2025 CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEY

The Growing Partisan Divide on Foreign Policy

50 Years of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

By Dina Smeltz, Craig Kafura,
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

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Acknowledgments

At this 50th anniversary of the Chicago Council Survey, we want to thank all of those who have made this milestone possible.

First and foremost, we owe a special thanks to Lester Crown and the Crown family. The Crowns have supported the Council's survey efforts for decades and provided funding to support hiring the Council's first full-time in-house survey research fellow. Since 2018, the Chicago Council Survey has been a core project of the Lester Crown Center, endowed through the generous support of Lester Crown and the Crown Family.

The first Chicago Council Survey, conducted in 1974, was generously supported by the Ford Foundation and the Lilly Endowment. Subsequent Surveys were largely made possible by the generous John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which on two occasions underwrote the entire cost of the annual survey as well as its dissemination; in total, the MacArthur Foundation supported 15 rounds of the Survey and nearly every edition from 1982 through 2018. This comprehensive report would not be possible without their historic support.

The Chicago Council Surveys were additionally supported by the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, who supported every Survey from 2002 through 2018, and on several occasions by the Information Office of the European Community/Commission/Union. Since 2004, and annually since 2010, the Korea Foundation has been a consistent supporter of the Council's work to better understand American views of the Korean peninsula and the US-Korea relationship. Similarly, the United States-Japan Foundation has supported several of the Chicago Council Surveys since 1998.

Other organizations have supported specific projects within the broader survey effort. In 2023 and 2024, New America supported a collaborative project exploring the racial demographic differences on US foreign policy issues. A special analysis in 2017 of generational differences on foreign policy was supported by the Charles Koch Institute (now Stand Together) and led the Council to incorporate generational attitudes as a regular feature of its analysis.

We also want to thank all of the people who have spent years of their professional careers working to build a better understanding of the American public's foreign policy views. John Reilly, president of what was then the

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, led the Council's first foray into survey research in 1974 together with Bernard Cohen, Benjamin Page, Nora Dell, Robert Hunter, Norma Newkirk, and Carolyn Setlow. Led internally by Arthur Cyr, and benefiting from the insights, expertise, and work of Catherine Hug, Robert Pearson, William Schneider, Nora Dell, Bruce Peterson, Donald Jordan, Bernard Roschco, Trevor Tompson, Stephen del Rosso, April Kanne Donnellan, Richard Sobel, and Jason Barabas, the Council's survey became a key quadrennial study eagerly anticipated by global audiences.

In the new millennium, Marshall Bouton took the helm at the Council and led the Council's survey research to new international dimensions. The Council collaborated with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, COMEXI and CIDE in Mexico, East Asia Institute in South Korea, and Asia Society for international research collaborations in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Benjamin Page and Catherine Hug continued to support the now biennial survey and were joined by Steven Kull. Across the years the survey also benefited from insights and analysis from Michael Green, Gregory Holyk, Lawrence Jacobs, Dukhong Kim, Richard Longworth, Teresita Schaffer, Robert Shapiro, Jennie Taylor, and Dali Yang. The projects were driven internally by Christopher Whitney and Silvia Veltcheva, with additional leadership from Rachel Bronson and Thomas Wright.

In 2012, the Council brought on board Dina Smeltz, now Managing Director and Chair for Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, to lead the Council's survey research as a full-time, in-house expert. Under Dina's leadership the survey team grew, with the team including Craig Kafura, now Director for Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Karl Friedhoff, former Bouton Fellow for Asia Policy, several excellent research assistants including Lily Wojtowicz, Brendan Helm, Emily Sullivan, and Lama El Baz, and consultants Salma al-Shami and Gregory Holyk.

Under Ambassador Ivo Daalder's leadership, the Council's survey became an annual project with a formal Foreign Policy Advisory Board. Since 2014, this group of academics and policy practitioners have provided expert input and insights on the survey's questionnaire and results. The board has included Joshua Busby, Alex Cooley, Michael Desh, Daniel Drezner, Peter Feaver, Richard Fontaine, Brian Hanson, Heather Hurlburt, Bruce Jentleson, Ellen Laipson, Tod Lindberg, James Lindsay, Thomas Mann, Rana Mitter, Diana Mutz, Benjamin Page, Robert Pape, Candace Rondeaux, Elizabeth Saunders, Kori Schake, James Steinberg, and Jordan Tama. The team at Leff Communications, especially Brittany Williams and Delilah Zak, provided invaluable editing and design support for many of these projects. Finally, with the assistance of Joshua Busby, Jonathan Monten, and Jordan Tama, the Council resumed its biennial parallel surveys of opinion leaders in 2014,

providing an invaluable comparison of how average Americans and policy elites compare in their thinking on US foreign policy.

Last, but certainly not least, we are grateful to the dozens of interns who have volunteered their time and talents in support of the Council's survey work over the decades.

About the Council

Founded in 1922, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to increasing knowledge and engagement in global affairs. Our in-depth analysis and expert-led research influence policy conversations and inform the insights we share with our growing community. Through accessible content and open dialogue of diverse, fact-based perspectives, we empower more people to help shape our global future.

About the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy

We believe the public plays a critical role in determining the direction of US foreign policy and that an informed and engaged public is critical for effective policymaking. We aim to influence discourse and decisions on important US foreign policy and national security issues by researching public opinion and producing original policy analysis.

About the Chicago Council Survey

The Chicago Council Survey provides the most comprehensive view of American public opinion on critical US foreign policy issues, highlighting critical trends and shifts in thinking over time since 1974. The Council's polling experts, their annual report, and related topical briefs compose the Council's most recognized area of research. A signature area of study under the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, the Chicago Council Survey provides the public with a mechanism for sharing views with politicians and decision makers who each year cite the survey as a valuable resource for influencing policy debates.

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Executive Summary

As this report goes to print, the world seems to be falling apart. Conflicts rage in Ukraine, Sudan, Nigeria, the Congo, Yemen, and many other countries. The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is holding but tenuous, protesters are risking their lives on the streets of Iran, and Venezuela faces an uncertain future. It may seem like the world has hit new levels of strife, but a review of the 50 years of Chicago Council Survey data on American public opinion reminds us that Americans have lived through upheaval before, with varying impacts on the US public's outlook for the country's place and responsibility on the global stage.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War in 1974, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted its first survey of American public opinion on US foreign policy. In the five decades since, the Chicago Council illuminated public sentiment during and after the Iran hostage crisis, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the September 11 attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of China, Russia's decade-long war in Ukraine, and the ascent of Donald Trump to the presidency.

Since the first Chicago Council Survey, results have shown consistency in public support for the broad principles of US foreign policy despite global volatility. Majorities across the political spectrum support an active role for the United States in the world, support US alliances, and support the US overseas military presence, Americans generally align on the use of force when an ally or the United States is directly threatened. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents also view international trade as good for the country and say free trade agreements are an effective way to realize US foreign policy goals.

Yet these results show a widening partisan divide when it comes to the application of these broad principles, especially since 2015 and the advent of America First agenda. While Americans across the political spectrum once viewed immigration, tariffs, engagement with China, and support for Israel and Ukraine similarly, this is no longer the case. Now Republicans and Democrats—and Independents, whose opinions resemble those of Democrats more than Republicans in the most recent survey—see the world and America's role in it differently.They disagree on what priorities and threats are most critical to the vital interests of the United States, an important focal point for any administration. Partisans also disagree on whether multilateralism or unilateralism is the better approach to US involvement in the world, whether increasing diversity in the United States has more positive or negative impacts for the country, and on specific US foreign policies toward contentious international problems.

Consensus on Broad Contours of US Foreign Policy

US role in the world

Since 1974, about two-thirds of Americans on average have supported an active US role in global affairs. The notable exceptions were in times of economic difficulty like the 1982 recession, the lagging effects of the 2008 financial crisis, and the post-Covid inflation spike in the early 2020s. While support for active global engagement declined from 2021 to 2024, it rose in 2025, driven mainly by increased support from self-described Republicans. Nevertheless, the differences between active US participation and staying out of world affairs have narrowed considerably since Cold War-era levels.



US alliances

Alliances are another point of agreement with persistent and growing support. Since 1974, majorities have consistently said the United States should maintain or increase its commitment to NATO (growing from 54% in 1974 to 74% in 2025). While fewer Republicans and growing percentages of

Democrats have supported NATO in recent years, larger majorities than ever before say US alliances in the Pacific (72%), Europe (69%), and the Middle East (67%) benefit the United States or both the United States and allies (first asked in 2017). Moreover, the 2025 results find almost six in 10 Americans overall say maintaining US alliances is a very effective way to realize US foreign policy aims (55%), one of the highest readings since the Chicago Council Survey began asking the question just over a decade ago.



Use of US troops

A clear indicator of American support for allies is whether they are willing to send US troops to defend them. Consistent with their attitudes during the Cold War, Americans want to stand by their European partners. Then, the Council's polls found that roughly two-thirds of Americans, with majorities across party lines, favored the use of US troops should the Soviet Union invade Western Europe

When last asked in 2024, two-thirds of Americans across party lines said they would favor using US troops if Germany were invaded (65%). In 2025, majorities also supported using US troops to defend Poland (62%) or the Baltic states (55%) from Russian attack and to defend South Korea from a

North Korean attack (52%). Similarly, 41 percent supported intervening militarily to ward off a Chinese attack on Taiwan, up significantly from 23 percent in 2013 and just 19 percent in 1982.

Past surveys show that Americans are also likely to approve of military responses to what they perceive as a direct threat to the country, for example, militant groups like ISIS. Few are interested in using the US military for territorial expansion, even in the abstract (30% Republicans, 17% Democrats, 16% Independents). That support drops further in specific scenarios: More than nine in 10 Americans oppose using US troops to annex Canada (93%) or Greenland (92%), with similar opposition across party lines.

Globalization and International trade

When the Chicago Council first asked about globalization in 1998, the public was skeptical, with just over half (53%) saying its effects were "mostly good." Over time, the public grew steadily more favorable to the point where today, a record high of three quarters think globalization is beneficial to the United States (74%), including large majorities across political affiliations. In addition, Americans have grown more convinced that international trade is good for the economy (from 57% in 2004 to a peak of 87% in 2018, and 79% today). While there has been increasing use of tariffs in economic statecraft in the past decade, across party lines, Americans view signing free trade agreements as an effective means of achieving US foreign policy goals (84% Democrats and Independents, 80% Republicans). By contrast, just four in 10 Americans overall (44%; 78% Republicans, 37% Independents, and 24% Democrats) think placing tariffs against other countries' goods is effective.

Where Consensus Unravels

Despite agreement on these broad questions about the United States and its role in the world, recent years have seen growing partisan polarization across a range of issues. Today Democrats and Republicans (and Independents) disagree on the most critical threats facing the United States, the most important goals for US foreign policy, and how to deal with critical issues such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the rise of China, US-Israel relations, and US immigration policy.

Foreign Policy Priorities and Critical threats facing the country

In the Council's Cold War surveys, Republicans and Democrats tended to prioritize the same set of foreign policy goals for the country. Those included protecting the jobs of American workers, maintaining the value of the dollar, securing adequate supplies of energy, pursuing worldwide arms control, and containing the spread of communism. Today, Americans only agree on the

importance of protecting the jobs of American workers (73% very important goal) and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (67%).

American views of the most critical threats facing the United States have similarly split along partisan lines. This wasn't always the case. The first time the Chicago Council asked about threats in 1998, Republicans, Democrats, and Independents largely agreed, with majorities across party lines naming the same five threats as critical. In the 2025 survey, however, Republicans and Democrats overlap on only two items: international terrorism and government corruption. Democrats and Independents, on the other hand, show complete overlap on their top five threats: government corruption, weakening democracy, climate change, a global economic downturn, and terrorism.

Multilateralism

Though alliances are valued across party lines, how the United States should work with those allies and with international institutions has been a persistent—and growing—source of partisan division. Over the past decade, Democrats and Independents have been more likely than Republicans to favor playing a shared, rather than dominant, leadership role in the world, and this difference has widened with time.

