What Trump’s Attack on Venezuela Means for the Region and the World

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife were captured by US military forces amid a "large-scale strike" against the country on Saturday. The two will "now face American justice" for their "campaign of deadly narco-terrorism against the United States and its citizens," US President Donald Trump said during a press conference. Trump said the United States plans to "run" the country "until a safe, proper and judicious transition can take place." 

World leaders largely condemned the Trump administration's actions, with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva referring to the attack on its neighbor as a "grave affront to Venezuela's sovereignty and yet another extremely dangerous precedent for the entire international community." In a statement issued by his spokesperson, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep concern over the situation and the "potential worrying implications for the region." 

With much still unknown, we asked experts to assess the immediate and long-term stakes for Venezuela, the United States, and the world.

Editor’s note: This article will be updated to include additional contributions as they are published. - Christina Colón, Director of Editorial & Digital Content

A Threat Against Recalcitrant Allies

Daniel W. Drezner

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

In the summer of 2024, I cautioned in Politico that a second Trump administration would be likely to increase, not decrease, US military adventurism: “Even though the term is directed at him a lot, Trump is not an isolationist—he is a mercantilist who prefers using force in this hemisphere.” The use of force to depose Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is a pretty strong data point supporting this contention.

Going forward, one interesting effect to look for from this US action is how other heads of state and heads of government respond. A constant of US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been to focus on pressuring or flattering the individual leaders of other countries. Some of my colleagues have labeled this a “neo-royalist” worldview, focusing on individual elites rather than laws or institutions. The obvious implication of this action is that the Trump administration is unconcerned with international laws or norms when it comes to attacking foreign leaders.

One interesting effect to look for from this US action is how other heads of state and heads of government respond.

I strongly suspect that the Trump administration will use this Maduro action to threaten the leaders of recalcitrant allies and weak adversaries that they might be next on the chopping block. Such threats might actually work. Just as US members of Congress have expressed fears of personal attacks during the Trump years due to his violent rhetoric, countries that lack great power patronage might prove to be more pliable to continued US pressure. Of course, the other effect could be for other country leaders to bind themselves more closely to other great powers as a form of political insurance against the United States. Stay tuned.

An Opening for China

Paul Heer

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy

The Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela gives Beijing another opening to portray China as a more responsible international actor than the United States. The Foreign Ministry immediately declared that China is “deeply shocked and strongly condemns” Washington’s “blatant use of force against a sovereign state and action against its president,” characterizing it as a serious violation of international law.

The response is consistent with a white paper that Beijing published on Chinese relations with Latin America less than a week after the Trump administration published its National Security Strategy. The latter prioritized strengthening US influence in Latin America, particularly at the expense of “certain foreign actors,” which was widely understood to refer primarily to China. Indeed, Beijing’s white paper outlined its comprehensive efforts to expand its relationships in the region, partly in support of “safeguarding national sovereignty” and in opposition to “hegemonism and power politics”—which was widely understood to refer to the United States.

Beijing has had an “all-weather strategic partnership” with Venezuela and President Nicolás Maduro in particular.

Beijing has had an “all-weather strategic partnership” with Venezuela and President Nicolás Maduro in particular, based in large part on China’s need for oil and Venezuela’s need for investment. Indeed, Maduro met with a special envoy from China apparently just hours before his capture by US forces.

Accordingly, China will join the bandwagon of international condemnation of the United States' invasion of Venezuela and will probably play a leading role in any UN response. In doing so, Beijing will seize the opportunity to score diplomatic points against Washington across the developing world and even among US allies.

Some commentators have suggested that Beijing could use the US rationale and means for attacking Venezuela to launch a similar assault on Taiwan. But this is highly unlikely because Beijing—contrary to much prevailing commentary—is not seeking an excuse or an opportunity to invite the international costs and condemnation of attacking Taiwan. 

