Pivot to Europe: US Public Opinion in a Time of War

Results of the 2022 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy

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
Executive Summary

Russia's invasion of Ukraine sent shockwaves around the world. The crisis put European security at risk, gave rise to an exodus of refugees, and stressed a global economy still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. While Americans are far removed from the physical struggle on the ground, they have felt the reverberations of the war in their own lives through increased food prices, supply chain disruptions, and higher costs at the gas pump.

The war in Ukraine has also affected Americans' view of the world today. Despite the economic pinch they have endured during this crisis, Americans think helping Ukraine in its struggle against Russia is worth the sacrifice. And somewhat surprisingly given the polarization in the United States today, this commitment is embraced by supporters of both major political parties. On some of the most significant foreign policy issues of the day—the threats facing the country, how the United States should respond to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the US military presence in Europe and Asia—Americans across party lines are in agreement, albeit often for different reasons.


Broad Agreement on European Security Focus

The invasion has refocused public attention on Europe, with Americans across the political spectrum now saying Europe is the most important region of the world for the security of the United States (50%). This represents a notable shift from past surveys, when their security concerns focused squarely on the Middle East. Americans' commitment to NATO and support for US military bases in Europe are now at their highest levels in nearly 50 years of polling by the Chicago Council (Figure A). In addition, majorities support the accession of new NATO members Sweden (76%) and Finland (76%) and would also support the accession of Ukraine (73%) and Georgia (67%).



Enduring Support for Assisting Ukraine

Despite the high price tag associated with US assistance to Ukraine, solid majorities of the American public remain supportive of US economic assistance (71%) and military transfers (72%) to Ukraine (Figure B). Indeed, 58 percent are willing to continue to support the country "as long as it takes", even if American households will have to pay higher prices for gas and food. While a majority remain opposed to sending US troops to fight on Ukrainian soil, a substantial minority of Americans (38%) would support it despite repeated pledges from President Joe Biden and NATO leaders that they will not send their troops into combat in Ukraine.



The Public Views Russia's Invasion as Setting a Precedent

While Americans say Europe is currently the most important region for US security, they see the potential for other countries to emulate Russia and provoke additional conflicts elsewhere. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (64%) expect that other countries will follow Russia's example of launching wars for territorial conquest, and three in four (76%) believe China will view Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a precedent, encouraging it to invade Taiwan.



3 in 4 Americans


believe China will view Russia's invasion of Ukraine as precedent to invade Taiwan

If Beijing Invades, Americans Want to Help Taiwan

If Beijing were to invade Taiwan, Americans favor assisting Taipei along the lines of the country's current assistance for Ukraine (Figure C). Majorities say if China were to invade Taiwan, they would support imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions against China (76%), sending additional arms and military equipment to Taiwan (65%), and even using the US Navy to prevent China from imposing a blockade around Taiwan (62%). Four in 10 (40%) say they would support putting US boots on the ground to help Taiwan defend itself.

Figure C: US Reactions to an Invasion of Taiwan


If China were to invade Taiwan, would you support or oppose the United States: (% support)




Partisan Agreement Does Not Extend to Foreign Policy Priorities

Despite the bipartisan agreement on how the United States should address the war in Ukraine and the threat to Taiwan, there remain stark partisan differences over foreign policy more generally. As in past surveys, Republicans favor a more unilateral and security-first approach to foreign policy and are wary about engaging abroad for reasons other than American security or economic interests. It might follow, then, that Republican support for maintaining an active part in world affairs, at 55 percent, is now at the lowest in the history of the Chicago Council Survey (Figure D). Democrats, on the other hand, tend to think internationally coordinated solutions to global problems should be the main focus of US foreign policy. In line with this mindset, 68 percent of Democrats support an active US role in world affairs. While still much higher than among Republicans, Democrats' support for an active role has also declined from its peak of 78 percent two years ago to 68 percent now. As a result, overall support for an active US role in world affairs has declined to 60 percent among all Americans—the lowest since 2014.

