Transatlantic Publics Lose Confidence That Allies Will Help in Event of Attack

Running Numbers by Dina Smeltz
Hussein Malla / AP
Two men walk past the NATO logo

But both Americans and Europeans are hopeful that relations will improve in the future.

The Trump administration’s demands to acquire Greenland from Denmark, threats to annex Canada as the 51st US state, and grudges against European allies for not taking part in the US-Israeli war in Iran—a conflict on which they were not consulted—have all taken a toll on transatlantic relations. Both the US administration and European leaders carried their respective grievances to Ankara when they met for the 2026 NATO Summit. While the meeting managed to keep “the United States onside” and restate the NATO Article 5 commitment in its summit declaration, there has been some European public opinion collateral from these developments over the past year. 

At first glance, a series of recent polling suggests that public support for NATO is fairly intact. Pew Research Center surveys conducted in 13 countries find a median favorability rating of 65 percent for the alliance. About six in 10 in the United States and Italy (57% each) and even higher proportions in Poland (78%), Sweden (74%), Germany (73%), Hungary (72%), the United Kingdom (68%), Canada (67%), and the Netherlands (65%) express a favorable view. A plurality in France is favorable toward the alliance (49%, down from 56% in 2025), while pluralities in traditionally NATO-skeptic Spain (48% vs. 44% favorable), Greece (59% vs. 38% favorable) and Turkey (59% vs. 27% favorable) express unfavorable views.

At the same time, Americans seem to recognize that the current administration’s policies have affected relations with Europe. Fewer than half now expect European allies would help defend the United States if it were attacked (47% in a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll). By comparison, just last year, 62 percent of Americans expressed confidence that European forces would come to assist the United States if it were attacked. 

For their part, European views of the United States have become more negative on a few indicators. A YouGov survey conducted in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom found far more voiced unfavorable than favorable attitudes toward the United States; in fact, opinion toward the United States is now the most negative since they started tracking this question in 2016. Pew Research Center polling also registered large drops in the share of Europeans who consider the United States a reliable partner, especially in Sweden (from 83% in 2022 to 31% in spring 2026), the Netherlands (from 88% to 41%), Germany (from 83% to 39%), Italy (from 73% to 34%), Spain (from 68% to 31%), France (from 62% to 27%), and the UK (from 82% to 49%). While 57 percent in Poland still consider the United States a reliable partner, this is also down from 85 percent in 2022. Hungary, meanwhile, stands out with an increase in public perception of the United States as a reliable partner (from 59% to 65% in 2026).  

Relatedly, trust in the United States to help Europe defend itself has dropped considerably. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) polling shows majorities in the 14 NATO countries included in the survey (along with Switzerland, which cooperates with NATO under the Partnership for Peace Program) think the United States would not defend them if their country came under attack. 

While some of the drops are undoubtedly influenced by the Trump administration’s policies toward Europe—including threats of additional tariffs, renewed threats of US attempts to acquire Greenland, and the Trump administration’s grants to MAGA (Make America Great Again)-aligned parties in Europe—majorities in France (59%), Germany (75%), Italy (66%), Poland (75%), and Spain (66%) believe European peace and defense is reliant upon good relations with Washington; smaller majorities say the same about European economic prosperity, YouGov finds. 

At the same time, the ECFR results show everyday Europeans are supportive of bulking up their defense capabilities, not only to appease US desire to rebalance the security burden but also to decrease their reliance on the United States. Majorities or pluralities in most countries support increasing national defense spending (exceptions: Estonia and Austria are fairly divided; Italy is opposed). More also support than oppose taking on common European debt to fund defense spending (exceptions: Bulgarians are divided; Austrians and Swiss oppose), and more favor than oppose developing an alternative European nuclear deterrent that does not rely on the United States (exceptions: Hungary and Austria are opposed). 

Despite Europeans’ disillusioned outlook toward the United States as a reliable security partner, there are hopeful signs among publics in both the United States and Europe toward the resilience of the NATO relationship. Half of Americans, including 69 percent of Democrats and 29 percent of Republicans, say current relations between the United States and Europe have been damaged but will probably improve with a new US administration. A quarter of Americans, and a 42-percent plurality of Republicans, say the relationship hasn’t changed since past administrations. Roughly one in 10 of the overall US public say that transatlantic relations are better now than they have been under past administrations (9% overall) or that they have been damaged beyond repair (12% overall). 

In Europe, the prevailing view is much the same. Majorities in France, Italy, Germany, the UK, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Portugal think US-European relations will improve once there is a new US president. Pluralities in Poland, Estonia, and Hungary agree. Yet between 17 and 36 percent across these countries say the damage may outlast the Trump administration.

About the Author
Managing Director & Chair, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Headshot for Dina Smeltz
Dina Smeltz, a polling expert, has more than 25 years of experience designing and fielding international social and political surveys. Prior to joining the Council to lead its annual survey of American attitudes on US foreign policy, she served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the US State Department's Office of Research from 1992 to 2008.
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