Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America's Allies

A task force, cochaired by Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, and Kevin Rudd with Ivo Daalder, argues that fraying American alliances and a rapidly changing security environment have shaken America’s nuclear security guarantees and threaten the 50-year-old nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Executive Summary

In recent decades, the threat of nuclear proliferation has emanated primarily from the Middle East and from south and northeast Asia. But the proliferation threat wasn’t always concentrated in these regions. Long before countries like North Korea and Iran topped the list of nuclear threats, leaders in Washington and elsewhere worried about a different group of countries—America’s allies in Europe and Asia. Indeed, in the early 1960s, intelligence officials projected that by the mid-1970s there likely would be 10 to 15 nuclear powers in the world within a decade, as countries like Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey would opt to join a growing nuclear club.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was designed to prevent this, and it did. But it succeeded in large part because of a concerted US effort since the 1960s to reassure its allies around the world that America’s nuclear umbrella would extend to their territory and ensure their security. Rather than developing their own national nuclear capabilities, key allies in Europe and Asia opted to rely on the US nuclear guarantee instead. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, just four countries (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons.

More recently, however, questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have arisen again in Europe and Asia. Allies in both regions confront growing military threats from a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and a nuclear North Korea. At the same time, successive US administrations have sought to retreat from some longstanding commitments, leaving America’s allies around the world uncertain whether they can still rely on the United States for their defense and security—nuclear and otherwise. So far, the discussions about nuclear deterrence and reassurance have played out largely beyond public view. But the issue is becoming increasingly salient, given growing threats from Russia and China especially, and growing doubts about the United States. America and its allies cannot ignore this new reality. For if we are to prevent new nuclear proliferation among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming thinkable once more.

Although the Biden administration has pledged to reaffirm long-standing US security commitments to its allies, a change in administration alone is unlikely to suffice in reestablishing the credibility of the US security guarantee, including the nuclear umbrella, in the eyes of most allies. Trust has been broken, and it will take more than a simple return to business as usual to reassure allies of America’s commitments. If Washington is to reestablish its credibility, it will take time and great effort on the part of both the United States and its allies to rebuild confidence in their joint framework for collective defense.

The United States will have to take the lead in rebuilding trust and confidence in its security commitments—including the nuclear guarantee. It will have to demonstrate that commitment in new and evident ways and work closely and collaboratively with its allies in Europe and Asia to renew their collective defense framework, including especially its long-neglected but increasingly important nuclear dimension. At the same time, allies will need to do their part to help rebuild the relationships with Washington and among themselves to strengthen overall deterrence and make US reassurance more credible and convincing. And all of the allies will need to commit to rethinking the arms control framework, nuclear and conventional, that should guide relations between the United States, Russia, China, and key Asian and European powers.

To that end, we make the following recommendations:

Rebuilding US Leadership

There are three major steps the United States can take to rebuild confidence in the US security commitments to its allies, including recommitting to extended nuclear deterrence.

• The president of the United States should reaffirm the foundational cornerstones of America’s security commitments , including reaffirming its treaty-based collective defense commitments unequivocally, reversing the decision to remove US troops from Germany and elsewhere, and negotiating long-term, balanced cost-sharing arrangements for US forces based in Europe and Asia.
• The United States needs to proactively raise the salience  of  nuclear  weapons issues in its alliance relations , including by bringing allies into the nuclear planning process from the outset, increasing alliance crisis- management exercises, and involving alliance leaders at the highest level in regular wargaming.
• The United States needs to take steps to bolster the deterrence  and  defense capabilities of the European and Asian alliances , including increasing conventional defense capabilities in Europe and Asia, deploying additional missile defense capabilities, and, if needed, reviewing its nonstrategic nuclear weapons posture in consultations with allies to assure the adequacy of its forward-based systems and commitments.

Strengthening European Defense Capabilities

There is a pressing need to rebalance the transatlantic partnership.

• Europe needs to take more responsibility for its  own  defense  and  security, and the United States needs to actively encourage and promote European defense and security cooperation and autonomy.
• European  defense  cooperation  needs to focus on real military capabilities, not just more processes, including by fulfilling existing commitments to make real investments to improve warfighting capabilities and enhancing overall readiness and the rapid deployability of European forces.
• Europe needs to build up the nuclear dimension of its defense efforts,  including by retaining and modernizing capabilities for existing NATO nuclear missions and by France and Britain working together to extend their nuclear deterrents to their European allies.