These partisan differences are even starker when it comes to views of the primary purpose of US policy abroad and the most effective ways to achieve America's goals.



Republicans emphasize the physical security of the country and the use of military power to deter and respond to threats (Figure E). When asked about the most important priority in making foreign policy, nearly half answer that it is to ensure the physical defense of our country (48%), with the need to seek economic gains for the United States in global trade coming in second (23%). To achieve those goals, Republicans say the most effective approaches are maintaining military superiority (66% very effective) and maintaining economic superiority (56% very effective).



Democrats take a broader view of US security and the US role in leading multilateral efforts to address these issues. They are most likely to say the top priority of US foreign policy should be leading international cooperation on global problems (34%) or protecting democratic values in the world (23%). And to achieve those goals, Democrats say the most effective foreign policy approaches are maintaining existing alliances (62% very effective) and participating in international organizations (48% very effective).

Conclusion

Rather than further dividing the West, Russia's invasion of Ukraine had the unintended consequence of uniting NATO members in assisting Kyiv financially and with military transfers, accepting Finnish and Swedish applications to join NATO, and shoring up the US public commitment to European security. Americans across party lines tend to agree on some of the most significant foreign policy issues of the day, including the US response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the possibility of a potential invasion of Taiwan, and the US military presence in Europe and Asia.

Across the political spectrum, Americans agree Europe is now the most important region for US security, and they support expanding NATO and defending member countries. Even though Republicans and Democrats may have different reasons for doing so, majorities in both camps support US bases in Europe and agree on specific US policies toward Russia.

Taken together, these findings suggest that policies dealing with traditional security issues can appeal to Republicans and Democrats alike if the issue or policy taps into the underlying foreign policy framework of each side.


Americans Pivot to Europe

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a geopolitical earthquake. Americans—Republicans and Democrats alike—are broadly concerned about the aftershocks of that invasion. They are also aligned on how the United States should respond, expressing clear preferences for maintaining and enlarging US alliances, maintaining the US military presence abroad, defending treaty allies if they come under attack, giving significant economic and military assistance to Ukraine, and doing the same for Taiwan if necessary.

Since Russia launched its assault on Ukraine, the United States and its allies have worked to bolster Ukraine and punish Russia. The largest area of cooperation between the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia has been on the economic front. They have levied a range of unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia with the aim of limiting Russia's ability to pay for the war, imposing costs on Russian policymakers and elites, and inflicting damage on the Russian economy. The United States has also taken the lead in providing arms and military supplies to bolster Ukraine's ability to defend itself against a larger Russian military force, with support from many European and Asian allies.

The war in Ukraine threatens the peace and stability of a region that many Americans see as critical for US security and economic growth. Today, half of Americans (50%) see Europe as the most important region of the world for the military security of the United States (Figure 1). It was not always so. In Council polling conducted in January 2020, few Americans (15%) saw Europe as most important to US security interests. Instead, most (61%) focused on the Middle East, just as US foreign policy had done for the prior two decades.


Many Americans (34%) also see Europe as the most critical region for US economic growth, though more Americans look to Asia (41%).



Increased Support for US Military Presence and Bases


With American attention focused on Europe, the public wants to maintain the US military presence in the region (65%), and support for US bases in allied European nations is on the rise (Figure 2).

More than two-thirds of Americans (68%) think the United States should have long-term military bases in Germany, a level not seen since 2002 and up 17 percentage points from 2012 (51%). And the most recent results show a dramatic reversal of American opinion on maintaining long-term military bases in Poland: support is now at 62 percent, up from 37 percent in 2014. Two-thirds also support long-term bases in NATO allies such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (65%), each of which shares a border with Russia. Finally, an increasing number of Americans favor maintaining bases in Turkey (56%, up from 40% in 2012).



NATO: More Popular Than Ever


Even during Donald Trump's presidency, congressional support for NATO remained bipartisan. Today, the American public is more committed to NATO than ever (Figure 3). More than six in 10 Americans (62%)—and majorities across party lines—say the United States should maintain its commitment to NATO, while an additional 19 percent want to increase that commitment—the highest number recorded since the Council first asked the question in 1974.



