, 43% somewhat effective). Reflecting their general preferences for multilateral approaches, Democrats (56%) are more likely than Republicans (41%) or Independents (40%) to view alliances as a very effective approach to US foreign policy and have been more likely to say so throughout the past decade.2

While a significant portion of Republicans also view alliances as very effective (41%), they are more likely to point to maintaining US military superiority as a very effective tool for achieving US foreign policy goals, as they have for the past decade. Six in 10 (63%) Republicans say such superiority is a very effective approach to US foreign policy, as do half of Americans overall (48%) and four in 10 Independents and Democrats (42% each).

Broad Support for American Global Military Presence

American goals of working with allies and maintaining US military superiority come together in the US global network of military bases. A core component of the US alliance system, the United States maintains more than 700 military bases in roughly 80 countries. In a case of bipartisan agreement, Republicans and Democrats broadly support maintaining long-term US military bases in many countries around the world. 

Majorities support long-term US bases in Germany (64%), South Korea (63%), Japan (62%), the Philippines (54%), NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (54%), and Poland (53%). In each case, majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents are in support.

Americans Ready to Use Force in Specific Scenarios

Americans also remain generally supportive of coming to the defense of US allies if they come under attack. The strongest support for such use is when traditional allies such as NATO or South Korea are involved. Majorities support using US troops to help a NATO ally like Germany (65%) or Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (51%) if Russia invaded. If North Korea invaded South Korea, half of Americans (51%) would support using US troops to defend South Korea.

When it comes to using US troops to aid Israel, partisanship plays a larger role. When polled this summer, 53 percent of Republicans and 34 percent of Democrats said they would favor using US troops to defend Israel if Israel were attacked by Iran. Similar percentages—55 percent of Republicans and 35 percent of Democrats—said the same about a situation where Israel was attacked by its neighbors.

Finally, when asked about using US troops to deal with one of the most contentious issues of the year—immigration—there are even deeper partisan divisions. While a narrow majority of Americans (53%) favor using US troops to stop immigrants coming into the country from Mexico, this is largely driven by Republicans: 84 percent are in favor, compared to half of Independents (50%) and just 30 percent of Democrats.

As the data show, despite Americans’ concerns about the costs of the US role in the world, Americans remain strongly committed to their international alliances, and they remain focused on maintaining a strong US military. One reason for their commitment to alliances: Americans see them as a force multiplier. When asked why they view alliances as beneficial for the United States, Americans say that alliances strengthen US diplomatic (57%) and military (50%) efforts around the world. And despite the shifts in policy between the Trump and Biden administrations, support for these two basic tenets of US foreign policy has remained generally stable and strong over the past decade.

IV. Support for Trade Holds Steady

Another major source of stability in American opinion in recent years has been on trade. Americans of all political stripes continue to see the benefits of international trade for both the United States at large and for their daily lives. Majorities say international trade is good for the US economy (75%), consumers like themselves (81%), creating jobs in the United States (58%), and their own standard of living (81%). Importantly, these stances are largely bipartisan except for views on creating jobs in the United States. Here, 69 percent of Democrats take a positive view versus 47 percent of Republicans.

But there is also broad support for greater economic self-sufficiency and some trade restrictions, especially when it comes to China. Even as Americans support international trade, two-thirds (66%) favor restricting that trade in order to protect American jobs. That includes 77 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of Democrats.

Attitudes on trade restrictions may be in part formed by economic competition with China. As economic competition with China becomes more entrenched, maintaining the United States’ technological edge in high-tech industries is a key goal for Americans. Six in 10 overall (60%), and similar majorities across party lines, say this is a very important goal, trailing only the goal of avoiding a military conflict with China (which 69% say is very important).

One way to maintain that edge: export controls on high-technology products. Eight in 10 Americans favor prohibiting US companies from selling sensitive high-tech products to China (79%, up from 71% in 2021), including large majorities across party lines. A majority of Americans also continue to support increased tariffs on Chinese imports. However, only a minority of Americans now favor significant reductions in US-China trade, even if it leads to greater costs for Americans (45%, down from 57% in 2021).

Conclusion

The American public is deeply divided as it heads into the 2024 presidential election. Topics such as the economy, immigration, and the perceived threats to democracy are major issues on which Republicans and Democrats hold starkly different views. These divisions also extend into foreign policy now more than they did a few decades ago. There are growing gaps between Democrats and Republicans in opinions of what role the United States should play in the world, best illustrated by the partisan differences on assisting Ukraine and Israel. However, these divisions have not yet fully manifested when it comes to the broader framework of US foreign policy. Americans still broadly support alliances, international trade, and the global presence of the US military, suggesting that the public would support continuity in US foreign policy no matter who wins the White House.

• 1For example, Democrats are more willing than other Americans to make decisions with allies even if it results in a policy that is not the United States’ first choice (71%). A majority of Americans overall and Independents agree (58% each), though just 46 percent of Republicans are of the same mind (and 53% disagree).
• 2Full results for the 2024 iteration of this question can be found in the Appendix.