Dominance in the Western Hemisphere 

Leslie Vinjamuri

President & Chief Executive Officer

The United States' attacks on boats in the Caribbean had rapidly morphed into something much larger and potentially long-term. The US has now intervened in Venezuela, removed President Nicolás Maduro, and, on Saturday, US President Donald Trump announced that the United States will run the country—including, and especially, its oil sector—and draw on revenue from oil exports to fund the operation. Trump also indicated that US military troops would likely be sent to Venezuela for an undefined period of time and with, so far, unspecified objectives.  

With ongoing wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan that Washington seeks to end, and a major geopolitical challenge between the United States and China, Trump has demonstrated through his attack on Venezuela that the new National Security Strategy is more than empty words. Dominance in the Western Hemisphere and the exclusion of other major powers—especially China and especially where oil resources are at stake—is the top priority for the United States.

The Trump administration has shunned consultations with Congress and with major US allies and appears to have only a limited interest in demonstrating a clear and bounded legal justification in international or domestic law.  An indictment by a New York court is unlikely to be seen as providing legal context for military intervention, and even less so for an extended occupation. But this appears to be beside the point.

If drug trafficking, an illegitimate electoral victory, or control of oil is the new bar for a US military takeover, we are in for quite a rough ride in 2026—and also in uncharted territory. The 1989 invasion of Panama and 1990 capture of Panama's dictator Manuel Noriega, the 2003 removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and the 2011 intervention and removal of Libya's Muammar Gaddafi all bear some but ultimately little resemblance to what we are witnessing in this moment.

If drug trafficking, an illegitimate electoral victory, or control of oil is the new bar for a US military takeover, we are in for quite a rough ride in 2026—and also in uncharted territory.

Many challenges and risks lie ahead. Venezuelans and probably also US troops will be among the first impacted. And with Washington busy fighting internal battles and possibly also running Venezuela, there is bound to be less focus on resolving the wars in Ukraine or Gaza, let alone Sudan where there has been little, if any, headway.  This will contribute to the profound and long-lasting consequences for US allies, the UN system, and the important, if deeply problematic, notion of the sanctity of state sovereignty and the wider set of international norms and laws that undergird international order.   

The rest of the world—US partners and allies but also its adversaries—now need to decide how to respond to a US president that has extraordinary power and is willing to use it in ungoverned and unpredictable ways. It is possible that Europeans may decide that their negative moral judgment of Maduro, combined with the enduring importance of their alliance with the United States, mean that remaining neutral is the wiser course.  EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas issued an initial statement notable for its considerable hesitation. The European Union has held fire on the legality of US actions under her leadership. Prime Minister Keir Starmer also issued an initial response that withheld judgment, calling for time to "establish all the facts and speak to allies."  It is possible, though seems unlikely, that the United Kingdom or Europe would actively lend verbal support for US policy in Venezuela. That would be short-sighted.  

The domestic consequences of today's actions will be profound. Will Congress fall in line? And will this further drive division within MAGA?  Will this set yet a new bar for any ability to check executive authority? Or will this generate internal dissent and contestation? The answers likely depend on how US engagement unfolds in the weeks ahead. If a US intervention turns into a risky, long, or costly occupation of Venezuela, the domestic reservations are likely to be highly significant, and not favorable to Trump. But at a time when many people at home and abroad have been willing to concede norm-busting actions, a successful, fast, and lucrative transition in Venezuela may be rewarded at home and abroad—as much as it is difficult to imagine. 

A Shock to the Markets

Lord Jim O'Neill

Distinguished Nonresident Fellow on the Global Economy

As an economist who spent most of my professional life immersed in markets, I have learned to not outsmart markets when it comes to these kinds of extraordinary moments. I will be watching the crude oil, energy, and other markets closely when they open in Asia on Monday morning through to US trading hours. 

Quite often, when such shock events have happened in the past, markets have responded differently than conventional wisdom dictates. Whether markets conclude that this intervention is part of a well-thought-out plan, that, amongst other things, could mean Venezuela—with such huge oil reserves—can produce and export substantially more, and crude oil prices could fall further. This would probably be something other markets might celebrate. 