After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden applied to become alliance members. The accession of both countries to NATO was approved by the United States in a 95-1 Senate vote. US public support for admitting new NATO members is similarly high and bipartisan, even when respondents are told NATO members would have to defend these countries against potential future Russian aggression (Figure 4). Three-quarters (76%) of Americans support making both countries NATO members, including very strong majorities of Democrats (81%), Republicans (74%), and Independents (73%). Large majorities of Americans also support NATO membership for Ukraine (73%) and Georgia (67%).

Figure 4: NATO Expansion

Would you favor or oppose the expansion of NATO to include each of the following countries even if it means NATO members would have to defend them from potential Russian aggression in the future? (% favor)




In addition to showing high levels of support for admitting new members to NATO, solid majorities of Americans are also willing to commit US troops to defend European NATO allies. A record-high 61 percent support sending US troops to defend the NATO Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, should Russia invade (Figure 5). This is the highest level of support seen in Council surveys since the question was first asked in 2014 and a high among all partisan groups (67% of Democrats and 59% of Republicans and Independents).

Figure 5: Use of US Troops Abroad There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% favor) If North Korea Invades South Korea If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia If China invaded Taiwan •To help Ukraine defend itself against the Russian invasion 44 44 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2018 2019 1990 Mar-21 Jul-21 Aar-22 Jul-22 July 15 - August 1 , 2022 | n = 3,106 **CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS**

Support for Ukraine Remains Steady


Public support for Ukraine goes beyond favoring the country's inclusion in NATO. Americans are willing to incur genuine costs to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and this willingness is holding strong (Figure 6). Over half of Americans are willing to support Ukraine for "as long as it takes," even if this means American households will face higher food and gas prices (58%).



6 in 10 Americans


are willing to support Ukraine "as long as it takes," even if that means higher prices at home

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, bipartisan majorities of Americans support increasing sanctions against Russia (80%), accepting Ukrainian refugees (76%), sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government (72%), and providing economic assistance to the country (71%). This support has proved to be quite durable. Despite the impact of inflation and fears of an impending recession in the United States, American support for helping Ukraine financially and with military equipment has not shifted much since March (when 78% supported economic assistance and 79% supported sending military supplies). And while most remain opposed to sending US troops, there has been no drop-off in support among a substantial minority of Americans (38%) for sending US troops to Ukraine.



Americans Anticipate a More Unstable World as a Consequence of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

While Americans say their primary security focus right now is Europe, they see the potential for additional conflicts elsewhere. Two-thirds of Americans (67%) say it is likely that Russia's invasion of Ukraine will establish the precedent that national borders are not fixed and can be changed using military force (Figure 7). A similar proportion (64%) consider it likely that other countries will follow Russia's example of launching wars of territorial conquest. And three in four Americans (76%) believe China will view Russia's invasion of Ukraine as setting a precedent, encouraging it to invade Taiwan. The American public views this type of expansionism as unacceptable, with more than eight in 10 (82%) disagreeing with the idea that it is sometimes acceptable for one country to invade another if it has historical claims on the territory.




Asia: Rising Support for US Bases in an Economically Vital Region

Whether to prevent additional wars of territorial conquest including a potential conflict over Taiwan—or to protect US trade interests in an economically vital region, the American public supports a strong US presence in Asia. Two-thirds of Americans (64%) want to maintain the US military presence in Asia-Pacific, and public backing for specific American military bases in Asia has also increased (Figure 8).


More than seven in 10 Americans (72%) support long-term US bases in South Korea, close to the all-time high of 74 percent seen in 2018 at the height of the Trump-Kim nuclear crisis. For American bases in Japan, meanwhile, support is also at a record high (67%), up 18 percentage points from the low of 49 percent in 2010.

