In Iran, Trump's Mixed Signals Complicate a US Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy

In his State of the Union address, US President Donald Trump mostly avoided foreign policy. For a president currently attempting to negotiate an end to wars in Ukraine and Gaza, this came as a surprise. There was no direct mention of China, even with the president’s trip to Beijing on the horizon. But it was the president’s limited remarks on Iran that stood out—delivered amid the largest US military buildup in the Middle East in decades. 

Two days later, talks between Iran and the United States in Geneva concluded without a deal or clarity on what comes next, apart from more talks.  

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke positively of the third round of indirect negotiations, saying both nations were “showing greater seriousness in reaching a negotiated solution.” But US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner appeared to be far less confident in a successful negotiation. Trump told reporters on Friday that he was “not happy” with Iran, reiterating that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons but adding that a final decision had not been made when it came to using military force. 

US Vice President JD Vance and other officials will meet with Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi, who has been mediating the recent talks between Iran and the United States, in Washington today to continue discussions. Technical talks are set to take place next week in Vienna as Trump’s 10-to-15-day deadline for a deal rapidly approaches.  

All of this comes just weeks after a destructive and devastating crackdown on protesters by the Iranian regime that resulted in thousands of deaths. The current context has made narrowing the focus of the talks to a single diplomatic objective extremely difficult but essential. A weak Iranian regime determined to survive and a US administration that has multiple reasons to wish for a different Iran—and may be both undecided and internally divided on the optimal path forward—make the risk of escalation high for both sides. 

The Trump administration appears to be pursuing a difficult but conventional strategy of coercive diplomacy, which rests on a threat to use force if negotiations fail. But coercive diplomacy is notoriously difficult even in easy cases. Success depends on clear communication by the coercer of the objectives of diplomacy and a credible commitment to use force if diplomacy fails—and to deliver in its stated intentions, whether it be lifting sanctions or ceasing the threat to use force. 

In this case, the attempt to use coercive diplomacy to negotiate a deal faces multiple barriers. Trump’s preferred diplomatic style is one of disruption and unpredictability. While his unpredictability may have delivered success in some cases, it runs contrary to best practice for a successful coercive strategy.  

The United States has amassed the largest concentration of force in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but the administration has been ambiguous about its goals and Trump has sent mixed signals about US intentions. Trump has said he prefers a diplomatic solution that would keep Iran from having nuclear weapons and stop their enrichment of uranium. But US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has continued to raise Iran’s ballistic-missile program as a problem that must be addressed, calling Iran’s reluctance to discuss its ballistic missiles a “big, big problem.” 

Trump’s earlier rejection of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) further undercuts the ability of the United States to credibly commit to a deal that is limited to uranium enrichment. When Trump pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018, it was partly because the agreement included a sunset clause but also because the deal failed to address Iran’s ballistic missiles and regional activities.  

Even if the United States were to agree to a limited deal with Iran focused on uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons, it would not resolve either the United States’ or Israel’s security concerns with respect to ballistic missiles—a real and fundamental problem that impairs the search for a limited deal. On Friday, just hours after the State Department told nonessential employees of the US embassy in Jerusalem to leave the country, it was announced that Rubio would travel to Israel on Monday to discuss regional priorities, including Iran.  

In the event of a US strike on Iran, the risk of a retaliation is considerable. While the current US strategy is taking advantage of a weakened Iranian regime, Iran still has the means to retaliate and could attack US military bases in the region. It may also attempt to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off access to one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints. Such a move could cause oil prices to spike, severely disrupting the global economy. 

The negotiations are further happening at a time when Americans have little appetite for war, and as Democrats in Congress are pushing for oversight on matters of war and peace. Next week, Democratic leaders will force a vote on a war powers resolution related to Iran, which has a chance of passing in the House despite the failure of a similar measure on Venezuela. For his part, US Vice President JD Vance has said there is “no chance” a strike on Iran would result in an extended regional war. But he may not be able to deliver on this promise.  

All this to say, the stakes are high for Americans, US allies, and regional and international stability. The European Union has once again been sidelined but continues to state its desire for a diplomatic solution. The United Kingdom is attempting to support a diplomatic solution—and apparently resisting the president’s attempts to use the Diego Garcia base in the Chagos Islands as a launch point for any potential attack against Iran. On Friday, the UK government withdrew staff from the British Embassy in Iran. 

While Trump has held tight to his desire to be the “president of the peace,” he has proved he is willing to use military force. But Iran is not Venezuela, and its location in a complicated region makes the situation incomparably more complex. Even if a limited deal focused solely on nuclear enrichment is reached, concerns surrounding Iran’s ballistic-missile program and support of regional proxy groups will remain. Israel's security concerns, Iran's backlash, and a complex regional environment ripe for misunderstanding and aggression make the risk of escalation in this current moment considerable.