Democrats, Republicans, and Independents also disagree about how involved allies should be in US foreign policymaking. In 2025, 60 percent of Americans believed the United States should mainly make important foreign policy decisions with major allies, the highest level yet recorded on this question in 50 years (56% in 2020 and 51% in 1974), while just two in 10 said the United States should make these decisions unilaterally (21%). Democrats (74%) and Independents (60%) were in agreement that the United States should consult with allies, and both readings are at their highest level since 1974. Republicans were more evenly divided, with 43 percent favoring consultations with allies and 38 percent preferring unilateral US decision-making. In a similar and decade-old pattern, majorities of Democrats (83%) and Independents (68%) say the United States should compromise, if necessary, in order to make decisions within the United Nations compared to just 44 percent of Republicans.

How best to deal with China

While Republicans, Democrats, and Independents shared similar views of China up until the mid- to late 2010s, they have expressed diverging opinions since then. Republicans are more likely to see China as a top threat, favor broad economic decoupling from China, and favor containment over cooperation. By contrast, Democrats and Independents do not consider China as a top threat, oppose decoupling from China, and favor cooperation over containment.



Attitudes toward Russia and Ukraine

American views of the Soviet Union were cool during the Council's Cold War surveys, though they warmed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. But since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, American ratings of Russia have dipped to the lowest ever recorded, with few partisan differences. While majorities of Americans regardless of political leanings blame Russian President Vladimir Putin for the Russia-Ukraine war, Republicans are more likely than others to say Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is also to blame.

But there are differences when partisans express their views about the continuation of US support for Kyiv initiated under former President Joe Biden. At the outset of Russia's war in Ukraine, large majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents supported US military and economic support. The data from the 2025 survey finds that four years into the war, overall majorities of the American public still want the United States to provide Ukraine with additional arms and military supplies (62%), though at

lower levels than at the start of the conflict. Since November 2022, however, partisan differences have widened considerably. Though Republican support rebounded in the July 2025 survey, GOP opinion seems to react to President Trump's alternating positions on supporting Ukraine. Partisan disagreement on aid to Ukraine remains high, particularly for economic assistance to Kyiv.

US policy toward Israel

For most of the Chicago Council Survey history, Americans looked upon Israel favorably. But the Israeli response to Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack—continually bombarding Gaza, which contributed to an estimated 70,000 deaths and a wider humanitarian crisis—led to the deepest partisan divisions on Israel yet seen in Council polling. Democratic and Independent feelings toward Israel have hit their lowest points ever, while Republican attitudes remain favorable. The latest survey finds a dramatic 52 percentage point difference between Republicans (62%) and Democrats (10%) on whether Israel plays a positive role in resolving the key problems facing the Middle East.

Perhaps most telling of all indicators on declining American public support for Israel, the 2024 Chicago Council Survey finds the lowest percentage ever recorded of those who say they would support using US troops to defend Israel if it were attacked by its neighbors (41%, vs. 53% in 2021). While a majority of Republicans continue to support defending Israel, it is at a new low of 55 percent (down from 72% in 2021). About a third of Democrats and Independents (35% each, down from 41% among Democrats and 49% among Independents) would support using US troops in this way, also the lowest recorded percentages for those partisans (see appendix table 5).

Immigration

Since the turn of the millennium, Republicans have diverged from Democrats (and, to a lesser degree, Independents) in their concerns about immigration and how to deal with the large population of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. Today, two-thirds of Republicans (68%) view "large numbers of immigrants and refugees" entering the United States as a critical threat—topping all other threats asked about in the 2025 Chicago Council Survey—compared to just 32 percent of Independents and 14 percent of Democrats. Republicans are also far more likely to favor deporting undocumented immigrants (46%, vs. 21% of Independents and 4% of Democrats).



A split in fundamental attitudes about America's racial makeup may partly explain views on immigration policy options. The 2025 Chicago Council survey finds majorities of Democrats (73%) and Independents (52%) say welcoming more people of many different races, nationalities, and ethnic groups makes the United States a better place to live, but just 29 percent of Republicans agree—and 35 percent say it makes the country worse. These partisan divisions may reflect the very different racial demographics among the party faithful. In the 2025 Chicago Council Survey, a narrow majority of Democrats describe themselves as non-white (53%, 47% white), compared to six in 10 Independents (59% white) and eight in 10 Republicans (79%). By comparison, in 1974, the overwhelming majority of Republicans (97%), Independents (93%), and Democrats (85%) were white.

American exceptionalism

These diverging views on immigration policy—and on diversity more broadly—point to growing differences between Republicans, Democrats, and Independents about more-fundamental questions surrounding American identity. This includes the idea of American exceptionalism, the notion that the United States' unique character makes it the greatest country in the world. Support for exceptionalism declined significantly from 2012 (when the question was first asked), falling from 70 percent in 2012 to 53 percent today. Just under half of Americans (46%) believe the United States is no greater than other nations, up from 29 percent in 2012. Driving this shift are Democrats and Independents; both groups have increasingly abandoned exceptionalist views, with the 2025 survey finding near-record lows. In contrast, Republicans' belief in American exceptionalism is largely unchanged from 2012.



Conclusion

Despite volatility in international relations over the past five decades, the American public has broadly and consistently expressed support for the US alliance structure, overseas bases, and a system of free trade. Americans generally appreciate US allies and recognize that alliances are an effective tool for realizing US foreign policy ambitions.

However, Americans are also increasingly divided along partisan lines on how best to exercise American power and to what ends. These divisions include a growing partisan split on the primary threats to the United States, the best way to realize US foreign policy goals, how the United States should work with other countries, and how to deal with a range of critical geopolitical crises including the war in Ukraine, relations with China, and conflict in the Middle East. Issues that tap into nontraditional threats (like climate change) or questions of American identity (like immigration) are areas where partisans most significantly diverge.

The growing gap in beliefs about American exceptionalism suggests that these two groups no longer share the same understanding of American identity and purpose. In fact, today the United States is challenged by a much more polarized population and political environment than in the past 50 years, which could lead to a more erratic United States in the world.

The United States of America will mark the 250th anniversary of its founding this year. As recent changes in government have demonstrated, the ways in which the United States projects its influence abroad now more often shift from one administration to another. Increasing polarization among the American public adds weight to this momentum. A major downside of this pattern could be US allies losing confidence that the United States will remain a credible and reliable partner for them, instead pushing them to seek international partners other than the United States.

Introduction

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted its first survey of American public opinion on US foreign policy in December 1974 to gauge public opinion on international issues. The survey was conducted in the wake of the Vietnam War and during the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. In the five decades since, the Chicago Council has continued to capture the sense of particular eras—post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, post-9/11, America First—and has sought to identify and define critical shifts in American public thinking.

Whether sensing stability or volatility in world affairs over five decades, Americans have remained supportive of international engagement, US alliances, and international trade. There is a great deal of consistency from decade to decade around these broad principles of US foreign policy.

But Democrats, Republicans, and Independents disagree on how to put these principles into practice. There are deep fissures that have emerged in the previously bipartisan consensus on the most critical threats to the United States, on the country's most important foreign policy goals, and how the United States should deal with adversaries and allies around the world. These divisions may prove difficult to bridge in future generations.

Chapter 1. Consensus around US Global Engagement, Alliances, and Use of Force

Public Support for Active US Global Engagement Rises, but Remains Lower Than in Previous Decades

Conventional wisdom says the US public wants to stay out of world affairs, and Americans are often described as isolationists. But after five decades of US leadership on many critical global issues, Americans broadly support US international engagement.

Over the past 50 years, the Chicago Council Survey has been asking Americans whether it is best for the future of the United States to take an active part in or stay out of world affairs. This question aims to measure public support for US engagement with other countries and involvement in solving international challenges.

As longitudinal results highlight, a broad majority of Americans (on average about two-thirds over five decades) have generally supported an active US role in global affairs. But attitudes shifted with world events, including an economic recession in the post-Vietnam decade that depressed support for an active role in world affairs to a low point in 1982 (54%). Amid a renewed US arms race with the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, internationalist sentiment returned and remained high following the Cold War, peaking in the wake of the September 11 attacks (71% in 2002) before slowly dissipating as the new "forever wars" dragged on in the greater Middle East.

In 2015, the year after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Donald Trump announced his presidential run, and Republican Party supporters, previously the staunchest advocates for active participation in international affairs since Chicago Council polling began, surrendered the internationalist mantle to Democrats. For the remainder of the decade, Democrats drove the public's newfound support for global engagement before the COVID pandemic and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 cooled internationalist sentiment across the board.



Public support for active engagement declined steadily from 2021 (64%) to 2024 (56%) before rebounding in 2025 to 60 percent. At the same time, the percentages who say that the United States should stay out of world affairs hit new highs in 2014, 2023 and 2024. Currently four in 10 Americans would prefer the United States stay out of world affairs (40%), on the higher side of previous results, resulting in one of the narrowest gaps between the two options on record. Chicago Council analysis has found that concerns about the economy, inflation, and US support for both Ukraine during their respective wars may have dampened enthusiasm for active global engagement.

Americans do not want to shoulder global responsibilities alone, however. Since first asked a decade ago, two-thirds of Americans overall (66%), including 77 percent of Democrats, 66 percent of Independents, and 52 percent of Republicans, say the United States should play a shared leadership role in world affairs, rather than a dominant leadership role or no leadership role at all. (see appendix table 1).

Mid-2010s Saw Partisan Reversal in Support for International Engagement

For close to three decades, Republicans were the most enthusiastic champions of an active US role in world affairs. Since around 2015, however, they have become less positive than Democrats about an active US international role. In fact, the largest slide in internationalist support has occurred among Republicans, with a steady drop every year since 2019. In 2023, for the first time in five decades of polling, a slim majority of Republicans preferred to stay out of world affairs (53%). But in 2024 and 2025, Republican opinion reversed course—currently, 59 percent of GOP supporters favor an active US role in the world.

Since the mid-2010s, Democrats have been the most unequivocal proponents for active engagement among the US public. Though a smaller majority of self-described Democrats (67%) now than between 2018 and 2020 favor an active role (during that time, support for global engagement reached all-time highs for Democrats), a solid two-thirds continue to back US global involvement.

Those respondents who describe their political affiliation as either Independent or “other” have generally been least supportive of an active role in the world, though in 2023, Republicans were the most apt to choose this response option.[5] In 2025, a narrow majority of Independents favored an active US role (54%, up from 47% in 2024).A sizable 45 percent preferred to stay out, reversing a slight majority in 2024 (52%).



Similar trends are apparent among those who would rather America stay out of world affairs. For decades after polling started in 1974, Democrats were consistently more likely than Republicans to oppose global involvement, a trend that persisted in the wake of US involvement in the Middle East following September 11, 2001. The mid-2010s, however, witnessed a partisan reversal. On the eve of Trump's first electoral victory in 2016, Republicans (36%) were likelier than Democrats (29%) to prefer staying out of world affairs. The partisan gap widened, hitting a peak of 24 percentage points in 2023 with a Republican majority (53%) advocating less international involvement (compared to 29% of Democrats), and has declined in the two years since.

Throughout the decades, self-described Independents have increasingly favored reducing America's global role. Before the turn of the 21st century, their views largely occupied a partisan middle ground. But since the time of the 2008-09 financial crisis, Independents have generally been more likely than Democrats or Republicans to say America should stay out of world affairs. Since the partisan reversal of the mid-2010s, their views have hewed closest to Republicans on this question, and in 2025, they were the likeliest

group to say staying out of global affairs would be best for the country (45% Independent, 40% Republicans, 32% Democrats).



American Influence Stable and Still Highest of All Countries

Lower levels of support for active US engagement do not seem to reflect a sense of waning US influence. While politicians often sound the alarm that the United States is in decline and losing power to other countries, everyday Americans of all political stripes are not yet persuaded: The US public continues to rate the United States the most influential country in the world. Out of a possible 10 points representing extremely influential, Americans rate the United States an average of 8.6, not far off from previous ratings going back 20 years. This view is shared across partisan groups.

Influence of the United States

I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale: with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely influential. ***The United States*** *(mean)*



July 18-30, 2025 | n=2,007
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

What makes the United States so influential? Americans are most likely to point to US economic power (71%) and military power (63%) as very important sources of US influence. These are followed by technology and innovation (62%) and international leadership (53%). Fewer than half view the US political system (44%), economic assistance to other countries (37%), or American culture (34%) as very important sources of American clout in the world. In a separate question asking whether military or economic power is more important for a country's global influence, a decisive majority of Americans pick economic strength (76%), outnumbering those choosing military strength (24%) by roughly three-to-one and continuing a trend in opinion since 1998 (appendix table 2).