Support for US bases in Australia is also at its highest point: 56 percent, which is up 16 percentage points from the first time the Council asked about US bases in the country in 2012. And Americans do not consider those bases as being simply for show. As with allies in Europe, Americans are willing to commit US troops to defend South Korea if it is invaded by North Korea (55%).



Support for Taiwan—But Not With Troops

The war in Ukraine has reminded Americans that Russian and Chinese rhetoric of reclaiming territory can easily become more than just talk. Americans seem realistic about Russia and China's sway in their own regions: six in 10 Americans (60%) agree the United States must learn to live with strong Chinese and Russian influence in their respective regions, even if this displaces US influence. At the same time, Americans say they would not stand idly by if China were to invade Taiwan. In response to a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Americans across party lines support measures designed to aid Taiwan and punish China (Figure 9). These include imposing sanctions on China (76%), accepting Taiwanese refugees (67%), sending military supplies to the Taiwanese government (65%), and even using the US Navy to prevent China from blockading the island (62%). While a majority draw the line at sending American soldiers into combat against China on behalf of Taiwan, a sizable minority support sending US troops (40%).




Great Power Competition: Maintaining the Status Quo

How the United States chooses to counter Russia and China will play a key role in shaping global politics in the coming years, and bipartisan majorities of Americans say the territorial ambitions of Russia (60%) and China (52%) are critical threats to the United States. While Americans want to hold the line with Russia and China, they are not endorsing a US-led campaign to contain these countries and combat their influence around the world.

Across party lines, only minorities of Americans think the United States should play a "leading role" in coordinating an international response to China's rise (35%) or Russia's invasion of Ukraine (30%), instead preferring to see the country play a supporting role in these international efforts (53% for China's rise and 55% for Russia's invasion of Ukraine) (Figure 10). When assessing the broad range of objectives that fall under the umbrella of US foreign policy, fewer than one in 10 Americans (9%) view constraining potential aggressors in the world as a top priority.


In the cases of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Americans support a range of policy responses, but majorities draw the line at sending American soldiers into combat against China and Russia. This aligns with broader current American views on policy toward Russia and China, which support pushing back against these countries—particularly when they threaten democracies in their neighborhoods—but not in a way that involves direct military conflict.



Support for an Active US Role Abroad, But Lower Than Last Year


The American public overall (60%) and majorities of Democrats (68%), Republicans (55%), and Independents (55%) continue to say it is better for the United States to take an active part in world affairs (Figure 11). However, these percentages are lower for Americans of all political stripes than they have been in recent years. From a chaotic end to the war in Afghanistan to worries about nuclear confrontation to mounting domestic challenges, several reasons could explain why support for playing an active part in world affairs is at its lowest point since 2014.

In an open-ended follow-up to this question, many Americans attempted to explain their perspective between the two options. For example, one respondent who answered "stay out" noted, "We need to meet our own needs before attempts to assist others. You cannot pour from an empty cup." Another made the case that the United States should only provide international assistance if "a country specifically asks for help." Among many Americans in the "stay out" camp, the argument was not that the country needs to focus its resources and attention only on itself but that this needs to be the higher priority.



While support for active engagement is down, majorities across the board still prefer active US international participation. Among those who support an active global role for the United States, many believe the world is interconnected and that no country can be isolated from its problems or uninvolved in helping to find solutions. As one respondent put it, "We do not live in a bubble. All of humanity is connected. What we and others do matters."

Of course, taking an active role in world affairs is not without costs. There are reputational, economic, and security considerations that come with US engagement abroad. A majority of Americans (56%) say the benefits of maintaining the United States' role in the world outweigh the costs, with Democrats most decisively taking this position (Figure 12).




Despite Policy Consensus, Outlooks on Focus of US Foreign Policy Remain Partisan

As the preceding results show, there is a large degree of consensus that can help form the basis of bipartisan policy on core security issues. This agreement is most notable when it comes to policy toward Europe and Asia, given the existing threats from China and Russia and the presence of America's most important allies. Beyond this core consensus, however, stark partisan differences remain, both in how partisans see the world and in how they would deal with it most effectively.

