Will America Be Back?

When US President Joe Biden entered the White House in 2021, he vigorously embraced a narrative of business as usual. The central premise of his administration’s foreign policy seemed to be that the United States was back after a fluke (the first Donald Trump presidency). But around the globe, skepticism of US leadership remained.

Then Trump was reelected and returned to the White House in 2024 with an even more pugnacious approach to alliances, unilateralism, and new foreign wars. The response from some Democrats and foreign policy elites since has been an echo of their earlier refrain: A new president will end the era of chaotic foreign policy and restore steady US leadership in the world. But is it too late?

While the United States’ track record is imperfect, Trump has made plain the foundational cracks in the US political system. America’s current era cannot thus be accurately diagnosed as a temporary lapse in judgement but is rather a manifestation of the country’s politics that allies must learn how to manage.

The concept of “American exceptionalism”—or the view that the United States is a unique and indispensable nation—has long anchored its approach to global affairs and foreign relations. But in recent years, Republicans and Democrats have diverged in their interpretation of it. While Democrats today largely see America’s unique role as a champion and leader of the liberal international order, for Republicans under Trump, exceptionalism entails the right to secure US national security objectives unilaterally.

While there is an acknowledgement that democratic systems are messy, the United States has become outwardly unpredictable and unreliable. Global leaders see a US system swinging from worldview to worldview in volatile political cycles that no longer promise eight years of relative stability.

Unlike in many other democratic systems, there is no way to course correct between elections in the United States. While votes of no confidence and calls for the dissolution of the parliament are common occurrences elsewhere, in the United States, impeachments do not lead to a change in government. At the same time, the US government shuts down or plans for a lapse in appropriations nearly every year (if not multiple times a year) due to its inability to legislate, and the president can seemingly unilaterally enter foreign wars or impose tariffs without any real consequences—even if the majority of Americans oppose such actions and Congress has not approved them.

This system will remain in place regardless of who is inaugurated in 2029. Questions about whether allies can rely on the United States are not just about Trump’s presidency, but about the foundations of American power and the inefficacy of the nation’s checks and balances. Indeed, Republicans who once claimed to value alliances as a core pillar of American security (some of whom critiqued Trump back in 2016) are now his envoys and his surrogates.

In its 250th year, America needs to approach its foreign policy through the system it has, not the system foreign policy elites wish for. This means that Congress must reassert itself in proactive and systematic ways in foreign affairs. By overly deferring to the president—especially on issues that squarely fall in its lane, such as war powers—Congress has contributed to the atrophied system of checks and balances that is pushing allies to consider their options vis-à-vis the United States.

At the same time, the United States needs to contemplate what message it wants to send to the world going forward—and whether such a projection is in tension with America’s political reality.

Allies are not planning for the return of a past iteration of America. It would behoove Americans to start doing the same. A return to a begone era of foreign policy is not possible. And even if it was, recent history suggests it would not survive beyond one election cycle. The world has changed since US statesmen designed the current system almost 80 years ago. America must too.