A Moment of Great Disruption

Recent primary elections in Michigan and Missouri have sharpened the debate about the future of both the Republicans and the Democrats ahead of the November 3 midterms, the outcome of which will determine whether US President Donald Trump spends the next two years battling Congress or emboldened by the polls. Foreign policy is unlikely to provide any relief. The United States is likely to remain entangled in conflict with Iran, even if recent Council polling finds that most Americans see more costs than benefits to the fighting. America's allies and partners, meanwhile, are trying to determine whether the current disruption will pass with President Trump, or whether this is a feature of the future international order.

These are big questions, none of which have an easy answer. And they are interconnected. Already, the midterms are shaping Trump's calculations about the costs and benefits of war in the Middle East, for example. This week, I consider five questions that will shape our understanding of what comes next.

What comes after Trump—and has America been permanently changed?

Politically, it is impossible to predict what comes after Trump. Much will depend on the choices American voters are offered on election day. Trump’s approval rating is low—35 percent in the latest Reuters/Ipsos poll—but he remains influential in Republican primaries. Two hundred and twenty of the 227 candidates Trump endorsed had won their primaries by early July, though there have since been notable defeats in Michigan and Tennessee. If Democrats nominate a candidate who cannot win in the handful of swing states that decide presidential elections, association with Trump’s policies will not, by itself, be disqualifying whether these policies are popular or not.

For many outside the United States, the more consequential question is not who wins, but whether America’s current trade, technology, and security policies will be carried forward by any American president. Many people believe the United States will continue a transactional approach to alliances, an instrumental approach to trade, and that America's commitment to international leadership is over.

I agree that there is no going back. The next president will likely continue to press Europe to spend more on defense, although NATO’s new commitments mean much of that work is already underway. Tariffs are also likely to carry forward in some form now that they provide a source of revenue, and at a time when federal debt is historically high and projected to keep rising. The current set of tariffs could also breed vested interests, making a reversal politically difficult. But the current disruptive approach to tariffs seems less likely to continue. Strategic competition with China—and tighter scrutiny of advanced technology flows—will almost certainly persist, even if the instruments and intensity change.

But foreign policy is only part of the story. The more important question may be whether the next president enacts meaningful restraints on executive authority and attempts to rebuild a rules-based order grounded in shared values and common interests among US allies. Even if the next administration renegotiates the rules (and I think it will), “not going back” could mean renegotiating the terms of cooperation through diplomacy and within alliances, rather than through radical disruption.

In a world that is defined by a far more competitive security environment and the continuing ‘China Challenge,’ I think the next president will conclude that America is more secure and prosperous when it works with allies in Asia and Europe on issues of defense, nuclear strategy, and technology. However, I am far less confident that the United States can easily regain the trust of its allies. This will require steady diplomacy, transparency, and a heavy investment in repairing broken relationships, including with civil society. Even then, the United States is unlikely to return to the era of large-scale foreign assistance (though US commitments to foreign aid were never as large as Americans assumed). I also do not anticipate a return to previous efforts to develop a counteroffer to China for the Global South.

On Israel, both Trump and former US President Joe Biden may have laid the groundwork for a transformation in the bilateral relationship. This will remain strategically important, but it is likely to become more conditional. Here, too, the old status quo is unlikely to return.

How will the Iran war end?

The more plausible future is an ongoing pattern of conflict and temporary ceasefires. In other words, movement between a hot and cold war. The immediate question is whether the current diplomacy can reopen the Strait of Hormuz without formalizing Iran’s wartime leverage over it.

Still, even a workable agreement on the strait would not resolve the underlying disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, its regional influence, Israel’s security, or the future of US-Iranian relations. Instead, greater insecurity in the region is driving new alignments and coalitions in search of security that the United States has failed to provide. The signing of a mutual defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan is a clear example of this.

Will the midterms constrain or strengthen Trump?

On this question, it is important to distinguish formal congressional power from practical political constraints. If Democrats take the House of Representatives, hearings and investigations would intensify but the consequences would extend further: They could block much of Trump’s remaining legislative agenda and use appropriations, subpoenas, and war powers resolutions to pressure the administration. That would matter.

Even so, a House majority alone would not fully bind Trump, who has continued to expand and rely on the executive authority of the president, especially on foreign policy. A Democratic House could create friction, scrutiny, and political costs without fundamentally constraining the president. And if Republicans retain both chambers, he will almost certainly claim a mandate and emerge stronger.

In general, like many presidents in the second half of their term, Trump is likely to become even more invested in foreign policy after the midterms. This could create even greater disruption, especially for US allies.

Who defines the Democratic Party’s future: progressives, moderates, or a new populist coalition?

Michigan sharpened the debate about who will define the Democratic Party’s future, but it did not settle it. Abdul El-Sayed’s narrow victory over the establishment-backed Haley Stevens showed that an economic-populist message can win a statewide Democratic primary in a state carried by Trump. Yet the margin was under one point. The general election will test whether that coalition can travel beyond a primary.

I do not expect the struggle between progressives, moderates, and populist coalitions to be resolved anytime soon. Nor do I think it is purely generational; the 2024 election does not support that simple interpretation. The familiar labels may obscure the coalition that is beginning to take shape. Policies such as government-provided healthcare and higher taxes on wealthy people and corporations command more support among Independents than the “democratic socialist” label does. Moderates can point to the importance of electability and credibility in swing states; progressives can point to greater enthusiasm and a stronger diagnosis of the economic dislocation that produced Trumpism.

The party’s future may therefore belong not to one faction but to candidates who can combine economic populism with institutional competence, patriotism, and a less doctrinaire approach to cultural questions. And never forget how far likeability can go to alter electoral outcomes. The real contest is over who can mobilize the Democratic base without losing working-class and Independent voters who have lost faith in the party.

If the United States no longer wants to uphold the international order, who will?

We are in a highly disruptive moment. Much—but not all—of the international order is ending.

Middle powers are working to form meaningful coalitions on everything from security and technology to climate and trade policy. But this won't make for a new world order. Instead, we should expect to see relics of the old order still functioning, more or less well. After all, 72 percent of world trade is still governed by World Trade Organization rules, and there is every reason to believe the vast majority of states will send representatives to New York in September for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly. Newer arrangements are also still intact, AUKUS and the Quad among them.

But expect continued transactionalism, not a new world order of the kind we had grown accustomed to. The great powers will continue to assert their dominance, and competition is likely to trump cooperation. States will seek multiple alignments to protect their autonomy from great power coercion. Multilateralism will struggle to adapt to the current realities. Stay tuned for more on this as it is a major point of focus for me and many of my colleagues at the Council.