Republicans Focus on Physical Defense of Country and Economic Gains

Throughout the 2022 Council Survey, Republicans take a securityfirst stance, focusing on more traditional aspects of what it means to keep the country safe, while Democrats take a broader approach. For example, when asked about the most important priority in making foreign policy, a plurality of Republicans (48%) say it is to ensure the physical defense of the country (Figure 13). The nexthighest priority (though at a distant 23%) is to seek economic gains for the United States in global trade. Few Republicans view promoting democratic values around the world (10%) or leading international cooperation on global problems (9%) as the most important priority for America.



These Republican priorities align with their preferred approaches to achieving them. Two-thirds (66%) say maintaining US military superiority is very effective in achieving US foreign policy goals, and a further 56 percent say maintaining US economic superiority is very effective. And while half of Republicans (50%) say maintaining existing alliances is a very effective approach for US policy, few (16%) say the same about participating in international organizations. Some of the Republican preference for working autonomously may be rooted in a view that the country is strong enough to act without assistance from others: in the 2022 Chicago Council Survey, Republicans are much more likely to say "the United States is rich and powerful enough to go it alone" (51% of Republicans versus 32% of Democrats and 38% of Independents). Finally, Republicans are more likely to see the United States as an exceptional country. This core belief comes through clearly in the rhetoric of Republican leaders, including former president Donald Trump. In his farewell address, Trump claimed Americans are "united by a common conviction that America is the greatest nation in all of history" and that this exceptional status is a "precious inheritance." And these sentiments are shared by a large majority of Republican public. Consistent with Chicago Council polls over the past decade, most Republicans think the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world (77%).


Democrats Focus on Leading International Cooperation and Protecting Democratic Ideals

The Biden administration has given prominent attention to shared challenges facing the world and working with others as the best way to confront them. In just the third sentence of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, Biden writes, "We will only succeed in advancing American interests and upholding our universal values by working in common cause with our closest allies and partners." The Democratic public has a similar view, focusing on broader security challenges and the approaches that go along with them. Democrats view the primary challenges facing the world as those that transcend state borders, and they believe multilateral approaches are the best way to address those challenges (Figure 14). According to Democrats, leading international cooperation on global problems (34%) is the most important foreign policy priority, followed by protecting democratic ideals and values in the world (23%). And to pursue those priorities, Democrats want to work with other countries in a leading (rather than a supporting) role on climate change (73%), promoting human rights and democracy around the world (61%), and a range of humanitarian initiatives such as combatting world hunger (50%) and sending COVID-19 vaccines to other countries in need (51%). In Democrats' eyes, the two most effective foreign policy approaches for the United States are maintaining existing alliances (62% very effective) and participating in international organizations (48% very effective).

Democrats' inclination toward collective action rests upon the idea that the United States benefits from—and needs—the support of other countries to achieve its goals. Most Democrats reject the idea that the United States is rich and powerful enough to go it alone in the world (68%), while Republicans are divided on the idea (51% say it is; 48% say it is not). And unlike Republicans, who overwhelmingly believe the United States is the greatest country in the world, a majority of Democrats reject the idea that the United States is uniquely exceptional, instead saying the country is "no greater than other nations" (55%).

Figure 14: Foreign Policy Approaches

How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States – very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all? (% very effective)



Conclusion

Republicans are focused on the physical defense of the nation and see projecting US strength through superior military and economic power as the best way to achieve that security. Democrats, on the other hand, are more inclined to view international collaboration and cooperation as the best way to address common problems.

Given these underlying preferences, Republicans are likely to see US military assistance to Kyiv and Taipei as an extension of US influence and power. Democrats are more likely to view US assistance to Ukraine and Taiwan as a cooperative effort aimed at protecting democratic nations under assault.

Taken together, these data show that US policymakers might gain widespread support for their initiatives if they can craft them to appeal to the motivations of both partisans. In the end, whether Americans prefer to project strength or cooperation, they agree the United States has a significant role to play in today's uncertain world.