In Their Own Words: How Americans Define Active US Engagement

Americans interpret "taking an active part in world affairs" in varying ways. Asked in open-ended response questions why they support an active US global role, their answers vary widely, at times along partisan divisions. But certain themes are consistent regardless of political affiliation. Many point to the reality of an interdependent, globalized world that disqualifies a US retreat from global involvement. As one respondent explained, "The world is no longer a place where one country can isolate themselves and not be affected by the outcomes of other countries' situations."[1] Another said "to think that the problems of other countries don't affect Americans is short-sighted."[2]

Others point to the need to work with other countries on global problems: "We live in a global community, with interconnected economies, various alliances and adversaries, and a slew of problems that can only be addressed in a multinational way."[3]

At the same time, some respondents favor the America First direction of the current administration, believing that other countries should "pay us for our support and services" and that the United States should not provide "free rides"[4] to other governments. Many Americans also emphasize the importance of focusing on problems at home alongside, or instead, of helping to address problems in other countries. A common narrative is that "America has its own issues that need [to be] addressed rather than focus on foreign affairs"[5] and "currently, we are spending immense amounts of money to support the interests of other countries with extremely varied returns for average Americans."[6]

Alliances Considered Most Effective Way to Achieve US Foreign Policy Goals

The United States maintains the world's most extensive alliance network, and managing these partnerships has not been without challenges. While these alliances were initially formed to face specific regional threats, successive administrations have navigated uneasy relationships, managed crises, and tried to strengthen alliance ties as those threats kept changing.

[1] Female, 72 years old, self-described Independent.
[2] Female, 35 years old, self-described Republican.
[3] Male, 53 years old, self-described Republican.
[4] Male, 53 years old, self-described Republican.
[5] Female, 28 years old, self-described Democrat.
[6] Male, 21 years old, self-described Other.

America's relationships with European allies were strained in the late 70s and early 80s by disputes over trade, nuclear deployments, and US-Soviet tensions. The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s eventually led to transatlantic cooperation, but not before several years of sharp disagreement. Similarly, the early 2000s saw a peak of transatlantic alliance cooperation as NATO allies joined the United States in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, followed by some disagreement over the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

US alliance relationships in East Asia have also had their difficulties. From ally concerns over US involvement in Vietnam to the US-Japan economic rivalry to the varied attempts by the United States to deal with North Korea's nuclear program, transpacific alliance relationships have always had their complications. Other allied governments—including South Vietnam, the Khmer Republic, and, in 2021, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—have simply collapsed despite years of American assistance.

Longtime allies in Canada, Europe and Asia are chafing at recent US foreign policy decisions, especially concerning the US imposition of tariffs and threats to increase them over disagreements. The United States has signed on to, and then withdrawn from, several international agreements including the Paris climate agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. US-European tensions have heightened over President Trump's design for US hegemony over Greenland after the EU met his demands for increased defense spending at the 2025 NATO summit. Beyond Europe, governments have been rattled by the Trump administration's bold moves to capture Nicolas Maduro and his wife from sovereign Venezuela, their suggestions for taking ownership of bases in South Korea, and threats to make Canada the 51st American state.

But polling shows that everyday Americans value these partnerships. And believe US alliances enhance the country's position in the world. Maintaining alliances and superior US military capabilities are viewed by the public as the two most effective ways to achieve US foreign policy goals. More Americans overall say maintaining US alliances is a very effective way to realize foreign policy aims (55%) than maintaining superior military power (48%) and this is one of the highest readings in support of alliances since the Chicago Council Survey began asking the question just over a decade ago (see appendix table 3).



These increasingly positive views of alliances as a way to achieve US foreign policy objectives have taken place among all partisan groups. While self-described Democrats are the most convinced about the effectiveness of alliances (64%, an all-time high), a majority of Republicans agree (53%, an all-time high), along with about half of Independents (48%).

Efficacy of Maintaining Existing Alliances

How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States—very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all?
***Maintaining existing alliances** (% very effective)*



July 18-30, 2025 I n=2,148
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Uses of the US Military

The 2025 Chicago Council Survey finds a broad, bipartisan consensus on many reasons for using US troops. Across party lines, majorities favor deploying troops to defend allies and American territory. Seven in 10 also support preventive action to stop countries from obtaining nuclear weapons (72%) or supporting terrorism (69%). Large majorities across the board oppose using US troops to take control of Greenland or Canada and oppose using the US military for territorial expansion more broadly. Where this consensus breaks down is at home: While Republicans favor using US troops to conduct law-enforcement operations in the United States (70%) and to suppress antigovernment protests (52%), few Democrats and Independents agree.

Public Priorities for Using US Troops

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% favor)



July 18-30, 2025 | n=1,068
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Across the Political Spectrum, Majority Support for Transatlantic Alliance

The US public has been fairly consistent in its support of transatlantic ties. When first asked in 2017, 62 percent of Americans said US security alliances in Europe benefit the United States either alone or along with its allies. That percentage has risen to an all-time high of 69 percent.

As has been the case since this question was first asked, Democrats are the most likely to say European alliances provide mutual benefits or primarily benefit the United States (81%). Republican opinion has fluctuated a bit since 2017, dipping to 50 percent in 2023 before bouncing back to a majority in 2025 (57%). And though they were somewhat less supportive of the US-Europe alliance in the 2010s, a full two-thirds of Independents (67%) see mutual benefits or benefits to the United States today, largely unchanged since 2020. This places them firmly between the two partisan camps and closest to the average American for the past five years.[7]

[7] Americans also express confidence in the European Union. When last asked In 2023, six in 10 Americans (63%) had a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in the European Union to deal responsibly with world problems—below only the United States and on par with Japan—though Democrats (76%) had notably more confidence in the EU than Independents (58%) or Republicans (53%).



Support for alliances extends to maintaining a US military presence in Europe. In 2025, majorities across party lines said the United States should have long-term military bases in Germany (60% overall); in the Baltic NATO allies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (56% overall); and in Poland (53% overall). Support for US bases in Germany is longstanding: Since the Council first asked the question in 2002, Americans have consistently favored maintaining US bases on the soil of its long-time ally. And since 2022, majorities have backed the US military presence in more recent NATO members Poland and the Baltic states (see appendix 4).

When asked in May 2025 specifically about the US commitment to NATO, three in four Americans (74%) favored maintaining (48%) or increasing (25%) US support for NATO, similar to readings going back to 2002. Although differences exist in the degree to which partisans support NATO today, with a significant dip in support among Republicans since 2022, majorities across political camps continue to say the US should increase or maintain its commitment.



A clear indicator of Americans' support for allies is whether they are willing to send US troops to defend them. Consistent with their attitudes during the Cold War, when majorities across party lines favored the use of US troops should the Soviet Union invade Western Europe, Americans remain committed to the defense of their European partners. In 2025, roughly six in 10 Americans said they would be willing to support the deployment of US troops "if Russia invades a NATO ally like Poland" (62%), including two-thirds of Republicans (64%) and Democrats (65%) and 59 percent of Independents (see appendix table 5). An invasion of Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia would similarly garner majority support for troops use from Republicans (52%), Democrats (60%), and Independents (54%) (see appendix table 5). And when last asked in 2024, two-thirds overall (64%) said they would favor using US troops if Germany were invaded (66% Republicans, 68% Democrats, 61% Independents).

A key commitment undergirding US security alliances is the guarantee to defend a fellow alliance member if they are attacked. When asked if regional allies would come to the defense of the United States if it were attacked, an overall six in 10 are at least somewhat confident that European allies would (62%). Seven in 10 Democrats place trust in European allies (69%), compared

to six in 10 Republicans (60%) and Independents (57%) (see appendix table 6).

Cross-Partisan Support for Transpacific Alliances

Asian allies find themselves facing similar demands as European allies to increase their defense budgets and absorb the economic consequences of Trump's tariff policies.

As has been the case for its allies in Europe, the American public has been consistent in its appreciation of US allies in Asia—and has grown even more positive toward these alliances. Seven in 10 Americans say US alliances in East Asia benefit the United States as well as the United States and its allies (72%), higher than any reading since 2017. Larger majorities across the political spectrum than ever before endorse these partnerships, including Democrats (74%), Independents (72%), and Republicans (68%).



Americans are somewhat less willing to deploy US soldiers to Asia in the event of an attack than to defend European allies from Russia (see appendix table 5). Yet willingness to step up has increased over the decades: In 1998, just 30 percent favored sending US troops to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion, compared to half (52%) today. Similarly, 41 percent today support intervening militarily to ward off a Chinese attack on Taiwan, up significantly from 23 percent in 2013 and just 19 percent in 1982.[8]

To facilitate mutual defense, majorities of both parties in 2025 said the United States should have long-term military bases in South Korea (67%), Japan (60%), and the Philippines (56%), on the frontlines of any potential conflict with North Korea or China (see appendix table 4). This support has been growing steadily since the late 2000s, coinciding with China's steady rise and North Korea's unfolding nuclear tests. In a separate question, half of the US public expresses trust that Asian allies will come to the United States' defense (51%). Here too, Democrats are slightly more confident (54%) in Asian allies than Republicans or Independents (49% each) (see appendix table 6).

Highest Support Yet for Alliances in the Middle East

The humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the war between Israel and Hamas have complicated the United States' relationships with other regional actors, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and tested the US ability to balance competing priorities in the region. Against this backdrop, public views of US alliances in the Middle East have become especially relevant.

American support for US alliances in the Middle East is now higher than it has ever been, with large increases among Republicans and Independents over the past year—perhaps in response to US support for Israel in the war in Gaza (see more on views toward the Israel-Gaza war on pages 54-57). A combined two-thirds say US alliances in the Middle East benefit the United States, including majorities across party lines.

[8] As a starting point, these proportions are fairly robust. If a conflict were to become "live" rather than a hypothetical, messaging from the White House and cues from other political, media, and economic elites could influence public support in either direction.



Half of Americans (52%) currently support maintaining a long-term American military presence in Saudi Arabia, largely unchanged from 54 percent the last time this option was asked in 2006. A further 48 percent support bases in Turkey, a NATO member straddling Europe and the Middle East (see appendix table 4).

Trade: Agreement in Theory, Divergence on Policy

Global trade has shifted drastically since the 1970s, when the United States grappled with the dissolution of the Bretton Woods currency regime. In the decades that followed, financial liberalization, the collapse of the communist bloc, and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led to falling trade barriers and rapid growth in transborder commerce. But globalization came increasingly into question in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, and Donald Trump's return to the presidency has sent average tariff rates back to where they were almost a century ago.

Globalization Gets Highest Marks Yet as Partisan Divergence Narrows

When the Chicago Council first asked about globalization in 1998, the public was skeptical, with just over half (53%) saying its effects were “mostly good.” Today, three quarters think so (74%), and majorities have affirmed globalization in the intervening decades. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents evaluated globalization similarly prior to the financial crisis. After 2008, however, Democrats grew fonder of economic interdependence, peeling away from Republicans and Independents.

In 2021, a record 34-point gap separated Democrats (86%) from Republicans (52%), with Independents in between (65%). But as of 2025, that gap has narrowed to just 13 percentage points. Four in five Democrats (81%), two-thirds of Republicans (68%), and three-quarters of Independents (73%) say increasing economic connectedness with other countries is mostly good for the United States, highlighting partisan unity not seen since 2012.



Majority Agree on Benefits of Trade and Free Trade Agreements

Across party lines, Americans view international trade as broadly beneficial. In the 2025 Chicago Council Survey, eight in 10 Americans said that international trade is good for the US economy (79%), with majorities of Democrats (84%), Republicans (78%), and Independents (78%) agreeing. Americans' positive view of international trade grew significantly in the mid-2010s, with a substantial rise between 2016 and 2018. However, partisan consensus on the value of international trade fractured in 2020, as Republicans became much less convinced in the economic benefits of trade than other partisans before rebounding in 2024 and 2025.



