Most Americans Favor Increasing Sanctions on Russia

As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, the US public remains supportive of sending military and economic aid to Kyiv and in favor of boosting sanctions against Moscow.

In a move to lower energy costs for American consumers ahead of the midterm elections—in which cost-of-living concerns top the list of voting factors—US President Donald Trump recently announced a deal to import 300,000 tons of Russian diesel into the US market. He also paused a set of additional sanctions against Russia just days before they were due to take effect. The stunning policy reversal has drawn bipartisan backlash at home and condemnation from European allies, who argue that importing Russian diesel won’t meaningfully improve the global economy and only empowers Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

Data from the July 2026 Chicago Council Survey finds Americans support increasing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Russia, as they have since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. And despite feeling less threatened by Russia’s territorial ambitions, majorities—and a growing share of Republicans—remain supportive of sending economic and military aid to support Kyiv. 

Key Findings 

• To address Russia's war in Ukraine, majorities of Americans would support increasing sanctions on Russia (69%) and sending economic (59%) or military (59%) aid to Kyiv. 
• While 70 percent of Republicans support raising sanctions against Russia, they are more divided when it comes to sending additional economic aid (45%, up from 32% in March 2025) and military aid (48%, up from 30%) to Ukraine, though support for such assistance has increased over the past year. 
• Americans across the partisan spectrum oppose sending US troops to help the Ukrainian government defend itself against Russia (66%), but majorities would support the deployment of troops to defend against a Russian invasion of a NATO ally like Poland (60%) or the Baltic states (54%).
• While Americans’ general feelings toward Russia are still at Cold War lows, fewer than half think Russia’s territorial ambitions pose a critical threat to the United States (42%, down from 50% in June 2024). 

Majorities of Democrats, Independents Support Continuing Aid to Ukraine

Just last month, Trump signed the bipartisan Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which codified and expanded existing US sanctions against Russia, into law. The sanctions targeted Russian financial institutions, high-level officials and oligarchs, and purchasers of Russian energy, with the aim of bringing Putin to the negotiating table. Following Trump’s recent decision to temporarily waive the sanctions, lawmakers across the partisan aisle have condemned the pause and moved to counter the administration’s actions. 

For their part, Americans are most supportive of increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia (69%) in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, with two-thirds or more across partisan lines in agreement. 

There are greater partisan divides when it comes to providing material support for Ukraine. While most Americans—including Democrats and Independents—support providing economic assistance to Kyiv (59% overall, 74% Democrat, 60% Independent) and sending additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government (59% overall, 71% Democrat, 59% Independent), just around half of Republicans agree (48% military aid, 45% economic aid). However, Republicans are no more favorable of Russia than other partisans, so their lower support for sending aid to Ukraine likely reflects a reluctance to commit additional Americans resources to the war.

Across the MAGA1 and non-MAGA camps, Republicans express similar levels of support for increasing sanctions on Russia and reservations about sending military aid to Ukraine. However, MAGA Republicans are significantly less supportive of sending economic assistance to Kyiv (40% vs. 53%).

And although majorities of Democrats across ideologies favor the full range of policies toward Ukraine, liberal Democrats express much stronger support for supporting Ukraine economically, militarily, and diplomatically than moderate or conservative Democrats.

Rise in Republican Support for Sending Aid to Ukraine 

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, support for sending economic and military aid sharply rose to its highest level among all partisans (much higher than it did following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, at which point less than half of Americans overall supported economic and military aid). As the war dragged on, however, support for sending continued aid to Kyiv declined across all partisans, though most sharply among Republicans—reaching a record low of just 30 percent (military aid) and 32 percent (economic aid) in March 2025, following Trump’s contentious meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 

Since then, Democratic support has declined marginally, though at least seven in 10 continue to favor increased military assistance (71%) and economic aid (74%). For their part, Republicans and Independents have grown significantly more supportive of aiding Ukraine since March 2025, with six in 10 Independents (59% military aid, 60% economic aid) and half of Republicans (48% military, 45% economic) currently supporting increasing assistance. 

Increased support for sending economic and military aid to Ukraine could reflect more positive cues from Republican policymakers and popular conservative political commentators, who have reconsidered their views of the ongoing war and are now more supportive of Kyiv. The return of Republican attitudes to previous levels could also be related to Ukraine’s tactical successes on the battlefield, as reports suggest innovations in Ukraine’s military operations have reversed a year’s worth of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk.

Sending Troops to Ukraine Remains Unpopular  

Today, overall public support for committing American troops to Ukraine remains low (31%), with Democrats most in favor (42%; 45% liberal Democrats vs. 38% moderate or conservative). Just a quarter of Republicans (24%; 23% MAGA Republicans vs. 24% non-MAGA) and three in 10 Independents (29%) favor sending US troops to help the Ukrainian government defend itself against Russia. Overall, Americans across the board concur against putting boots on the ground (66% overall, 74% Republicans, 68% Independents, and 56% Democrats). 