The fact that this has occurred so early in a new year, and the subsequent fallout in US and other major equity markets, will be noteworthy.

If the reaction is to the contrary and there is no clear plan, an opposite and more painful fallout could ensue. The fact that this has occurred so early in a new year, and the subsequent fallout in US and other major equity markets, will be noteworthy. There is a strange quirk that if the S&P 500 rises over the first five days of a new calendar year, it tends to suggest a good year to follow. Of course, equity markets generally rise and don’t decline over a year, but on the occasions when the S&P 500 drops over the first five days, it is a strong warning it could be a bumpy year.

Separately from this, there are the actions that will be taken by most of the BRICS+ countries and the need for a refined and better international order in which their voice is stronger. It is going to be an interesting year.

A Pretext for Securing Access to Oil

Joshua Busby

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

In moments like this one, scholars often look to historical analogies for what might come next. The most recent experiences from the United States and international partners reveal that while regime change may be easy, subsequent stabilization and nation-building are hard. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are instructive examples and have contributed to widespread pessimism about regime change in the academic community. 

If one is looking for a best-case scenario, analysts might point to the US invasion of Panama in 1989, when the United States seized the country’s dictator Manuel Noriega on charges of drug trafficking. However, Panama has a far smaller population and territory compared to Venezuela. 

It remains unclear whether the United States will own what comes next in Venezuela, especially if the country descends into factional violence, which we have seen in other countries after the top leadership is ousted. Washington’s capacity to manage and support a transition in Venezuela is suspect given the downscaling of diplomacy and development assets at the US State Department, the dissolution of USAID, and the reorientation of the Department of Defense for “Great Power Competition.” 

The Trump administration has framed its actions against Venezuela as a law enforcement operation against drug trafficking, based on a previous 2020 indictment of Maduro, rather than a military operation. In the lead up to the attack, the Trump administration pointed also at times a desire to restore access to oil assets that were first nationalized in the 1970s with foreign assets, which were further seized in the early 2000’s under Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chávez. 

The more Washington uses this attack as a pretext for securing access to oil, the more this will play into claims that the United States is acting in a manner that violates international law and norms against territorial conquest—norms already under tremendous strain given Russian’s invasion of Ukraine.

The more Washington uses this attack as a pretext for securing access to oil, the more this will play into claims that the United States is acting in a manner that violates international law and norms against territorial conquest—norms already under tremendous strain given Russian’s invasion of Ukraine.

The rest of the Maduro regime was apparently left in place in Venezuela, and it is not clear the Trump administration has plans to go any further. Trump’s press conference today suggested the United States would run the country for the time being with some unidentified Venezuelans, possibly from the current government, and with an eye toward restoring stability and access to oil. This raises profound questions about whether further US troops will be deployed. Maduro had remained in power through electoral fraud, most recently in 2024 in an election that was regarded as stolen. So, the question remains, what happens to the Venezuelan government now? 

A Political Mishandling

Paul Poast

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy and Public Opinion

While some worried that US President Donald Trump was setting up the United States for an Iraq-type quagmire in Venezuela, I sensed that the administration was instead hoping for something closer to Washington's 1989 ousting of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. It seems that the administration not only pulled off such a scenario but did so even more effectively, as the invasion portion of the Panama operation lasted a month before Noriega surrendered.

While militarily successful, the operation was not legal under international law, unless the UN Charter's definition of "self-defense" is stretched to its breaking point. But the same could be said for what happened in Panama in 1989. In both cases, the US administration—George H.W. Bush in 1989 and Donald Trump in 2026—thought the United States had a national security interest in removing the leader of a Latin American country. And in both cases, the drug trade played a role in their justification.

While militarily successful, the operation was not legal under international law, unless the UN Charter's definition of "self-defense" is stretched to its breaking point.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was not popular in Venezuela, the region, nor internationally, as evidenced by the latest Nobel Peace Prize recipient. There was an argument to be made for removing him from power and both the Trump and Joe Biden administrations had long-standing sanctions on Venezuela. But Trump politically mishandled the situation.