When asked about which countries get advantages from trade, 79 percent say trade mostly benefits the United States or benefits both the United States and other countries, up sharply from when the Chicago Council first asked this question in 2017. Democrats (87%) and Independents (79%) remain more likely to view international trade as beneficial to the United States than are Republicans (68%). But these are all solid majorities, and views of trade as a benefit for the country are up among all partisan groups compared to eight years ago.[9]

[9] In relative terms, trade skepticism is far more prevalent among Republicans than Democrats, though it is low overall. Whereas 16 percent of Americans overall think the benefits of trade accrue mostly to other countries, close to three in 10 Republicans (28%) hold this view. By contrast, only 8 percent of Democrats feel the same way (see appendix table 11).



Reflecting these positive views of trade, a large majority of Americans (83%) believe that signing free trade agreements with other countries is either somewhat (47%) or very effective (36%) for achieving US foreign policy goals. These views of free trade agreements have grown significantly over the past decade across all partisan groups, with eight in 10 or more across party lines viewing trade agreements as an effective approach (84% Democrats and Independents, 80% Republicans) (see appendix table 3).

Republicans Embrace Tariffs While Democrats and Independents Oppose Them

Although Americans broadly view international trade as beneficial to themselves and the country, they disagree about how the United States

should engage in that realm. Today, almost half of Americans (46%) believe US trade policy should have no restrictions in order to allow American consumers the widest possible range of choices and the lowest prices. But just 22 percent of Republicans hold that view, compared to six in 10 Democrats (61%) and half of Independents (50%). Republicans, in contrast, prioritize domestic employment, with three-quarters (76%) saying US trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs. Democrats (36%) and Independents (48%) are less likely to accept that premise.



While Republican opinion on these two items has stayed constant since 2018, the past year has made a world of difference for other partisans. As Trump raises America's average tariff rates to Depression-era levels amid a worsening affordability crisis, Democrats and Independents have changed their minds about trade restrictions. As the 2025 Chicago Council Survey shows, six in 10 Democrats (61%, up from 34% in 2024) and half of Independents (50%, up from 37% in 2024) say US trade policy should have no restrictions.

Americans have also become less confident in tariffs as a tool of US foreign policy. In 2025, fewer than half of Americans (44%) believed tariffs were either somewhat or very effective in achieving US foreign policy goals, down from 64 percent in 2024. This is due primarily to significant declines among Democrats (24%, down from 61% in 2024) and Independents (37%, down from 59% in 2024), while Republican confidence has grown slightly (78%, up from 71% in 2024). With Democrats and Republicans moving in opposite directions on tariffs as a policy tool, the result is a 54-percentage-point gap in their perceived effectiveness.

Chapter 2. When Consensus Unravels: Goals, Threats, Multilateralism, and Geopolitical Crises

While Americans agree on the outlines of US foreign policy in the broader sense, this harmony breaks down on the specifics: which challenges should take highest priority, how best to achieve foreign policy objectives, and attitudes toward geopolitical challenges. Republicans tend to diverge significantly from Democrats and Independents, who more often than not see eye to eye.

Divergences on Goals of US Foreign Policy

In the Council's Cold War surveys, Republicans and Democrats tended to prioritize the same set of foreign policy goals for the country. Majorities across party lines viewed protecting the jobs of American workers, maintaining the value of the dollar, securing adequate supplies of energy, pursuing worldwide arms control, and containing the spread of communism as very important goals for the country. And while there were certainly disagreements between partisans about the specifics of US foreign policy in those years, the public was nevertheless settled on a core set of objectives.

Today, Americans only agree on the importance of protecting the jobs of American workers (73% very important goal) and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (67%). Of the broad range of possible foreign policy goals presented in the Chicago Council Survey, these two objectives stand out as longstanding priorities: Since 1974 (and 1994, when the Council first asked about preventing nuclear proliferation), they have remained the top foreign policy priorities for Americans, despite their slight dip in importance in the most recent survey (see appendix table 7). But bipartisan consensus on these

items represents the exception rather than the rule among an otherwise deeply polarized public.



Aside from protecting jobs and preventing nuclear proliferation, the goals that fall to the bottom of Republicans' priorities top the agenda for Democrats. For Democrats, limiting climate change (82%) and developing sources of renewable energy (78%) are the two most important US foreign policy goals. The partisan gap between Republicans and Democrats on the importance of limiting climate change has grown by five percentage points since last year to its widest point yet (65 percentage points).

On the bottom of Democrats' list of priorities are maintaining superior military power (32%) and limiting China's influence around the world (31%)—goals Republicans rank much higher in importance.

For their part, Independents resemble Republicans in that their top priorities are protecting the jobs of American workers (69%) and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (59%). Yet, like Democrats, Independents tend to prioritize climate action (59% developing sources of renewable energy, 48% limiting climate change) and combatting world hunger (46%) over reducing fossil fuel dependency (42%), maintaining US military superiority (41%), and limiting Chinese influence (30%).

Republicans Diverge from Democrats and Independents on Threat Perceptions

Over the past several decades, American views of the most critical threats facing the United States have split along partisan lines, with Republicans diverging from Democrats and Independents. These differences pose a challenge for policymakers: addressing the public's concerns is far more difficult when the public is so divided on which challenges are most pressing.

Public perceptions of threats were not always so divided. In the 1998 Chicago Council Survey, Republicans, Democrats, and Independents largely agreed, with majorities across party lines naming the same five threats as critical. A decade later, in 2008, there remained a great deal of bipartisanship—with climate issues and immigration in two new areas of divergence. Yet in the most recent 2025 Chicago Council Survey, Republicans and Democrats overlap on only two items when identifying the top five threats to US national interests over the next decade: international terrorism and government corruption. Democrats and Independents, on the other hand, show complete overlap on their top threats: government corruption, weakening democracy, climate change, and a global economic downturn. For Republicans, immigration (68%) tops the list of critical threats in 2025. Notably, Democrats and Independents rank "large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States" dead last among the 12 items offered, highlighting dramatic disagreement with Republicans (see appendix table 8).

Top Five Critical Threats by Partisan Affiliation

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (% critical threat)

	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1	Large number of immigrants and refugees coming into the US (68)	Weakening democracy in the United States (82)	US government corruption (74)
2	International terrorism (68)	US government corruption (82)	Weakening democracy in the United States (63)
3	The development of China as a world power (66)	Climate change (77)	Climate change (50)
4	Iran's nuclear program (64)	A global economic downturn (61)	Technological advancements in warfare (50)
5	US government corruption (61)	International terrorism (52)	A global economic downturn (49)

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By contrast, climate change lands squarely at the bottom of Republicans' list (just 14% consider it a critical threat). This issue has one of the highest partisan divides (a difference of 63 percentage points) in the 2025 Chicago Council Survey. This is due in part to growing concerns about climate change among Democrats over the past decade (rising from 44% in 2012 to 77% today), while Republicans' low level of concern has remained consistent.

Fears of an economic downturn also elicit a shrug from Republicans. In 2025, just one-third (35%) considered a potential downturn to be a critical threat, making for a partisan gap of 26 points – the largest on record for this issue.



Democrats and Independents More Inclined toward Multilateralism than Republicans

How closely the United States should work with allies and international institutions has been a persistent—and growing—source of partisan division. Over the past decade, Democrats and Independents have been more likely than Republicans to favor playing a shared, rather than dominant, leadership role in the world, and this difference has widened with time. When last asked in 2023, three-quarters of Democrats (77%), two-thirds of Independents (66%), and a bare majority of Republicans (52%) favored a shared leadership role. Since the Council first asked the question in 2015, the gap between Republicans and Democrats has grown from 15 percentage points to 25 (see Appendix Table 1).

Like some previous US administrations, the Trump administration has at times sidelined US allies in key negotiations. In the 2025 Chicago Council Survey, most Americans (60%), however, thought the United States should mainly make important foreign policy decisions with major allies, the highest level yet recorded on this question in 50 years. By contrast, just two in 10 thought the United States should make these decisions unilaterally (21%).



While Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all consider alliances to be effective, they are split on how much to involve allies in US decision-making. Solid majorities of Democrats (74%) and Independents (60%) today agree the United States should consult with allies before making important decisions, and both readings are at their highest levels yet. A plurality of Republicans endorses consultations with allies (43%), similar to 2020 (45%) but at a lower level than five decades ago (when 54% agreed, on par with Democrats). A similar proportion of Republicans prefer unilateral decision making (38%), similar to previous levels.

In the same vein, six in 10 Americans agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions with US allies even if that means the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. Democrats (79%) and Independents (60%) are much more inclined than Republicans (38%) to agree (see appendix table 9). This multilateral instinct also applies to working with the United Nations. Two-thirds of Americans agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations, even if this necessitates a compromise from the United

States. Here too, Democrats and Independents are far more willing to make this tradeoff than are Republicans. Since the Council first asked the question in 2004, Republicans have become slightly less likely to favor compromise through the UN (44%, down from 49%), while Democrats have become more likely to embrace it (83%. up from 75%). Independents, after declining through the late 2000s and early 2010s, have rebounded to their 2004 level of support (68%) (appendix table 10).

Majority Now Prefer Friendly Cooperation and Engagement with China, but Partisans Sharply Diverge

When the Chicago Council began polling in 1974, the United States had yet to establish official diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. At present, overall opinion of China is another clear example of the growing partisan polarization in US-China issues.

Throughout five decades of polling, partisan views of China have largely moved in tandem. But since the mid-1990s, Democrats have been warmer on China than Republicans, with Independents' views staking out a middle ground between the two. This pattern continued even during the bipartisan decline in public attitudes toward China between 2020 and 2024: while views of China grew more negative across party lines, Republicans fell farther and faster than Democrats or Independents. In the 2025 Chicago Council Survey, a 16-point gap separates Democratic (42) and Republican (26) feeling toward China—the largest in a half-century—with Independents falling close to Democrats (38).



Partisans also diverge on the question of whether China's development as a world power poses a critical threat to the United States. Since 1990, partisan attitudes about China's rise have generally moved together even if Republicans tended to be slightly more concerned about China. However, since 2021, Republicans have been dramatically more likely to view China's rise as a threat compared to other Americans. Today, two-thirds of Republicans (66%) view China's development as a critical threat, compared to just 44 percent of both Democrats and Independents.

Rise of China as a Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: ***The development of China as a world power*** *(% critical threat)*



July 18-30, 2025 | n=2,148
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Partisans also now disagree about how the United States should approach China. From 2006 until 2019, roughly two-thirds of Americans consistently supported undertaking friendly cooperation and engagement with China, outnumbering those preferring a containment policy by two-to-one. A sharp reversal took place beginning in 2020, a year that saw Americans split down the middle on how to approach China. Subsequently, for several years during the Biden administration, a narrow majority of Americans—including narrow majorities of Democrats and Independents and a large majority of Republicans—favored a harder line on China.

But the 2025 Chicago Council Survey found that this period of bipartisan agreement on China is over. Two-thirds of Democrats (66%) prefer that the United States undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Just a third of Republicans (33%) agree—and at 33 percentage points, this is the largest partisan gap between Republicans and Democrats on this question

since it was first asked in 2006. Independents, whose views continue to fall closer to Democrats than Republicans, have also shifted notably in attitudes, with a majority (56%) now favoring a policy of cooperation and engagement rather than limiting China's power (41%).



Attitudes toward the Soviet Union, Russia, and the War in Ukraine

In the early days of Chicago Council Surveys, American views of the Soviet Union were fairly cool across the board and remained that way during the final fifteen years of the Cold War. Chicago Council Surveys conducted between 1978 and 1986 found that Americans gave the Soviet Union no greater than 34 degrees on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 is the warmest possible response. In 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and waning days of the Soviet empire, opinions became much warmer, from a highest rating of 59/100 in 1990 and hovering at 50 degrees until the Russian annexation of

Crimea in 2014. Since then, attitudes toward Russia have returned to Cold War levels, even dipping below previous lows. In terms of global influence, Americans place Russia in a middle tier, with an average of about six out of 10 across the years. Republican, Democratic, and Independent views of the Soviet Union and Russia have mostly moved in tandem over the past five decades.



Matching their similarities in views of the Soviet Union, Republicans, Democrats, and Independents also shared a similar view of US-Soviet policy. Majorities across party lines favored bilateral arms-control efforts and limiting the sales of advanced US computers to Moscow. Similarly, across the political spectrum, majorities of Americans opposed prohibitions on scientific exchange and restricting US-Soviet trade.