From the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Americans have consistently opposed sending American forces to help the Ukrainian government defend itself and instead preferred to use diplomatic and economic tools to support Kyiv. In July 2022, support for deploying troops reached a height of just 38 percent before falling to a low of 26 percent in September 2023 and rebounding in mid-2025 (35% in July). At this point, support for sending troops among Democrats neared a majority (48%), stretching the partisan divide with Republicans (20%) to its highest level (a 28-percentage-point difference). 

However, Americans seem to recognize the United States’ role in the collective defense of NATO member nations. Majorities across partisan affiliations support the use of force if Russia invades a NATO ally like Poland (60% overall) or Baltic states like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (54%). In fact, a Russian attack against a NATO ally is one of the few circumstances in which the general public would support deploying US troops (see appendix table 1). Support for using troops to defend NATO allies has remained consistent since 2022, with marginal fluctuation above 60 percent (for a NATO ally like Poland and Germany) and above 50 percent (for a Baltic NATO ally).

Liberal Democrats express the most willingness to commit American troops to defend NATO allies against a potential Russian invasion (70% Poland and 68% Baltic allies), compared to less than half of moderate or conservative Democrats (46% Poland and 41% Baltics). Non-MAGA Republicans are more likely to favor sending US troops to defend NATO allies against Russian attacks (63% and 56%) than their MAGA counterparts (57% and 49%)—but differences across Republican factions are smaller than those among Democrats. 

Americans Back Ukraine’s Admission to NATO

Despite being off the table for now, solid majorities across partisan affiliations back Ukraine’s admission to NATO. However, there is a wide divide between Republicans and Democrats (21 percentage points) on the issue, as well as some intraparty divides. 

Nearly all liberal Democrats favor supporting Ukraine’s admission to NATO (90%), compared to 67 percent among moderate or conservative Democrats. Among Republicans, about six in 10 across the MAGA (59%) and non-MAGA camps (64%) back NATO membership for Ukraine. Republicans’ greater skepticism of Ukraine’s admission to the transatlantic alliance may reflect the Trump administration’s opposition to its inclusion in a peace deal or a belief that pushing for its membership contributed to Russia’s invasion in 2022. 

At the same time, the overall public’s support for Ukraine’s admission to the alliance may reflect a lack of understanding of NATO’s Article 5, which states that an armed attack against one or more members is considered an attack against all. If Ukraine were to be admitted to NATO, its war with Russia would extend to all member states, including the United States. Given that few Americans would support sending troops to help Kyiv defend itself against Moscow, there is a clear disconnect in public opinion favoring Ukraine’s NATO membership. 

Fewer Americans See Russia as Threat to US Interests

Today, just four in 10 Americans—and Republicans and Independents—are concerned about Russia’s territorial ambitions, reflecting the declining salience of Russia's war in Ukraine among the public at the time this survey was fielded. Americans have grown less threatened by Russia’s territorial ambitions since March 2022, at which point more than two-thirds across all partisan affiliations felt they posed a critical threat to the vital interests of the United States (see appendix table 2). Still, Americans remain more threatened by Russia than they were in the aftermath of its annexation of Crimea in 2014. 

Democrats stand apart from other partisans, sensing a greater threat from Russia (51%). Moderate or conservative Democrats tend to see Russia posing a greater threat (56%) than liberal Democrats (49%), while equal shares of Republicans across factions agree in their perception of the threat posed by Russia’s territorial ambitions (39% MAGA vs. 38% non-MAGA).

On a scale from 0-100, where 0 represents very cold, unfavorable feelings, and 100 represents very warm, favorable feelings, Americans’ feelings toward Russia remain low (but higher than their lowest rating of an average of 15 in 2024). Today, Americans give Russia an average rating of 26 (up from 22 in 2025), though Democrats express slightly colder feelings than other partisans (22 vs. 29 among Republicans and Independents). These levels represent a return to Russia’s favorability among the American public between 2017-2026 and reminiscent of sentiment during the Cold War. 

Conclusion 

Data from the 2026 Chicago Council Survey show majorities of Americans across political affiliations support increasing, not waiving, sanctions against Russia. Majorities of Democrats and Independents and half of Republicans also continue to favor assisting Ukraine. At a time when Americans are very concerned about their cost of living, their enduring support for Kyiv shows a lasting commitment to helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression. 

• 1

  Respondents in Chicago Council Surveys are asked to self-identify as supporters of the Democratic or Republican Parties, or as Independents. However, to better understand the different movements within each party, partisans are divided into subgroups. Democrats are divided according to their self-described ideological leanings toward liberal versus a combination of moderate or conservative Democrats. In the 2026 Chicago Council Survey, 62 percent of Democrats identify as liberal to some degree (13% extremely liberal, 33% liberal, 17% slightly liberal), while 37 percent identify as moderate (30%) or conservative to some degree (7%). For analytical purposes, we combine moderate and conservative Democrats into one group for intraparty analyses. Republicans are divided into MAGA Republicans (the 61% of self-identified Republicans who also say they are part of the Make America Great Again movement) and non-MAGA Republicans (the 37% who say they are not part of the MAGA movement).