In short, this could have been an operation that many applauded. Instead, largely through the series of clearly illegal "boat strikes" over the past few months, Trump turned this into a situation where, at best, many will begrudgingly acknowledge that this wasn't the worst thing done by the Trump administration.

The Ripple Effects on Russia and China

Alexander Cooley

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Affairs

The US capture and rendition of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro reveal how both Russia and China are recalibrating their revisionist strategies in response to US President Donald Trump’s openly transactional use of American power. Maduro’s removal underscores the potential limits of their influence in the Western hemisphere, while allowing Beijing and Moscow to reshape the global diplomatic and normative environment in more favorable terms.

Maduro’s removal dealt a tangible setback to Moscow and Beijing, each of which had invested heavily in Caracas as part of a broader counterhegemonic strategy. Russia formalized its alignment through a Strategic Partnership Treaty signed last May, institutionalizing cooperation across defense, energy, sanctions evasion, and technology. China, meanwhile, has extended more than $60 billion in loans to Venezuela since 2007, making it Beijing’s largest debtor in Latin America and a flagship case for its resource-backed debt diplomacy. Yet neither power proved willing or able to shield Maduro from decisive US military action.

At the same time, Trump’s unilateral operation reinforces long-standing Russian and Chinese critiques of US foreign policy that resonate globally. An intervention carried out without UN backing or even domestic consultation lends credibility to claims that the “rules-based order” has always functioned selectively to serve American imperial goals, economic predation, and hypocrisy. Moscow and Beijing will point to how US-led regime change produces instability and political chaos, rather than promote democratic transition, as was the case in the Arab Spring. And rather than compelling alignment with Trump’s revived hemispheric Monroe Doctrine, the image of Maduro’s forcible rendition and appearance in a Brooklyn courtroom may instead push vulnerable leaders across Latin America and beyond to politically hedge by diversifying their geopolitical partnerships.

Trump’s gambit may itself drive Moscow and Beijing to consider more aggressively pursuing their own regional territorial ambitions.

Most consequentially, Trump’s gambit may itself drive Moscow and Beijing to consider more aggressively pursuing their own regional territorial ambitions. Russia for years had floated the idea that it would be willing to tolerate US intervention in Venezuela in exchange for Washington allowing Moscow to control Ukraine. China may draw parallel conclusions, interpreting Washington’s actions as evidence that international legal constraints no longer matter and the United States has tired of its traditional alliance commitments, including those that would defend Taiwan. As the global order enters a period of accelerating transformation, states with both the capability and opportunity to reshape it may feel increasing urgency to do so. 

Turmoil in the Energy Sector

Rachel Bronson

Lester Crown Nonresident Senior Fellow on Energy and Geopolitics

When it was released a few weeks ago, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) elevated Latin America to the top American geopolitical priority. It also spelled out a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, aiming to “expand” US presence in Latin America. Three days into the new year, the outlines of this corollary are becoming clearer. The Trump administration is going to intervene directly where and when it believes it has interests to do so. 

Venezuela is home to the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, though its ability to extract and export has been degraded over time. Its heavy sour crude requires advanced skills and technology—and higher prices—to extract, transport, and refine. In the early 2000s, then-President Hugo Chávez began a series of expropriations that led to the exit of many US companies, a massive brain drain of Venezuela’s once world-class energy labor force, and years of lawsuits. As a result, oil exports spiraled from a high of about 3.5 million barrels per day (mbd) to about 1 mbd today. Venezuela’s crumbling energy infrastructure will require tens of billions of dollars in investment to restore it to its former glory. Although the United States still imports a small amount—mostly for diesel, asphalt, and heavy byproducts—today, China is Venezuela’s largest export market. 