In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, no more than a third of Americans considered the military power of Russia to be a critical threat—until the annexation of Crimea in 2014. By 2017, perceptions of threat from the military power of Russia jumped from 33 percent in 1990 to the low 40s. They peaked

at 54 percent in March 2022, one month after the second invasion of eastern Ukraine and war with Kyiv. Similarly, threat perceptions from Russia's territorial ambitions increased from 38 percent in 2014, after the Crimean annexation, to majority levels starting in March 2022.

Critical Threat Posed by Russia

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (% critical threat)



July 18-30, 2025 | n=2,148
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Just as there was bipartisan agreement in attitudes toward Russia over the years, at the outset of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine large majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents favored US military and economic support for Ukraine. Four years into the war, overall majorities of the American public still want the United States to assist Ukraine, though at lower levels than at the start of the conflict. In the July 2025 Chicago Council Survey, six in 10 Americans supported providing additional arms and military supplies to Kyiv (62%, up from 52% in March 2025).

However, partisan differences have widened considerably over the course of the war. By March 2025, Council surveys registered a 47-percentage point difference between Republican and Democratic support. Following a series of Trump administration attempts to force a ceasefire to the Ukraine war and after President Trump expressed frustration with Russian President Putin's "tapping" him along, Republican support rebounded: the 2025 Chicago Council Survey found that 51 percent of Republicans supported sending additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government, up markedly from just 30 percent in March 2025. An equal proportion of Republicans opposed sending additional matériel to Kyiv (48%, down from 68% in March).

The same survey found Independents were also more likely to support military aid (61%, up from 51% in March 2025). For their part, Democrats' support for assisting Ukraine remained high (75%) and fairly stable from recent polls.



A majority of Americans (61%, up from 55% in March 2025) also favor providing economic assistance to Ukraine. While partisan differences are greater on economic than military aid, support for economic assistance to Kyiv has also risen among Republicans. Despite these GOP fluctuations on assistance to Ukraine, large majorities of all partisans have continually supported increasing sanctions on Russia because of its aggression against Ukraine (77% Democrats, 74% Republicans, 69% Independents in the most recent results).



Israel-Gaza War Further Dividing the Partisans

For most of the Chicago Council Survey history, Americans looked on Israel favorably, rating the country between 53 and 61 out of 100 on the Council's feeling thermometer scale. While Americans were sympathetic toward Israel after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, partisan divisions deepened as Israel continually bombarded Gaza, contributing to an estimated 70,000 deaths and a wider humanitarian crisis.

In the latest survey, Republicans give Israel an average of 59 out of 100, compared to an average of 36 among Democrats and 44 among Independents—the lowest-ever ratings for the latter two partisan groups. This also represents the largest ever partisan difference since this question was first asked in 1978.



At the same time, Americans have lost confidence in Israel to be a positive player in the Middle East. When first asked in 2015, half of Americans (49%) thought Israel played a positive role in resolving the key problems in the region, including 60 percent of Republicans, 40 percent of Democrats, and 47 percent of Independents. When last asked in June 2025, American assessments had dropped to just 32 percent saying Israel plays a positive role. Moreover, the partisan gap has dramatically expanded. Six in 10 Republicans (62%) and just one in 10 Democrats (10%)—a gap of 52 percentage points—now say Israel plays a positive role, with three in 10 Independents (28%) agreeing.



There is also an enduring partisan difference on whether the United States should restrict military aid to Israel so it cannot be used in military operations against Palestinians. Chicago Council polling in 2024 found that majorities of Democrats (68%) and Independents (54%) but only a third of Republicans (35%) favored these restrictions. This represents the largest-ever partisan gap—33 percentage points—between GOP and Democratic Party supporters.

Most telling of all indicators on declining American public support for Israel, the 2024 Chicago Council Survey finds the lowest percentage ever recorded who say they would support using US troops to defend Israel if it were attacked by its neighbors (41%). While a majority of Republicans continue to support defending Israel, it is at a new low of 55 percent (down from 72% in 2021). About a third of Democrats and Independents (35% each) would support using US troops in this way, also the lowest recorded percentages for these partisans. On the other hand, Democrats (62%) and Independents (51%) are more inclined than Republicans (48%) to favor US troops participating in an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The issue of an independent Palestinian state is one that also divides Americans across partisan lines. In the 1990s and in 2002, Chicago Council Surveys found that fewer than half of Americans overall supported an independent Palestinian state, similar across all partisan groups. But by the time the Council conducted its annual survey in 2014, this bipartisan consensus had collapsed, as Republicans became less likely to favor a two-state solution (just 29% in 2015) while a majority of Democrats grew to support it (61%; 42% of Independents).Today, five in 10 Americans support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip (51%), while four in 10 oppose it (41%). Majorities of Democrats (63%) and Independents (53%) favor Palestinian statehood, while a majority of Republicans oppose it (58%, 35% support).



Deep Polarization on Attitudes toward Immigration

Growing polarization is hardly limited to purely international issues. Immigration, an issue with domestic and international dimensions, has also seen growing divisions between Republicans and Democrats since the turn of the millennium. Over that period, Democrats (and Independents) have become far less concerned about immigration as a threat and more supportive of giving undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship, while Republican views have remained fairly consistent. This has led to a significant gap between partisan groups on a range of immigration issues.

Overall, just 36 percent of Americans today say the prospect of large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States represents a critical threat to the United States. This is a notable decline from the late 1990s, when majorities across parties viewed the issue as a critical threat. Over the past two decades, the gap between parties has steadily grown wider. Today, two-thirds of Republicans (68%) view it as a critical threat—topping all other threats asked about in the 2025 Chicago Council Survey—compared to just 32 percent of Independents and 14 percent of Democrats[10].



[10] For more on attitudes toward immigration among different demographic groups in the United States, please see the following report from the 2023 Chicago Council Survey: Race, Ethnicity, and American Views of Immigration and Diversity.

Republicans also stand apart from Democrats and Independents on the best way to deal with the millions of undocumented immigrants living in the United States[11]. Democrats broadly favor a path to citizenship for them, either immediately (65%) or after a penalty and waiting period (20%, while very few favor deportations (4%). Republicans are more divided. A plurality and record high (46%) say these immigrants should be forced to leave their jobs and the country, while slightly fewer (43% combined) favor a path to citizenship (21% immediately, 22% with penalty). Independents fall in between the two, though two-thirds (66%) favor allowing a path to citizenship, either immediately (42%) or after a penalty and waiting period (24%); only two in 10 (21%) favor deportations as the primary policy approach.

[11] To compare recent results to those spanning several decades, the survey uses the language "illegal immigrants" in several questions. In past work, we tested describing undocumented immigrants as "illegal" versus "unauthorized" and found that changing the wording affects respondents' attitudes on immigration policy. We kept the original wording for 1,077 of 2,148 respondents this year to track changes since the first time we asked the question in 1998. For the remaining 1,071 respondents, we used the adjective "unauthorized." We observed no statistically significant differences. Throughout the report, the adjectives "illegal," "undocumented," and "unauthorized" are used interchangeably.



These divisions on immigration policy are not new but have deepened over the past decade. Republican support for deportations (46%) is the highest level recorded in the past decade of Council polling on this issue. Concurrently, the data shows the largest-ever gap in support for deportations between Republicans and Democrats (42 percentage points). But Democrats' opinions over the past decade have changed even more dramatically. Two-thirds (65%) favor allowing undocumented immigrants to immediately apply for citizenship, up from just 48 percent a decade ago. Independents have also grown more supportive of a path to citizenship, rising from 29 percent in 2015 to 42 percent in 2025.

A split in fundamental attitudes about America's racial makeup may be contributing to views on immigration policy options. Republicans, compared to Democrats and Independents, disagree on the inherent benefits of racial and ethnic diversity. A solid majority of Democrats (73%) say welcoming more people of many different races, nationalities, and ethnic groups makes the United States a better place to live (including 54% who say

it makes for a lot better place to live), as do half of Independents (52%, including 35% a lot better). By contrast, just 28 percent of Republicans believe diversity makes the United States a better place to live (12% a lot better, 16% a little better). The 45 percentage points that separate Republican and Democratic views toward racial diversity reflect deep divisions over American identity and inclusion.



Partisan Divisions on American Exceptionalism

These diverging views on immigration policy—and on diversity more broadly—point to growing differences between Republicans and Democrats on morefundamental questions about the nature of the United States.

Over the past decade, Chicago Council Surveys have found a steadily declining belief in the idea that the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world (53% in 2025, down from 70% in 2012). But this decline has taken place almost entirely among Democrats and Independents. While 83 percent of Republicans say the United States is the greatest country, just 45 percent of Independents and 38 percent of Democrats agree.[1] This gap of 45 percentage points between Republicans and Democrats is one of the highest levels recorded since the question was first asked in 2012.

Regardless of which party held the White House in the last 13 years, a large majority of Republicans have consistently described the United States as the

greatest country. For their part, Democrats and Independents have become less nationalistic over time, even during the years when Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden were in office. This pattern indicates that the idea of the United States as an exceptional country or not is not contingent on which political party holds power in a given period.



It's not simply that Democrats and Independents have become less likely to view America as an exceptional nation. Since 2012, attitudes about American exceptionalism and immigration have grown increasingly correlated, particularly among Republicans. In the early 2010s, a narrow majority of Republicans who believed America was the greatest nation on Earth also believed large flows of immigrants and refugees represented a critical threat; today, three-quarters of exceptionalist Republicans also view immigration as a critical threat.

There is also a growing coincidence between beliefs in American exceptionalism and anti-diversity views among Republicans. In 2022, 28 percent of Republicans who thought America was the greatest country believed that increasing diversity made the United States a worse place to live; in 2025, that number had risen to 37 percent.

Views of American exceptionalism and how to deal with undocumented immigrants are also linked. Those Americans who say the United States is no greater than other nations are more likely to favor a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants (77%) compared to Americans who view the United States as the greatest country in the world (54%). Exceptionalists are also more likely to favor deporting undocumented immigrants (33%, vs. 11% of non-exceptionalists).

These growing partisan divisions on immigration policy and on American exceptionalism hint at a greater underlying split in American attitudes over what the United States is and what it means to be an American.

Conclusion

Despite volatility in international relations over the past five decades, the American public has consistently expressed broad support for the US alliance structure, overseas bases, and international trade. Americans generally appreciate US allies and recognize that alliances are an effective tool for realizing US foreign policy ambitions.

At the same time, Americans are increasingly divided along partisan lines on how best to exercise US power and to what ends. These divisions include a growing partisan split on the primary threats to the country, the best way to realize US foreign policy goals, how the United States should work with other countries, and how to handle a range of critical geopolitical crises, including the war in Ukraine, relations with China, and conflict in the Middle East. And issues that tap into questions of American identity or nontraditional threats (like climate change and immigration) are areas where partisans most significantly diverge.[12]

The results of the 2025 Chicago Council Survey point to a growing split in how Americans think about the United States' place in the world. The first path, typified by Republican public opinion, keeps exceptionalism front and center, requiring a more exclusive American identity that reclaims greatness

[12] For a deep analysis of Chicago Council and other survey data and the impact of polarization on global developments, see Rachel Myrick, *Polarization and International Politics: How Extreme Partisanship Threatens Global Stability* (Princeton University Press, 2025).

by putting “America First.” Doing so prioritizes sovereignty and cultural cohesion at the expense of openness and cooperation.

The second path, down which Democrats and Independents are increasingly headed, acknowledges that the world has changed around an America that will have to adapt to being “no greater than other nations.” This worldview is, broadly, more internationalist, cooperative, and willing to compromise.

The growing gap in beliefs about American exceptionalism further suggests that these two groups no longer share the same understanding of American identity and purpose. Reforming that common sense of purpose around a new, motivating vision for the country appears ever more distant.

Historically, Americans have divided at several points over the country’s role in the world. They did so in the 1790’s over whether to ally with France, in the 1890’s over imperialism, and in the 1930’s over whether to engage or retreat from Europe. As the United States of America celebrates the 250th anniversary, the current highly partisan and polarized political environment is exacerbated by everyday Americans’ animosity toward opposing political party supporters. The growing gap in beliefs about American exceptionalism suggests that these partisan groups no longer share the same understanding of American identity and purpose. Reforming that common sense of purpose around a new, motivating vision for the country appears ever more distant.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1

Q11. What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the dominant leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or should it not play any leadership role?

