What the New Congress Could Mean for Trump's 'America First' Agenda

On issues ranging from tariffs and foreign aid to the use of military force and the lifting of sanctions on Russia, the second Trump administration has acted unilaterally to institute policies that depart from majority sentiment on Capitol Hill. While many Democrats and some Republicans have criticized these policies, members of Congress have largely been unable to take the collective action needed to shift course. Until now.

The midterm election resulted in a stunning rebuke of the Trump administration. Democrats are on track to win the largest majority that either party has held in the House of Representatives in more than 30 years and won Senate races in states such as Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina that have long been solidly red. The unpopularity of the war in Iran and US President Donald Trump’s tariffs were key contributors to the electoral landslide.

Even before the elections, a number of Republican congressional candidates distanced themselves from key parts of the Trump administration’s foreign policy agenda. Outgoing Republicans who have criticized Trump’s foreign policies may thus be willing to join with Democrats during the “lame-duck” sessions of the House and Senate, increasing the prospects for congressional action on legislation designed to counter those policies. And the electoral rebuke of the Trump administration delivered by voters may make some other Republicans more willing to depart from the Trump agenda. That said, the lame-duck session will be brief, and action on many issues will need to wait until the new Congress takes office in January.

Still, the US midterm congressional election results provide Congress with an opening to act more assertively to rein in presidential unilateralism and redirect US foreign policy—now and once new members are sworn in. With Democrats taking control of the House and Senate, there will be greater opportunity to advance a broad congressional foreign policy agenda that prioritizes strong ties with US allies and partners, restricts presidential unilateralism on tariffs and the use of force, and values both hard and soft power. Such an agenda would not just represent good policy but would also represent good politics, as it would have broad backing among the American public.

Here are the challenges that lie before the 120th Congress and some concrete steps it can take in the next two years to move away from Trump’s “America First” foreign policy.

Strengthening ties with US allies and partners

A particularly large gap exists between Trump and Congress on how the United States should engage with its allies and partners. While Trump has considered withdrawing the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sharply reduced aid to Ukraine, and harshly criticized many other allies and partners, most members of Congress think the United States should strengthen these long-standing relationships. Indeed, Congress has already taken steps to reinforce alliance commitments, including enacting a law in 2023 that requires congressional approval to withdraw from NATO, and including in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) a requirement that certain military assessments and certifications must be completed before the number of US troops stationed in Europe and South Korea can be reduced below 76,000 and 28,500, respectively.

Looking ahead, there are several additional steps Congress can take to shore up US alliances and partnerships. First, Congress should enact into law the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2027, which has been approved by the House and is currently stalled in the Senate. This legislation would further constrain the administration’s ability to pursue a large-scale withdrawal from Europe by prohibiting the use of federal funds to remove the US Army’s prepositioned military equipment from the continent. Congress can further foster its relationship with European countries by enacting pending legislation that would support Ukraine through mandating continued intelligence sharing, providing new military aid, and preapproving the transfer of American-made weapons by other countries. The new Congress should also ensure the United States maintains pressure on Russia to end its assault on Ukraine by nullifying the Trump administration’s recent lifting of sanctions on Russian diesel exports and reducing the amount of flexibility and discretionary authority granted to the US president under existing Russia sanctions laws.

Limiting the use of military force

Although the US Constitution gives Congress the sole authority to declare war, Trump has deployed the US military without congressional authority to combat drug traffickers in the Caribbean Sea, remove former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power, and enter into an extended war against Iran. In June, the House and Senate approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the president to end US military action against Iran unless Congress authorizes the action, but there has not been sufficient support in Congress to gain House and Senate approval of binding legislation that would force an end to the military operations.

The new Congress could reassert the legislature’s constitutional role as the guardian of use-of-force decisions by taking more aggressive action on the Iran war and updating the 1973 War Powers Resolution. On the Iran war, Congress could leverage its power of the purse and prohibit the expenditure of funds on military operations against Iran in the absence of congressional authorization of the use of force. On the broader issue, Congress could amend the War Powers Resolution to clarify what kinds of military actions are subject to the resolution’s restrictions. The resolution currently states that it applies to the introduction of US armed forces “into hostilities.” This language leaves unclear whether some uses of force, such as the launching of missiles or dropping of bombs without the deployment of troops in the target country, fall within the resolution’s scope. An amendment specifying the resolution applies to all such uses of force could make it harder for presidents to avoid congressional accountability.

Restricting tariffs

On trade, Trump has acted unilaterally to impose an array of tariffs on other countries. Recognizing that the US Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate international commerce, US courts have struck down some of these tariffs, only to see Trump impose new ones in different forms. Several Republicans have voted with Democrats to revoke some of the tariffs, but Republican congressional leaders have used their control over the legislative process to prevent such resolutions from being approved by both the House and Senate.

The new Congress could address this by passing legislation that repeals Trump’s tariffs and reasserts congressional authority over trade more broadly. One approach would entail requiring that Congress approve any new tariffs for them to be imposed. Alternatively, legislation could require the executive branch to give Congress notice before imposing any tariffs and provide Congress with an opportunity to reject the tariffs before they are instituted. Enacting such reform legislation would require overcoming a presidential veto, but the broad unpopularity of Trump’s tariff policies might make it possible.

Restoring a balance between hard and soft power

Since returning to the White House, Trump has increased defense spending while weakening key instruments of soft power. His administration has dismantled the US Agency for International Development (USAID), shrunk international educational exchange programs, and sought to cut the international affairs budget by nearly 50 percent. The current Congress ultimately approved a foreign aid budget for fiscal year 2026 that was considerably more ample than what the administration requested but still represented a 16 percent cut.

The new Congress should restore preadministration funding levels for foreign aid, with an emphasis on programs that save lives and enhance America’s reputation such as global health, disaster assistance, and exchange programs. In addition, the new Congress should invest in rebuilding and modernizing America's diplomatic capacity. Revitalizing American soft power in these ways would help the United States address key global challenges and compete more effectively with China.

Conducting rigorous oversight

While advancing these and other important policy initiatives, the new Congress could use its oversight powers of hearings and investigations to shine a light on faulty decisions, abuses of power, and misuse of federal funds by the administration. For instance: Why was the administration unprepared for Iranian efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US attack on Iran? Why did Trump accept the gift of a luxury jet from Qatar? On what grounds has US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth decided not to promote military officers recommended by the promotion boards of the military services? And how has the administration used the money that Congress appropriated for foreign aid? Getting answers to these and other questions would provide accountability and make it more likely that future administrations will carry out foreign policy responsibly and effectively.

To be sure, there are limits to Congress’s ability to shape foreign policy. Congress does not directly control America's foreign policy institutions, cannot act as quickly as the president, and is rarely able to overcome a presidential veto. As such, the president will remain the most powerful foreign policy actor. But the deep unpopularity of Trump’s foreign policy and the post-election turnover on Capitol Hill provide lawmakers with an important opportunity to redirect key aspects of foreign policy and rein in executive overreach. If the new Congress seizes the moment, it could be remembered in part for helping reimagine and reset America’s role in the world.