Perhaps the Pendulum Will Swing Back

When it comes to foreign economic policy, it seems that throughout its history the United States has rarely done anything halfway. America always goes to the extremes of openness or closure to the global economy. This has been true since the days before its independence. One of the animating “injuries and usurpations” that the Founding Fathers enumerated in the Declaration of Independence was “cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world.” 

In the early days of the Republic, the United States hoped to trade with everyone, while avoiding entangling alliances with anyone. Soon, however, the young nation began following Alexander Hamilton’s advice and erecting protectionist trade barriers, beginning with the “Tariff of Abominations” in 1828. High tariffs became pretty much the norm from the Civil War to the Second World War—although the United States did welcome foreign direct investment and migrant labor for most of that era.

After 1945, US policymakers learned the lessons of the interwar period’s disastrous protectionism. Successive administrations from both parties crafted a liberal international order designed to bolster allies, defeat communism, and make the world more peaceful and prosperous. The US economy was the most open it had ever been. 

But about a decade ago, the tide began to turn toward closure. That shift has supercharged over the past year. The Trump administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and immigration enforcement actions are merely the most noticeable in the attempt to reduce US interdependence with the rest of the world. 

If the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ public opinion surveys are correct, this turn toward closure is not terribly popular with the American people. Perhaps the pendulum will swing back in the coming years. But American history suggests that when it comes to US foreign economic policy, the status quo should never be taken for granted.