Dominant world leader (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	28	38	21	28	17
2016	29	41	24	24	17
2017	31	46	25	26	21
2019	26	42	18	20	24
2020	24	38	16	21	22
2021	23	41	15	16	26
2023	22	36	16	18	20
Shared leadership role (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	63	57	72	59	-15
2016	62	53	70	63	-17
2017	62	50	70	64	-20
2019	66	51	75	69	-24
2020	68	54	78	69	-24
2021	69	53	77	73	-26
2023	66	52	77	66	-25
Not play any leadership role (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	8	4	6	12	-2
2016	8	6	6	12	0
2017	6	4	4	10	0
2019	7	6	5	11	1
2020	7	6	5	9	1
2021	8	5	7	10	-2
2023	12	11	7	16	4

Summary of Q11 – 2023 data only

Q11. United States' leadership role (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Dominant world leader	22	36	16	18	20
Shared leadership role	66	52	77	66	-25
Not play any leadership role	12	11	7	16	4

Appendix Table 2

Q385. Which of the following do you think is more important in determining a country's overall power and influence in the world:

Economic strength (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1998	63	65	62	66	3
2002	66	70	65	66	5
2010	72	65	78	73	13
2014	77	69	81	79	12
2016	71	58	78	74	20
2024	73	61	80	76	-19
2025	76	60	87	80	-27
Military strength (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1998	28	27	30	25	3
2002	27	25	29	27	4
2010	23	33	19	21	14
2014	23	30	19	20	12
2016	28	41	22	24	19
2024	26	38	20	23	18
2025	24	40	13	20	27

Summary of Q385 – 2025 data only

Q385. Maintaining power and influence (% more important)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Economic strength	76	60	87	80	-27
Military strength	24	40	13	20	27

Appendix Table 3

Q8. How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States – very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all?

Q8/2. Maintaining US military superiority					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	42	50	40	39	10
2014	47	54	43	45	11
2015	40	50	37	34	13
2016	47	61	43	42	18
2017	47	66	38	43	28
January 2020	53	80	39	46	41
2022	51	66	42	48	24
2024	48	63	42	42	21
2025	48	75	34	41	413
Somewhat effective (%)					
2012	42	40	44	41	-4
2014	37	34	42	37	-8
2015	40	35	45	40	-10
2016	38	30	43	39	-13
2017	37	29	42	38	-13
January 2020	35	19	42	39	-23
2022	36	27	43	36	-16
2024	36	27	43	37	-16
2025	37	21	46	42	-25
Not very effective (%)					
2012	12	9	13	13	-4

2014	12	10	12	15	-2
2015	13	9	12	17	-3
2016	11	7	12	14	-5
2017	12	4	15	15	-11
January 2020	7	0	11	9	-11
2022	10	6	12	12	-6
2024	10	8	11	13	-3
2025	10	3	16	11	-13
Not effective at all (%)					
2012	3	1	2	5	-1
2014	2	2	2	3	0
2015	6	4	4	8	0
2016	3	2	2	4	0
2017	3	1	4	4	-3
January 2020	4	0	6	4	-6
2022	2	1	2	4	-1
2024	5	2	3	8	-1
2025	3	1	3	6	-2

Q8/3. Placing sanctions on other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	16	12	19	14	-7
2014	22	16	27	20	-11
2015	13	12	17	10	-5
2016	16	16	18	14	-2
2017	20	23	20	16	3
January 2020	23	36	17	20	19
2022	17	20	19	13	1
2024	15	20	15	12	5
2025	18	32	14	12	18
Somewhat effective (%)					
2012	47	47	50	42	-3
2014	43	43	47	39	-4
2015	48	47	52	45	-5
2016	47	48	51	44	-3
2017	47	46	47	47	-1

January 2020	50	47	50	53	-3
2022	52	51	57	49	-6
2024	48	48	53	45	-5
2025	43	47	42	42	5
Not very effective (%)					
2012	30	34	26	31	8
2014	27	31	21	32	10
2015	28	31	25	31	6
2016	29	30	26	32	4
2017	27	26	26	28	0
January 2020	20	15	24	19	-9
2022	25	23	20	30	3
2024	29	26	27	32	-1
2025	29	17	33	35	-16
Not effective at all (%)					
2012	7	6	4	11	2
2014	7	8	4	8	4
2015	9	9	5	13	4
2016	5	5	4	7	1
2017	6	4	5	8	-1
January 2020	6	2	8	7	-6
2022	5	4	3	6	1
2024	7	5	4	10	1
2025	8	3	11	10	-8

Q8/5. Maintaining existing alliances					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	38	37	41	34	-4
2015	32	31	37	26	-6
2016	40	40	45	34	-5
2017	49	43	56	47	-13
January 2020	55	56	60	51	-4
2022	54	50	62	49	-12
2024	46	41	56	40	-15
2025	55	53	64	48	-11

Somewhat effective (%)					
2014	49	51	49	49	2
2015	52	51	52	54	-1
2016	50	48	49	52	-1
2017	42	48	35	44	13
January 2020	35	41	30	37	11
2022	39	43	33	41	10
2024	43	49	36	44	13
2025	36	42	27	39	15
Not very effective (%)					
2014	9	9	7	11	2
2015	11	12	7	13	5
2016	7	9	4	9	5
2017	7	7	6	7	1
January 2020	5	3	4	7	-1
2022	6	6	4	8	2
2024	8	8	5	10	3
2025	7	4	7	9	-3
Not effective at all (%)					
2014	3	1	2	4	-1
2015	4	4	2	6	2
2016	2	2	1	3	1
2017	1	0	2	2	-2
January 2020	3	1	5	4	-4
2022	1	1	0	2	1
2024	3	1	2	6	-1
2025	2	1	1	3	0

Q8/7. Economic aid to other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	11	7	17	8	-10
2017	17	9	27	15	-18
2022	20	11	32	16	-21
2024	14	6	24	11	-18
2025	21	8	33	19	-25
Somewhat effective (%)					
2015	47	42	53	45	-11
2017	48	44	52	47	-8
2022	53	49	56	52	-7
2024	48	44	54	46	-10
2025	45	44	48	44	-4
Not very effective (%)					
2015	30	37	24	31	13
2017	27	39	17	28	22
2022	21	33	10	24	23
2024	27	38	17	29	21
2025	26	37	14	28	23
Not effective at all (%)					
2015	10	12	5	14	7
2017	7	7	3	9	4
2022	5	6	2	8	4
2024	9	12	4	13	8
2025	8	11	4	8	7

Q8/8. Military aid to other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	12	12	15	8	-3
2017	12	9	17	11	-8
2022	16	11	23	14	-12
2024	16	10	23	14	-13
2025	16	12	23	14	-11
Somewhat effective (%)					
2015	48	47	52	45	-5
2017	56	62	56	52	6
2022	59	61	59	58	2
2024	51	54	54	46	0
2025	55	55	55	53	0
Not very effective (%)					
2015	29	30	25	31	5
2017	25	24	21	29	3
2022	20	23	17	22	6
2024	24	29	18	27	11
2025	23	27	17	25	10
Not effective at all (%)					
2015	10	9	6	14	3
2017	6	4	4	8	0
2022	4	4	1	5	3
2024	8	7	5	13	2
2025	6	5	4	8	1

Q8/15. Participating in international organizations					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	27	11	38	27	-27
2022	32	16	48	27	-32
2024	26	13	41	22	-28
2025	32	18	45	31	-27
Somewhat effective (%)					
2017	48	53	46	47	7
2022	48	54	42	50	12
2024	46	47	44	47	3
2025	44	47	40	44	7
Not very effective (%)					
2017	19	29	11	20	18
2022	15	23	7	17	16
2024	21	29	12	22	17
2025	18	27	11	18	16
Not effective at all (%)					
2017	5	6	3	5	3
2022	4	6	1	5	5
2024	7	10	2	10	8
2025	6	7	3	7	4

Q8/16. Placing tariffs against other countries' goods					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
January 2020	21	38	11	17	27
2022	15	24	13	11	11
2024	15	23	11	11	12
2025	16	37	5	10	32
Somewhat effective (%)					
January 2020	44	48	37	49	11
2022	48	52	48	46	4
2024	49	48	50	48	-2
2025	28	41	19	27	22
Not very effective (%)					
January 2020	23	12	35	21	-23
2022	30	20	32	34	-12
2024	27	24	29	29	-5
2025	30	17	38	33	-21
Not effective at all (%)					
January 2020	11	2	17	12	-15
2022	6	3	6	8	-3
2024	8	3	8	11	-5
2025	25	5	37	29	-32

Q8/10. Drone strikes against suspected terrorists in other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	22	26	25	16	1
Jan-20	35	63	17	32	46
2022	24	36	20	18	16
2025	23	42	15	17	27
Somewhat effective (%)					
2015	48	47	50	49	-3
Jan-20	38	29	44	40	-15
2022	45	49	46	43	3
2025	44	45	44	44	1
Not very effective (%)					
2015	21	21	17	24	4
Jan-20	17	6	26	16	-20
2022	24	12	27	30	-15
2025	24	11	31	28	-20
Not effective at all (%)					
2015	7	5	6	10	-1
Jan-20	9	1	13	10	-12
2022	6	2	7	8	-5
2025	7	1	9	10	-8

Q8/18. Stationing U.S. troops in allied countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	21	28	21	17	7
Somewhat effective (%)					
2025	54	55	52	54	3
Not very effective (%)					
2025	20	15	22	21	-7
Not effective at all (%)					
2025	5	2	4	8	-2

Q8/4. Signing free trade agreements with other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	13	9	18	11	-9
2014	18	15	20	17	-5
2015	13	10	19	10	-9
2016	13	9	18	10	-9
2017	21	15	26	20	-11
Jan-20	32	34	34	28	0
2025	36	33	40	35	-7
Somewhat effective (%)					
2012	54	53	53	53	0
2014	54	56	55	52	1
2015	51	46	58	48	-12
2016	54	52	59	49	-7
2017	53	51	55	53	-4
Jan-20	51	52	52	51	0
2025	47	47	44	49	3
Not very effective (%)					
2012	26	31	22	26	9
2014	21	22	19	23	3
2015	25	34	17	27	17
2016	26	31	18	31	15
2017	20	28	15	20	13
Jan-20	12	12	10	13	2
2025	12	17	12	10	5
Not effective at all (%)					
2012	5	5	3	7	2
2014	5	5	4	6	1
2015	9	9	5	13	4
2016	6	7	4	8	3
2017	4	5	2	7	3
Jan-20	4	2	3	6	-1
2025	4	2	3	5	-1

Q8/17. Maintaining US economic superiority					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2022	43	56	39	38	17
2025	45	65	37	39	28
Somewhat effective (%)					
2022	40	35	44	41	3
2025	40	28	46	42	-18
Not very effective (%)					
2022	13	8	14	16	-6
2025	11	6	12	13	-6
Not effective at all (%)					
2022	2	1	2	4	-1
2025	3	1	3	5	-2

Q8/16a. Providing humanitarian aid (%)					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	3821	19	54	38	-35
Somewhat effective (%)					
2025	41	49	34	40	15
Not very effective (%)					
2025	16	24	9	16	15
Not effective at all (%)					
2025	5	8	2	5	6

Summary of Q8 – 2025 data only

Net effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Q8/2. Maintaining US military superiority	85	96	80	83	16
Q8/3. Placing sanctions on other countries	61	79	56	54	23

Q8/5. Maintaining existing alliances	91	95	91	87	4
Q8/7. Economic aid to other countries	66	52	81	63	-29
Q8/8. Military aid to other countries	71	67	78	67	-11
Q8/15. Participating in international organizations	76	65	85	75	-20
Q8/16. Placing tariffs against other countries' goods	44	78	24	37	54
Q8/10. Drone strikes against suspected terrorists in other countries	67	87	59	61	18
Q8/18. Stationing U.S. troops in allied countries	75	83	73	71	10
Q8/4. Signing free trade agreements with other countries	83	80	84	84	-4
Q8/17. Maintaining US economic superiority	85	93	83	81	10
Q8/16a. Providing humanitarian aid	79	68	84	78	-16

Appendix Table 4

Q40. Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places?