Methodology

The 2022 Chicago Council Survey, a project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, is the latest effort in a series of wideranging surveys on American attitudes toward US foreign policy. The 2022 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the support of the Crown family and the Korea Foundation.

The survey was conducted from July 15 to August 1, 2022, among a representative national sample of 3,106 adults. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is +/- 1.8 percentage points, including a design effect of 1.2704. The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups or for partial-sample items. Partisan identification is based on respondents' answer to a standard partisan self-identification question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?"

The 2022 survey sample is composed of a main sample (n = 2,133) and several augment samples, which allow for more detailed demographic analysis: a Hispanic augment sample (n = 273), an African American/Black American augment sample (n = 264), an American Indian/Alaskan Native augment sample (n = 109), a Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander augment sample (n = 12), and an Asian American augment sample (n = 315). The results are weighted to account for these oversampled populations.

The survey was conducted in English and Spanish by Ipsos Public Affairs, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of Ipsos' largescale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel[®] (KP). KP is the first and largest online research panel that is representative of the entire US population. Ipsos recruits panel members using addressbased sampling (ABS) methods to ensure full coverage of all households in the nation.

The survey was fielded to a total of 6,350 panel members, yielding a total of 3,253 completed surveys (a completion rate of 51.2 percent). The median survey length was 26 minutes. Of the 3,253 total completed surveys, 147 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 3,106 respondents.

Cases were excluded if they failed met one of the following three criteria:

- Speedsters: Respondents who completed the survey in 8 minutes or less.
 - Total cases removed: n = 79
- Refused 50 percent or more of questions: Respondents who refused to answer 50 percent or more of the eligible survey questions.
 - Total cases removed: n = 84; n = 62 unique to criteria group
- Data check score of three out of four: Respondents who failed three or four of the quality checks implemented (see criteria below).
 - Total cases removed: n = 60; n = 6 unique to criteria group

- 1. Completed survey faster than 8 minutes.
- 2. Did not accurately input a "4" or refused or skipped Question Q3_1 in the survey, which was designed to make sure respondents were paying attention to the survey. ("In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the below list.")
- Refused one or more full battery of 5 attributes or more (Q5, Q808, Q7D, Q8, Q74, Q30, Q40, Q490, Q130, Q45, Q240A, Q250, Q253, QTW2).
- 4. Respondents who straight-lined their responses to a battery of grid questions (Q8, Q130, Q253, Q819).

Sampling and Weighting

In general, the specific survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) sample from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of the US adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due to differential attrition. To ensure that the selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks secured from a combination of the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) and the latest March supplement of the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions. Using the resulting weights as measure of size, a PPS (probability proportional to size) procedure is used to select study-specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces demographically balanced and representative samples that behave

as EPSEM. Moreover, in instances in which a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the CPS benchmarks for the population of interest.

Typically, the geodemographic dimensions used for weighting the entire KnowledgePanel include the following dimensions, with additional nesting of dimensions as well:

- Gender (male, female)
- Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+ years)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (White, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; other, non-Hispanic; two or more races, races, non-Hispanic; Hispanic)
- Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor's degree or higher)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Household income (less than \$10,000; \$10,000 to <\$25,000; \$25,000 to <\$50,000; \$50,000 to <\$75,000; \$75,000 to <\$100,000; \$100,000 to <\$150,000; \$150,000 or more)
- Homeownership status (own rent, or other)
- Household size (1, 2, 3, 4 members or more)
- Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- Hispanic origin (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, other, non-Hispanic)
- Language dominance (non-Hispanic and English-dominant, bilingual, Hispanic and Spanish-dominant) when survey is administered in both English and Spanish

Once the study sample has been selected and the survey administered and all the survey data are edited and made final, design weights are adjusted to account for any differential nonresponse that may have resulted during the field period. Depending on the specific target population for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the ACS, or—in certain instances—from the weighted KP profile data. For this purpose, an iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents. Detailed information on the demographic distributions of the benchmarks can be found in the following appendix.