When oil trading begins on Sunday night and into Monday morning, it will be the first test of whether Trump’s exhortations that the United States will “run” Venezuela will inspire confidence. Geopolitical shocks, such as what we’ve seen this weekend, usually roil energy markets. The Trump administration is betting on the fact that the market will welcome US intervention in Venezuela’s underperforming energy sector and that existing global capacity will keep markets cool. But there are many reasons to question this.

First, there doesn’t seem to be much of a plan for managing potential political unrest led by Nicolás Maduro loyalists, or by the opposition who expects to assume power now that he’s gone. Energy markets despise instability, and there’s good reason to expect turmoil. There is also reason to be skeptical, even if huge global investments begin pouring in, that Venezuela will quickly return to its former stature. I am reminded of promises made during the Iraq War that US investment would quickly return Iraq to a 3 mbd exporter (it took 10 years to get there) and eventually produce 6-8 mbd. Iraq is currently producing around 4 mbd. 

Energy markets despise instability, and there's good reason to expect turmoil. 

From a strategic geopolitical perspective, several key American adversaries have much to lose. Iran has been exporting oil to Venezuela since 2022 and has been collaborating with Venezuela on renovations and maintenance. Tehran stands to lose that role if US and Western companies become more engaged. Russia also stands to lose significantly if prices decline, as its war in Ukraine continues to demand higher oil prices.  The biggest loser though may be China. Beijing is watching another allied leader and resource-rich partner succumb to the United States. This aspect of Trump’s assault on Venezuela seems to respond to a concern outlined in the NSS that “non-hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, both to disadvantage us economically in the present, and in ways that may harm us strategically in the future.” China’s response bears watching. It is unlikely to quietly look away. 

When the Trump administration released the new NSS, many experts pointed out that such documents are often suggestions, not predictions. This weekend’s events seem to indicate it is more than a suggestion. 

The Humanitarian and Food Security Impacts

Ertharin Cousin

Distinguished Fellow, Global Food and Agriculture

The humanitarian and food security impacts of the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro are likely to be severe in the short term and highly uncertain over the medium term.  

Venezuela was already in crisis before Maduro’s capture. The economy has contracted more than 60 percent since 2013, nearly eight million people have fled, and more than 80 percent of the Venezuelan population is food insecure. While the biggest humanitarian risks will stem from the potential instability, supply disruptions, and breakdowns in institutions rather than the arrest itself, the arrest will certainly amplify these dynamics.  

Recent reports from Caracas reveal empty shelves as people rush to stock up on food amid the uncertainty. The sudden political rupture and leadership removal could quickly worsen conditions by interrupting food transportation and distribution, triggering further panic buying and hoarding, and forcing the closure of markets and shops due to community instability.  

History tells us that when a central authority is suddenly removed, especially by an external force, there is a risk of a security vacuum and violence. This was the case in both Iraq and Libya. Possible resulting actions include armed groups vying for control of territory, looting, and a breakdown of the public order, all of which could contribute to delays in the delivery of aid and receipt of other essential services. Conflict analysts have long warned that striking a regime without a clear plan for what comes next can create a vacuum that fuels further crisis, rather than stability.  

Risks of food insecurity are directly related to governance and operational capacity, including bottlenecks in food distribution. Venezuela’s food system has been managed through the government-promoted Local Committees for Supply and Production (CLAP). Even before this recent crisis, observer reports suggest that the program suffered from persistent shortages, allegations of corruption and politicization, and uneven distribution of food aids. If already fragile state institutions fracture or lose capacity after a leadership change, existing distribution networks, which millions rely on, could collapse or become dysfunctional. Even before this, aid organizations were struggling against political pressure and reduced access. Heightened violence and blame on external actors can make it much harder for NGOs and UN-linked relief agencies to operate safely, leading to further delays in food, medicine, and water delivery. Threats to Venezuelan domestic agriculture production and disruption of food imports may also further exacerbate the food insecurity challenge. Venezuela imports much of its food, and disruptions to port operations, foreign exchange, and trade logistics could further limit availability.