Q40/1. Japan (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	63	67	60	63	7
2004	52	56	52	50	4
2006	57	66	52	57	14
2008	58	67	50	57	17
2010	49	56	46	47	10
2012	51	57	49	51	8
2014	55	59	50	56	9
2016	60	69	57	56	12
2018	65	72	65	61	7
2021 Trilateral	59	65	54	59	11
2022	67	72	64	66	8
2023	63	65	62	62	3
2024	62	69	61	59	8
2025	60	65	58	59	7

Q40/3. South Korea (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	67	74	66	64	8
2004	62	71	62	56	9
2006	62	73	57	61	16
2008	63	72	59	59	13
2010	60	68	58	58	10
2012	60	68	57	58	11
2014	64	70	61	64	9
2016	70	76	70	64	6
2018	74	79	73	71	6
January 2020	69	80	65	65	15
2021 Trilateral	66	70	65	65	5
2022	72	77	72	69	5
2023	64	63	66	62	-3
2024	63	67	61	63	6
2025	67	74	65	65	9

Q40/6. Germany (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	69	73	66	68	8
2004	57	62	58	53	4
2006	57	64	57	54	7
2008	59	64	59	53	5
2010	50	59	46	48	13
2012	51	54	50	51	4
2014	57	62	53	57	9
2016	61	70	58	56	12
2018	60	66	60	57	6
2022	68	71	68	66	3
2023	61	67	63	55	4
2024	64	71	62	59	9
2025	61	66	59	59	7

Q40/7. Turkey (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	58	64	55	57	9
2004	46	56	44	42	12
2006	46	51	42	48	9
2008	49	56	44	48	12
2010	42	49	40	40	9
2012	40	45	39	38	6
2014	43	47	40	43	7
2018	53	59	51	50	8
2022	56	65	55	51	10
2023	50	48	51	50	-3
2024	46	46	46	44	0
2025	48	54	47	46	7

Q40/8. Australia (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	40	44	38	39	6
2014	42	44	38	43	6
2016	46	53	42	45	11
2021 Trilateral	54	56	49	56	7
2022	56	64	51	55	13
2023	49	52	49	48	3
2024	48	52	46	49	6
2025	48	52	45	48	7

Q40/10. Poland (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	37	39	32	39	0
2018	47	55	44	46	0
2022	62	68	59	61	9
2023	54	53	54	54	-1
2024	53	54	53	55	1
2025	54	56	53	54	3

Q40/12. The Philippines (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	51	59	45	51	14
2021	57	62	53	57	9
2024	54	62	50	53	12
2025	56	64	52	55	12

Q40/15. NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2022	65	67	67	61	0
2023	53	45	61	52	-16
2024	54	54	58	52	-4
2025	58	53	61	58	-8

Q40/16. Saudi Arabia (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	65	65	69	60	-4
2004	50	56	51	45	5
2006	54	62	47	53	15
2025	52	61	50	48	11

Summary of Q40 – 2025 data only

Q40. Long-term military bases in the following places (% should have)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Q40/1. Japan	60	65	58	59	7
Q40/3. South Korea	67	74	65	65	9
Q40/6. Germany	61	66	59	59	7
Q40/7. Turkey	48	54	47	46	7
Q40/8. Australia	48	52	45	48	7
Q40/10. Poland	54	56	53	54	3
Q40/12. The Philippines	56	64	52	55	12
Q40/15. NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia	58	53	61	58	-8
Q40/16. Saudi Arabia	52	61	50	48	11

Appendix Table 5

Q30. There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops:

Q30/1. If North Korea invaded South Korea (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1990	44	53	40	43	13
1994	39	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	30	33	28	33	5
2002	36	50	31	37	19
2004	43	49	43	39	6
2006	45	55	42	41	13
2008	41	51	32	45	19
2010	40	47	38	36	9
2012	41	51	40	36	11
2014	47	53	44	46	9
2015	47	53	50	42	3
2017	62	70	59	61	11
2018	64	70	63	61	7
2019	58	63	57	56	6
2020	58	57	58	58	-1
March 2021	53	57	51	53	6
2021	63	68	61	62	7
2022	55	54	58	53	-4
2023	50	46	57	48	-11
2024	51	52	54	49	-2
2025	52	58	50	50	8

Q30/2. If China invaded Taiwan (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1982	19	25	17	17	8
1986	19	22	18	18	4
1998	27	30	24	30	6
2002	31	39	24	32	14
2004	33	40	30	31	10
2006	32	39	31	29	8
2008	32	36	27	34	10
2010	25	34	21	21	13
2012	28	35	26	23	9
2013	23	26	19	25	7
2014	26	25	24	29	1
2015	28	28	29	28	1
2018	35	39	36	33	4
2019	38	42	38	35	4
2020	41	43	40	40	3
March 2021	42	47	37	42	10
July 2021	52	60	50	49	10
2022	44	44	46	42	-2
2024	43	45	44	40	1
2025	41	47	39	38	8

Q30/13. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	44	50	41	43	9
2015	45	45	51	40	-6
2017	52	54	52	51	2
2018	54	52	61	50	-9
2019	54	56	56	51	0
2020	52	47	56	52	-9
March 2021	44	44	44	44	0
July 2021	59	57	63	58	-6
March 2022	56	48	62	58	-14
2023	57	48	68	55	-20
2024	54	50	62	50	-12
2025	55	52	60	54	-8

Q30/39. If the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1982	64	75	59	66	16
1986	68	76	62	71	14
1990	58	64	55	58	9

Q30/13P. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Poland (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	62	64	65	59	-1

Q30/13G. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Germany (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2023	64	64	69	60	-5
2024	65	66	68	61	-2

Q30/21. To stop immigrants coming into the US from Mexico (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2019	49	82	21	50	61
2023	47	79	23	44	56
2024	53	84	30	50	54
2025	44	83	16	40	67

Q30/8. If Israel were attacked by its neighbors (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2010	47	60	41	41	19
2012	49	64	44	42	20
2014	45	52	41	44	11
2015	53	67	49	46	18
2018	53	69	45	50	24
2021	53	72	41	49	31
2024	41	55	35	35	20

Q30/3. To be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	65	65	75	64	-10
2004	52	49	56	50	-7
2006	51	45	55	53	-10
2008	52	48	60	49	-12
2010	49	47	56	45	-9
2012	50	51	55	45	-4
2014	50	46	59	41	-13
2019	59	61	64	52	-3
2024	54	48	62	51	-14

Q30/27A. To invade Greenland and make it part of the United States (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	7	14	5	3	9

Q30/27B. To invade Canada and make it part of the United States (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	6	8	4	7	4

Summary of Q30 – 2025 data only

Q30. Use of US troops (% favor)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Q30/1. If North Korea invaded South Korea	52	58	50	50	8
Q30/2. If China invaded Taiwan	41	47	39	38	8
Q30/13. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia	55	52	60	54	-8
Q30/13G. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Poland	62	64	65	59	-1
Q30/21. To stop immigrants from coming into the US from Mexico	44	83	16	40	67
Q30/27A. To invade Greenland and make it part of the United States	7	14	5	3	9
Q30/27B. To invade Canada and make it part of the United States	6	8	4	7	4

Q30. Use of US troops (% oppose)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Q30/1. If North Korea invaded South Korea	46	42	48	47	-6
Q30/2. If China invaded Taiwan	57	52	59	59	-7
Q30/13. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia	43	46	39	44	7
Q30/13G. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Poland	36	34	34	38	0
Q30/21. To stop immigrants from coming into the US from Mexico	55	16	83	59	-67
Q30/27A. To invade Greenland and make it part of the United States	92	85	94	95	-9
Q30/27B. To invade Canada and make it part of the United States	93	92	95	92	-3

Appendix Table 6

Q36. How confident are you that if the United States is attacked, our [SPLIT: European/Asian] allies will come to our defense?

Q36/A. European allies (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Very confident	17	14	21	15	-7
Somewhat confident	45	46	48	42	-2
Not very confident	31	33	26	33	7
Not at all confident	7	7	4	10	3

Q36/B. Asian allies (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Very confident	10	8	15	8	-7
Somewhat confident	41	41	39	41	2
Not very confident	37	40	38	35	2
Not at all confident	11	10	7	13	3

Appendix Table 7

Q7. Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one, please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all:

Q7/1. Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	28	32	29	32	3
1978	34	33	39	32	-6
1982	34	36	35	34	1
1986	32	39	30	31	9
1990	32	57	57	56	0
1994	24	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	32	24	37	33	-13
2002	41	40	42	44	-2
2004	18	18	16	19	2
2006	22	26	22	18	4
2008	24	26	27	21	-1
2010	24	24	28	22	-4
2014	25	24	30	20	-6
2018	31	24	42	25	-18
2021	32	26	40	30	-14
2024	32	20	44	30	-24
August 2025	28	18	42	27	-24

Q7/2. Strengthening the United Nations (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	44	42	46	44	-2
1978	48	48	53	44	-5
1982	48	44	51	48	-7
1986	46	46	49	45	-3
1990	44	42	48	44	-6
1994	49	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	46	39	49	47	-10
2002	58	45	69	61	-24
2004	38	25	50	34	-25
2006	40	29	50	40	-21
2008	39	24	52	39	-28
2010	36	27	51	30	-24
2012	35	28	46	29	-18
2014	37	27	50	31	-27
2018	43	29	61	34	-32
2024	40	27	57	36	-30
August 2025	39	29	62	34	-33

Q7/5. Protecting the jobs of American workers (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	74	73	78	72	-5
1978	78	78	78	78	0
1982	77	80	81	72	-1
1986	78	75	80	77	-5
1990	65	69	63	67	6
1994	82	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	80	82	82	77	0
2002	85	79	87	88	-8
2004	78	80	81	75	-1
2006	76	81	80	68	1
2008	80	78	86	77	-8
2010	79	78	82	77	-4
2012	83	84	84	82	0
2014	76	76	79	73	-3
2015	73	82	73	67	9
2016	73	78	74	69	4
2017	73	79	70	73	9
2018	69	79	65	67	14
2021	79	89	72	76	17
2024	79	89	74	75	15
August 2025	73	84	68	72	16

Q7/10. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1994	81	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	82	84	79	85	5
2002	91	86	93	92	-7
2004	73	74	72	72	2
2006	74	80	79	65	1
2008	73	80	74	66	6
2010	73	76	77	68	-1
2012	72	76	75	69	1
2014	73	67	78	71	-11
2015	72	78	73	66	5
2016	67	68	71	62	-2
2017	75	77	78	71	-1
2018	72	74	76	66	-2
2021	75	76	77	71	-1
2024	75	76	83	67	-7
August 2025	67	74	74	61	0

Q7/4a. Maintaining superior military power worldwide (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1998	59	63	57	59	6
2002	69	79	63	66	16
2004	50	68	45	45	23
2006	55	72	48	47	24
2008	57	76	49	48	27
2010	56	69	50	51	19
2012	53	68	48	46	20
2014	52	64	41	54	23
2015	55	69	48	51	21
2016	55	71	50	49	21
2017	56	74	49	50	25
2018	51	70	41	47	29
2021	49	74	41	39	33
April 2024	50	74	41	43	33
August 2025	48	71	32	44	39

Q7/25. Limiting China's influence around the world (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2021	50	67	39	46	28
April 2024	44	61	39	37	22
August 2025	39	58	31	33	27

Q7/19. Defending our allies' security (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	32	34	33	31	1
1978	50	57	49	49	8
1982	50	57	49	49	8
1986	56	65	50	56	15
1990	61	61	61	64	0
1998	44	42	43	44	-1
2002	58	62	58	55	4
2014	38	38	37	37	1
2015	38	43	38	34	5
2016	35	36	37	33	-1
2017	39	36	45	35	-9
2018	43	38	53	36	-15
April 2024	39	39	46	36	-7
August 2025	39	33	52	39	-19

Q7/9a. Limiting climate change (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2008	42	23	58	44	-35
2010	35	16	50	35	-34
2012	33	15	44	33	-29
2014	41	22	54	40	-32
2015	38	17	58	36	-41
2016	40	19	59	37	-40
2021	54	23	77	55	-54
2024	46	14	74	45	-60
August 2025	46	17	82	48	-65

Q7/12. Combating world hunger (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	61	60	60	61	0
1978	59	56	62	62	-6
1982	58	54	61	57	-7
1986	63	61	63	64	-2
1998	62	53	67	62	-14
2002	61	51	68	62	-17
2004	43	36	48	42	-12
2006	48	37	59	46	-22
2008	46	35	60	45	-25
2010	42	33	56	39	-23
2012	42	31	54	40	-23
2014	42	25	57	38	-32
2015	42	27	55	41	-28
2016	42	27	56	37	-29
2017	40	21	57	35	-36
2021	50	37	62	48	-25
August 2025	46	28	68	46	-40

Q7/30a. [SPLIT] Developing sources of renewable energy (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
August 2025	53	29	78	58	-49

Q7/30b. [SPLIT] Reducing US dependence on fossil fuels (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
August 2025	43	24	66	48	-42

Summary of Q7 – August 2025 data only

Q7. United States foreign policy goals (% very important goal)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Q7/1. Protecting weaker nations from foreign aggression	28	18	42	27	-26
Q7/2. Strengthening the United Nations	39	29	62	34	-33
Q7/5. Protecting the jobs of American workers	73	84	68	72	16
Q7/10. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons	67	74	74	61	0
Q7/4a. Maintaining	48	71	32	44	39

superior military power worldwide					
Q7/25. Limiting China's influence around the world	39	58	31	33	27
Q7/19. Defending our allies' security	39	33	52	39	-19
Q7/9a. Limiting climate change	46	17	82	48	-65
Q7/12. Combating world hunger	46	28	68	46	-40
[SPLIT] Q7/30a. Developing sources of renewable energy	53	29	78	58	-49
[SPLIT] Q7/30b. Reducing US dependence on fossil fuels	43	24	66	48	-42

Appendix Table 8

Q5. Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.