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (dsmeltz@globalaffairs.org) or Craig Kafura, Assistant Director, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (ckafura@globalaffairs.org).

Appendix: Weighting Benchmark Distributions

Age by Gender	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unv	veighted	CCS Weighted	
		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
18-29 male	10.27	210	6.76	312	10.04
18-29 female	10.03	221	7.12	309	9.94
30-44 male	12.70	363	11.69	396	12.74
30-44 female	12.84	334	10.75	399	12.83
45-59 male	11.58	390	12.56	362	11.64
45-59 female	12.24	375	12.07	384	12.36
60+ male	13.93	595	19.16	434	13.98
60+ female	16.41	618	19.90	511	16.47

18+ US Population Benchmark (March 2021 CPS Supplement Data)

	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unv	veighted	CCS Weighted	
Race/Ethnicity		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
White	62.54	146	48.16	1945	62.64
African American	11.98	470	15.13	370	11.90
Asian	6.11	391	12.59	189	6.09
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	0.29	14	0.45	9	0.30
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.76	123	3.96	22	0.71
Hispanic	16.87	538	17.32	525	16.89
All Other Races	1.44	74	2.38	46	1.47

Region	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unv	veighted	CCS Weighted	
		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Northeast	17.19	549	17.68	535	17.21
Midwest	20.63	578	18.61	641	20.63
South	38.26	1105	35.58	1188	38.25
West	23.92	874	28.14	743	23.91

Metro Status	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unv	veighted	CCS Weighted	
		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Non-Metro	13.34	346	11.14	415	13.35
Metro	86.66	2760	88.86	2691	86.65

Education	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unv	veighted	CCS Weighted	
		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Less than high school	9.60	198	6.37	292	9.40
High school	28.30	680	21.89	879	28.29
Some college	27.08	829	26.69	843	27.14
Bachelor's or higher	35.02	1399	45.04	1092	35.17

Household Income	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unweighted		CCS Weighted	
		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Less than \$25,000	12.82	402	12.94	397	12.77
\$25,000-\$49,999	17.02	494	15.90	527	16.98
\$50,000-\$74,999	16.34	500	16.10	508	16.36
\$75,000-\$99,999	13.16	415	13.36	411	13.23
\$100,000-\$149,999	17.91	593	19.09	558	17.96
\$150,000 or more	22.75	702	22.60	705	22.70

Hispanic Origin	Benchmark (%)	CCS Unv	veighted	CCS Weighted	
		Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Non-Hispanic	83.13	2568	82.68	2581	83.11
Mexican/Mexican- American/Chicano	10.23	308	9.92	318	10.24
Puerto Rican	1.50	54	1.74	46	1.49
Cuban, Cuban-American	0.81	29	0.93	25	0.81
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino	4.33	147	4.73	135	4.34

About the Chicago Council Survey

The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially since 2002, and now annually, is a trusted and widely cited source of longitudinal data on American public opinion about a broad range of US foreign policy and international issues. With its combination of time series and comprehensive coverage, the Chicago Council Survey is a valuable resource to policymakers, academics, media, and the general public because of its unique ability to capture the sense of particular eras—post-Vietnam War, post-Cold War, post-9/11—and to define critical shifts in American public thinking. The Chicago Council Surveys are highly respected and widely used in policy circles and academic research both in the United States and abroad. All of the past Chicago Council Survey data sets are available to the public via the Roper Center and ICPSR, and the 2022 data will soon be available at <u>globalaffairs.org</u>.

In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion and US foreign policy, the Chicago Council's polling has often expanded to international polling in East Asia, Iran, Mexico, and Russia. Besides these comprehensive reports, the Chicago Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion briefs on topical issues such as international trade, immigration, Russia, North Korea's nuclear program, China, and Iran. These short reports can be found on the Council's website and on the Chicago Council Survey blog *Running Numbers*.

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