Heightened violence and blame on external actors can make it much harder for NGOs and UN-linked relief agencies to operate safely, leading to further delays in food, medicine, and water delivery. 

Where do we go from here? There are three broad pathways for the coming months and years. One is prolonged political chaos and institution failure. This scenario risks widespread food insecurity, market collapse, and humanitarian deterioration as public services break down; aid is blocked or proves insufficient, and violence persists. Another is stabilization with international support. If a credible, transitional government emerges, aid corridors are secured, sanctions are reasonably calibrated, and institutions are rebuilt, then food security could gradually improve. But this pathway will take years, not weeks. The final path is counterinsurgency and localized conflict. This would be the worst case, with fragmented authority and criminal armed groups dominating parts of the country and making humanitarian access sporadic and dangerous. Several analysts cautioned against this kind of vacuum even before the capture.  

The future food security of the Venezuelan people will depend on the next steps taken by the United States. If Washington will lead, as Trump has insinuated, then former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn Rule” should remain top of mind: “If you break it, you own it.” 

A Historic Breach in the Dam of Rules

Suzanne Nossel

Lester Crown Nonresident Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and International Order

The Trump administration’s decision to single-handedly depose, capture, and try Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro represents a historic breach in the dam of rules, norms, and institutions that have confined the use of force and violations of sovereignty for 80 years.  

US President Donald Trump proclaimed the United States’ intent to run Venezuela and make swift use of its oil industry. US Attorney General Pam Bondi boasted on X that the ousted dictator would face the “full wrath of American justice on American soil,” making “justice” sound unmistakably like vengeance. A few foreign leaders, including Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, voiced the measure of outrage that one might expect for such a brazen and almost certainly illegal operation. Beijing said they were “deeply shocked.” But UN Secretary-General António Guterres fretted mutedly about “worrying implications” and a “dangerous precedent,” urging dialogue and stopping short of criticizing Washington.  

The European Union seemed inclined to look on the bright side, with foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas referencing the European Union’s prior calls for a transition and blandly calling for restraint. Even Russia resorted to passive voice, saying that the United States' act of armed aggression “causes deep concern and condemnation,” but did not go so far as to issue such condemnation itself.  

At least initially, the combination of Maduro’s brutality and illegitimacy, and Trump’s penchant for attacking critics—never so on such vivid display as right now—tempered the uproar. By the time Americans awoke to the news on Saturday morning, the goalposts had already moved. No one talked seriously about trying to reverse the coup. There were online musings about a similar decapitation in Iran, or whether China might try such a move on Taiwan.  

It is hard to envision the Trump administration having patience for the intricacies of determining how or whether Venezuela can rebuild its democracy

Trump, meanwhile, has about as much regard for the so-called “Pottery Barn Rule”—former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s mantra for foreign invasions, “If you break it, you own it”—as the proverbial bull in the China shop. His approach to post-Maduro governance in Venezuela seems to involve firing a starting gun for a turn-of-the-century style Texas oil rush, with companies and executives tripping over one another to gain access to the riches. It is hard to envision the Trump administration having patience for the intricacies of determining how or whether Venezuela can rebuild its democracy. He seems scarcely aware that Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado is backed by an estimated 70 percent of Venezuelans, nor that Maduro’s executive vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, is a lifelong socialist ideologue deeply loyal to Maduro. Trump claims the United States will “run” the place but said the same about Gaza in early February before dropping the idea.  

For Trump, stunning headlines about a masterful raid and an antagonist brought low are an end unto themselves. Trump’s primary goal in ousting Maduro was proving he could do so and get away with it. If he can succeed in that—and perhaps in a second act of enriching US oil companies—Trump will have gotten what he wanted from Venezuela. Whether US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others more invested in the country’s fate will be able to sustain the administration’s interest beyond that point remains to be seen. The ousting of Maduro is yet another manifestation of the world according to Trump—where might reins, rules are trammeled, and victors gloat over spoils.