Q5/6a. Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S. (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1998	55	56	58	51	-2
2002	60	58	62	57	-4
2004	52	62	49	50	13
2006	51	63	46	44	17
2008	51	63	46	44	17
2010	51	62	41	51	21
2012	40	55	30	40	25
2014	39	55	21	42	34
2015	44	63	29	46	34
2016	43	67	27	40	40
2017	37	62	21	35	41
2018	39	66	20	37	46
2019	43	78	19	42	59
2020	32	61	13	26	48
August 2021	42	74	22	38	52
March 2022	34	68	12	29	56
2022	39	70	18	37	52
2023	42	72	18	39	54
2024	50	83	27	45	56
August 2024 (FP6)	45	78	22	42	56
2025	36	68	14	32	54

Q5/8a. Climate change (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2008	39	19	58	40	-39
2010	34	16	50	34	-34
2012	32	15	44	33	-29
2014	35	12	51	35	-39
2015	40	17	58	38	-41
2016	39	18	57	35	-39
2017	46	15	67	47	-52
2019	54	23	78	54	-55
January 2020	51	19	77	51	-58
2020	50	21	75	48	-54
March 2021	54	17	80	56	-63
August 2021	53	18	81	53	-63
March 2022	48	15	73	51	-58
2022	54	20	81	54	-61
2023	52	16	82	51	-66
2024	47	17	72	48	-55
August 2024 (FP6)	49	20	77	50	-57
2025	49	14	77	50	-63

Q5/10. International Terrorism (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1998	84	88	83	84	5
2002	91	90	94	88	4
2004	75	88	71	71	17
2006	74	85	76	64	9
2008	69	82	67	61	15
2010	73	81	72	68	9
2012	67	77	65	61	12
2014	63	66	61	61	5
2015	69	75	68	64	7
2016	75	83	74	71	9
2017	75	82	73	71	9
2018	66	74	61	64	13
2019	69	76	67	66	9
2020	54	62	51	50	11
August 2021	63	77	61	55	16
2022	58	60	59	55	1
2023	52	59	50	47	9
2024	53	65	51	43	14
2025	55	68	52	48	16

Q5/29. North Korea's nuclear program (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	55	58	53	56	5
2016	60	63	64	52	-1
2017	75	80	76	70	4
2018	59	61	62	53	-1
2019	61	67	62	55	5
January 2020	52	57	58	41	-1
2020	51	53	54	47	-1
March 2021	59	65	61	53	4
2022	52	57	55	45	2
2023	52	57	53	48	4
2024	52	59	53	45	6
2025	49	55	49	45	6

Q5/15. Iran's nuclear program (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2010	68	76	65	65	11
2012	64	75	60	58	15
2014	58	66	59	51	7
2015	57	70	54	49	16
2018	52	59	50	48	9
2019	57	70	52	51	18
January 2020	61	73	62	51	11
2020	49	54	46	48	8
March 2021	57	67	54	54	13
2022	53	65	52	47	13
2023	49	56	45	46	11
2024	53	62	52	45	10
2025	51	64	45	45	19

Q5/28b. A global economic downturn (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2020	55	53	61	50	-8
March 2022	56	63	57	50	6
2022	55	56	57	53	-1
2023	54	59	55	50	4
2025	49	35	61	49	-26

Q5/20. Lack of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	26	29	27	22	2
2024	31	27	39	26	-12
2025	33	25	41	31	-16

Q5/38b. Weakening democracy in the United States (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2023	69	73	73	65	0
2024	67	62	75	64	-13
2025	65	49	82	63	-33

Q5/33. The military power of Russia (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1990	33	32	34	33	-2
1994	32	na	na	na	na
1998	34	31	41	29	-10
2002	23	20	27	22	-7
2017	41	32	50	39	-18
2019	43	44	50	36	-6
2020	41	39	51	31	-12
March 2022	54	54	63	49	-9
2023	46	47	51	41	-4
2025	44	41	51	38	-10

Q5/21. Russia's territorial ambitions (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	38	48	35	34	13
2015	32	39	28	30	11
2016	30	32	31	29	1
March 2022	67	66	73	64	-7
2022	60	56	68	56	-12
2024	50	48	60	42	-12

Q5/3. The development of China as a world power (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1990	40	37	43	40	-6
1994	57	-	-	-	-
1998	57	63	57	56	6
2002	56	58	55	59	3
2004	33	45	29	32	16
2006	36	40	36	33	4
2008	40	45	48	39	-3
2010	43	46	40	42	6
2012	40	44	38	39	6
2014	41	46	39	38	7
2017	37	41	36	35	5
2018	39	42	40	35	2
2019	42	54	36	40	18
January 2020	38	41	37	37	4
2020	55	67	47	53	20
March 2022	57	75	46	55	29
2023	58	71	52	53	19
2025	50	66	44	44	22

Q5/46. US government corruption (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	73	61	82	74	-21

Q5/47. Technological advancements in warfare (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2025	51	52	52	50	0

Summary of Q5 – 2025 data only

Q5. Potential Threats to the United States (% critical threat)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Q5/6a. Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the US	36	68	14	32	54
Q5/8a. Climate change	49	14	77	50	-63
Q5/10. International terrorism	55	68	52	48	16
Q5/29. North Korea's nuclear program	49	55	49	45	6
Q5/15. Iran's nuclear program	51	64	45	45	19
Q5/28b. A global economic downturn	49	35	61	49	-26
Q5/20. Lack of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians	33	25	41	31	-16

Q5/38b. Weakening democracy in the United States	65	49	82	63	-33
Q5/33. The military power of Russia	44	41	51	38	-10
Q5/3. The development of China as a world power	50	66	44	44	22
Q5/46. US government corruption	73	61	82	74	-21
Q5/47. Technological advancements in warfare	51	52	52	50	0

Appendix Table 9

Q145B. Please select whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: When dealing with international problems, the US should be more willing to make decisions with US allies, even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.

Q145B. With US allies even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. (% agree)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2018	64	42	80	66	-38
2019	65	44	84	66	-40
2020	62	37	84	63	-47
2024	58	46	71	58	-25
2025	60	38	79	60	-41

Summary of Q145B – 2025 FP4 Data Only

Q145B. With US allies even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Agree	60	38	79	60	-41
Disagree	37	60	19	37	41

Appendix Table 10

Q145. Please select whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: When dealing with international problems, the US should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations, even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.

Q145. Within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. (% agree)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2004	66	49	75	68	-26
2006	60	46	69	63	-20
2008	52	32	67	56	-35
2010	50	35	60	53	-25
2012	56	43	66	57	-23
2014	59	45	74	54	-29
2018	64	42	80	66	-38
2019	65	44	84	66	-40
2020	62	37	84	63	-47
2024	57	41	70	56	-29
2025	66	44	83	68	-39

Summary of Q145 – 2025 data only

Q145. Within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Agree	66	44	83	68	-39
Disagree	33	55	16	31	39

Appendix Table 11

Q189B. Which of the following comes closest to your view on trade between the U.S. and other countries. Does it:

Mostly benefit the U.S. (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	7	6	9	6	-3
2019	12	12	13	11	-1
2024	9	7	11	11	-4
2025	15	13	17	14	-4
Mostly benefit other countries (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	34	47	22	37	25
2019	21	32	9	24	23
2024	64	55	70	65	-15
2025	16	28	8	15	20
Benefit both the US and other countries (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2017	50	40	62	46	-22
2019	63	54	74	59	-20
2024	63	56	69	61	-13
2025	63	56	69	61	-13
Benefit neither (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap

2017	6	4	5	8	-1
2019	3	1	3	5	-2
2024	4	2	4	7	-2
2025	4	1	4	5	-3

Summary of Q189B – 2025 data only

Q189B. Views on international trade: (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
Mostly benefit the U.S.	15	13	17	14	-4
Mostly benefit other countries	16	28	8	15	20
Benefit both the U.S. and other countries	64	55	70	65	-15
Benefit neither	4	1	4	5	-3

Methodology

This analysis is primarily based on data from the 2025 Chicago Council Survey of the American public on foreign policy, a project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy.

The 2025 Chicago Council Survey was conducted July 18–30, 2025, by Ipsos using its large-scale, nationwide, online research panel (KnowledgePanel) in English and Spanish among a weighted national sample of 2,148 adults 18 or older living in all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ±2.2 percentage points, including a design effect of 1.07.

Partisan identification is based on how respondents answered a standard partisan self-identification question: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

The 2025 Chicago Council Survey was fielded to a total of 3,663 panel members, yielding a total of 2,294 completed surveys (a completion rate of 62.6%). The median survey length was 24 minutes. Of the 2,294 total competed surveys, 146 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,148.

Cases were excluded if they failed one of the following three criteria:

Speedsters: Respondents who completed the survey in eight minutes or less.

- Total cases removed: n=99

Refused 50 percent or more of questions: Respondents who refused to answer 50 percent or more of the eligible survey questions.

- Total cases removed: n=64; n=41 unique to criteria group

Data Check Score of 3 of 4: Respondents who failed three or four of the quality checks implemented (see criteria below).

- Total cases removed: n=37; n=6 unique to criteria group

1. Completed survey faster than eight minutes.
2. Did not accurately input a "4," refused or skipped Question Q3_1 in the survey, which was designed to make sure respondents were paying attention to the survey. ("In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the below list.").
3. Refused one or more full battery of five attributes or more (Q5, Q8, Q50, Q223A, Q30, Q30G, Q40, Q44, Q121, Q354C, QTW2).

4. Respondents who straight lined their responses to a battery of grid questions (Q8, Q44, Q121, Q354C).

The data for the total sample were weighted to adjust for gender by age, race/ethnicity, education, Census region, metropolitan status, and household income using demographic benchmarks from the 2024 March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The specific categories used were:

- Gender (Male, Female) by Age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59 and 60+)
- Race/Hispanic Ethnicity (White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, Other Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, 2+ Races Non-Hispanic)
- Education (Less than High School, High School, Some College, Bachelor or Higher)
- Census Region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Metropolitan Status (Metro, Non-Metro)
- Household Income (Under $25,000, $25,000–$49,999, $50,000–$74,999, $75,000–$99,999, $100,000–$149,999, $150,000+)

The 2025 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the Crown family and the Korea Foundation.

About the 2025 Chicago Council Survey Sample



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Americans Support Free Trade Agreements but Deeply Divided on Tariffs, Sam Dong and Karl Friedhoff. December 1, 2025.

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Americans Divided on Future US Role in Post-War Ukraine, Lama El Baz and Dina Smeltz. March 20, 2025.

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